{
  "id": 2767351,
  "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frankie RAMIREZ, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Ramirez",
  "decision_date": "1972-07-28",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "COWAN, J., concurs.",
      "SUTIN, J., specially concurring."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frankie RAMIREZ, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "OPINION\nWOOD, Chief Judge.\nThe appeal is concerned with instructions on intent under two criminal charges.\nDefendant was charged with aggravated battery. Section 40A-3-5(C), N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl.Vol. 6, Supp.1971). His requested instruction went to his asserted lack of intent to commit aggravated battery because of his intoxication. He claims the trial court erred in refusing the requested instruction.\nThe refused instruction on intent under the aggravated battery charge need not be reviewed. Defendant was not convicted of aggravated battery; he was convicted of the lesser included offense of battery. The instructions pertaining to the intent to commit aggravated battery are simply not pertinent to the battery conviction.\nDefendant was also charged, and convicted, of rape. Section 40A-9-2, N. M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 6). His requested instruction went to his asserted lack of the specified intent to commit rape. He claims this request was improperly refused and the instruction given by the court was erroneous. The instruction given informed the jury that \u201crape requires no specific intent\u201d and that voluntary drunkenness is neither excuse nor justification for the crime of rape. The requested instruction was properly refused because the specific intent to rape is not an element of the crime defined in \u00a7 40A-9-2, supra. The instruction given by the court was correct under State v. Scarborough, 55 N.M. 201, 230 P.2d 235 (1951).\nAffirmed.\nIt is so ordered.\nCOWAN, J., concurs.\nSUTIN, J., specially concurring.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WOOD, Chief Judge."
      },
      {
        "text": "SUTIN, Judge\n(specially concurring).\nThe meaning of \u201cspecific intent\u201d and \u201cgeneral intent\u201d in criminal law should be defined in New Mexico as a guide to its use. Specific intent has not been defined generally.\nIn United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 906 (U.S.D.C.S.D.Calif.1952), Judge Mathes defined specific intent in an instruction to the jury:\nA person who knowingly does an act which the law forbids or who knowingly fails to do an act which the law commands, purposely intending to violate the law or recklessly disregarding the law acts with specific intent.\nWhere specific intent is the gist of the crime, this instruction, if requested, must be given. State v. Gravson, 50 N.M. 147, 172 P.2d 1019 (1946).\nSpecific intent is the gist of the crime when it is made an ingredient of a statutory offense.\nIn Armijo v. People, 157 Colo. 217, 402 P.2d 79 (1965), the defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. The statute contained the words \u201cwith intent.\u201d The court said:\nThe distinction in the field of criminal law between a \u201cgeneral intent\u201d and a \u201cspecific intent\u201d is a well-recognized one and is of long standing. A given crime may consist of an act combined with a general intent or, on the other hand, it may consist of an act combined with a specific intent to commit the act, depending entirely upon the particular statute which defines the offense under consideration. Where the statute defining the crime includes a specific intent as an ingredient of its criminality, such specific intent is essential and must be established with the same certainty as any other material element of the crime. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law \u00a7 32, p. 116.\nThere is no doubt but that in Colorado, as elsewhere, the specific intent to commit bodily injury upon the person of another is a necessary and essential element of the offense known as assault with a deadly weapon. [Emphasis by the court].\nThe use of the words \u201cwith intent\u201d in a statutory offense creates the doctrine of \u201cspecific intent.\u201d Armijo v. People, supra; State v. Schultz, 1 Ohio Misc. 81, 205 N. E.2d 126 (1964); People v. Neal, 40 Cal. App.2d 115, 104 P.2d 555 (1940); People v. Walrath, 279 App.Div. 56, 108 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1951); State v. Healy, 156 Ohio St. 229, 102 N.E.2d 233 (1951).\nFor example, \u201cBattery is the unlawful, intentional touching or application of force to the person of another, when done in a rude, insolent or angry manner.\u201d Section 40A-3-4, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 6). \u201cAggravated Battery consists of the unlawful touching or application of force to the person of another with intent to injure that person or another.\u201d Section 40A-3-5, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 6, Supp.1971). Rape as defined in \u00a7 40A-9-2 omits any reference to \u201cintent.\u201d Therefore, sqecific intent is not an essential ingredient as the majority opinion correctly states. [Emphasis added].\nProof of \u201cspecific intent\u201d should be finalized in New Mexico. State v. Trujillo, 54 N.M. 307, 224 P.2d 151 (1950), says that \u201cThe majority rule seems to be that the specific intent may be presumed from the commission of the prohibited act, .\u201d [Emphasis added]. This does \u25a0not appear to be the general rule. Armijo v. People, supra; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law \u00a7 32. State v. Hatley, 72 N.M. 377, 384 P.2d 252 (1963), says that \u201cthis is inferred as a matter of law.\u201d [Emphasis added]. See People v. Neal, supra. \u201cSpecific intent\u201d must be proved as an independent fact, either by direct or circumstantial evidence. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law \u00a7 32. If there is substantial evidence which directly establishes \u201cspecific intent\u201d or facts from which it can be inferred, then it is sufficient.\nIf we do not finalize this matter, proof of \u201cspecific intent\u201d and \u201cgeneral intent\u201d will be identical.\nOn the battery charge for which defendant was convicted, defendant did not request an instruction on \u201cspecific intent.\u201d Since it was not called to the attention of the trial court, no error was preserved for review. Section 21-1-1(51) (2) (h), N. M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 4); State v. Moraga, 82 N.M. 750, 487 P.2d 178 (Ct.App.1971).",
        "type": "concurrence",
        "author": "SUTIN, Judge"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Scott McCarty, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant.",
      "David L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., Thomas Patrick Whelan, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "500 P.2d 451\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frankie RAMIREZ, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 888.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJuly 28, 1972.\nScott McCarty, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant.\nDavid L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., Thomas Patrick Whelan, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0166-01",
  "first_page_order": 322,
  "last_page_order": 324
}