{ "id": 2768555, "name": "Guy MILLER, Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant, v. CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Defendant and Cross-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Miller v. Connecticut General Life Insurance", "decision_date": "1972-10-20", "docket_number": "No. 953", "first_page": "321", "last_page": "324", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "84 N.M. 321" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "502 P.2d 1011" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "264 P. 951", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "case_ids": [ 1554434, 1554388 ], "year": 1928, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/33/0245-01", "/nm/33/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 N.M. 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1554434 ], "year": 1928, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/33/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5339252 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 N.M. 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5357063 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/80/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5342211 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 A.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "258 Md. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 1930237 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/md/258/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 N.W.2d 318", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "34 Wis.2d 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8670956 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/34/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 P. 314", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1915, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "20 N.M. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4714071 ], "year": 1915, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/20/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 P. 1082", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1917, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "22 N.M. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4726122 ], "year": 1917, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/22/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 N.M. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5321923 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/78/0188-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 529, "char_count": 9943, "ocr_confidence": 0.67, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2147582418692574e-07, "percentile": 0.596872443142438 }, "sha256": "7098a45e18a97a1db2778d097fa9c20275a785f508424c448aa634d6473d3c8b", "simhash": "1:71d8e02d36ae9572", "word_count": 1608 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:55:55.751115+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HENDLEY, J, concurs.", "SUTIN, J, specially concurring." ], "parties": [ "Guy MILLER, Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant, v. CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Defendant and Cross-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nCOWAN, Judge.\nPlaintiff Guy Miller filed suit against the defendant seeking a judgment declaring valid three life insurance policies issued by defendant to plaintiff but later cancelled by defendant. The plaintiff prayed for $10.00 nominal damages because of the attempted cancellation of the policies and, in addition, for compensatory and punitive damages \u201ccaused by the defendant\u2019s unscrupulous dealings with plaintiff.\u201d During the pendency of the action Guy Miller died and his wife was substituted as party plaintiff.\nAt the plaintiff\u2019s suggestion, it was agreed by the court and opposing counsel that the case would first be tried on the question of liability. Then, if the defendant was found liable for compensatory and punitive damages, the issue of amount of damages would be heard.\nAt the conclusion of the first part of the trial the court announced that it would award $10.00 nominal damages and hold the three insurance policies to be valid but would deny compensatory and punitive damages.\nDefendant initially appealed that part of the judgment declaring the policies to be valid and plaintiff cross-appealed on the damage issue. Prior to perfection, defendant vacated its appeal, but plaintiff retains her position as cross-appellant.\nShe first asserts that the court erred in not allowing her to present evidence upon the issue of compensatory or punitive damages. This point is without merit. The first hearing was, by agreement, limited to the question of liability. The record does not indicate that plaintiff was restricted in presenting any of her evidence on the issue of liability. During the post-trial argument, she made a tender of evidence but this evidence went to the issue of damages rather than to liability. Plaintiff conceded at oral argument that she knows of no evidence on the liability issue other than that already presented at the trial. The court\u2019s refusal to find liability disposed of the damage issue. Archuleta v. Johnston, 83 N.M. 380, 492 P.2d 997 (Ct.App.1971).\nPlaintiff next argues that the court erred in \u201cnot allowing the production of evidence on the mental suffering and punitive damages resulting from the tortious breach of a life insurance contract.\u201d Again we disagree with her position. Such evidence, going to the issue of damages, would be pertinent only if the court first found defendant liable for compensatory or punitive damages.\nThe plaintiff requested a conclusion that she was entitled to nominal damages in the sum of $10.00, which the court adopted. She also requested findings of fact supporting her position on the liability of the defendant for compensatory and punitive damages, which the court refused. Such refusal constituted findings to the contrary. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hesselden Construction Co, 80 N.M. 121, 452 P.2d 190 (1969).\nThe plaintiff has not attacked the sufficiency of the evidence nor any of the court\u2019s findings of fact or conclusions of law. Neither has she put in issue the court\u2019s refusal of any of her requested findings or conclusions. The court\u2019s findings and conclusions are, therefore, deemed true and controlling. Anderson v. Jenkins Construction Co, 83 N.M. 47, 487 P.2d 1352 (Ct.App.1971).\nPlaintiff\u2019s last contention is that defendant\u2019s appeal was frivolous under \u00a7 21-2-1 (17) (3), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 4). The rule in this state is that doubts as to the frivolous nature of an appeal will be resolved in favor of the appellant. Roger v. Garde, 33 N.M. 245, 264 P. 951 (1928). In so viewing the record plaintiff\u2019s contention is not substantiated by the record.\nThe judgment is affirmed.\nIt is so ordered.\nHENDLEY, J, concurs.\nSUTIN, J, specially concurring.", "type": "majority", "author": "COWAN, Judge." }, { "text": "SUTIN, Judge\n(specially concurring).\nNovel questions arose on this appeal which should be answered for future consideration.\nA. There was no Appeal From the Final Judgment.\nOn August 27, 1971, final judgment was entered for the plaintiff that defendant\u2019s life insurance policies were, at the time of decedent\u2019s death, in full force and effect; that the plaintiff was granted judgment of $10.00 for defendant\u2019s nominal breach of the insurance contracts, and for costs.\nOn September 27, 1971, plaintiff served notice of cross-appeal \u201cfrom those portions of the judgment entered herein August 27, 1971, denying Plaintiff compensatory damages over and above nominal damages and punitive damages and the opportunity to prove same.\u201d No such denial appears in the final judgment.\nAt the close of the case, the trial court orally denied compensatory and punitive damages, but an oral ruling is not a final judgment. Bouldin v. Bruce M. Bernard, Inc., 78 N.M. 188, 429 P.2d 647 (1967).\nThe judgment was not attacked and relief was not sought under Rule 60 [\u00a7 21-1-1(60), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 4)].\nAttention is called to Rule 58 [\u00a7 21 \u2014 1\u2014 1(58), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 4)] which affects the entry of final judgment in a declaratory judgment claim for relief.\nThis court does not have jurisdiction because no cross-appeal from the final judgment occurred.\nB. The Judgment was Satisfied and Released.\nOn December 27, 1971, defendant moved for leave to deposit with the court the amount of the judgment, interest and costs. On January 3, 1972, defendant vacated its appeal. The trial court then entered an order allowing payment with the clerk of the district court, and allowed disbursement \u201cupon the filing of record, . a Release and Satisfaction of Judgment . \u201d This order was approved as to form by the plaintiff.\nOn January 4, 1972, plaintiff filed of record a Release and Satisfaction of Judgment in which plaintiff acknowledged payment in full and released the judgment of record and released the defendant from the force and effect thereof.\nThis satisfaction and release of judgment makes it impossible for this court to render any decision which will affect the rights of the parties with respect to the judgment. State ex rel. Portales v. Board of Com\u2019rs of Roosevelt County, 22 N.M. 413, 163 P. 1082 (1917); Alldredge v. Alldredge, 20 N.M. 471, 151 P. 314 (1915).\nThe appeal should have been dismissed.\nC. The Bifurcated Trial led to Error.\nA bifurcated or split trial, when requested, means complete separate trials resulting in partial determination of the controversy. State ex rel. La Follette v. Raskin, 34 Wis.2d 607, 150 N.W.2d 318 (1967); Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials, 14 Vanderbilt L.Rev. 831.\nThe right to a bifurcated trial is set forth in Rule 42(b) [\u00a7 21-1-1(42) (b), N. M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 4)]. This rule permits a separate trial of any separate issue.\nThe instant case was tried before the court. Plaintiff raised four separate issues in one claim for relief, (1) an order declaring the insurance policies in effect; (2) compensatory damages for claimed negligent and bad faith acts of defendant in \u201crescinding\u201d the policies of insurance; (3) nominal damages of $10.00 for \u201cattempted rescission\u201d; (4) punitive damages for claimed unscrupulous acts of defendant.\nAt the trial opening, plaintiff suggested a bifurcated trial in which the trial court would first determine the issue of \u201cliability\u201d and then go into the question of \u201cdamages.\u201d '\u201cLiability is an obligation to pay, and arises only when all essential elements of an action are established.\u201d This includes proof of damages. Peroti v. Williams, 258 Md. 663, 267 A.2d 114 (1970).\nA discussion of bifurcation before the hearing was ambiguous. The following occurred at the end of the discussion:\nTHE COURT: Let\u2019s see where we are at the end of your proof.\nMR. TURPEN: I like that, but we wouldn\u2019t put in any evidence of damages in our case at all.\nTHE COURT: All right sir.\nAfter the end of the proof, plaintiff argued at great length in opening and closing solely on the issue of the declaratory judgment. Additional evidence was then introduced by defendant. Thereafter, the trial court commented at length on the validity of the insurance policies. Plaintiff then announced this was not a suit for that money, but for declaratory relief, declaring the policies in force. There was no mention whatever of the court making a determination of issues of negligence and bad faith for compensatory and punitive damages.\nOn appeal, plaintiff assumed the court determined for plaintiff the issue of negligence and bad faith in rescinding the insurance policies. Therefore, plaintiff contends he was entitled to offer evidence as to damages. Plaintiff did not raise any question of error arising out of the failure of the trial court to adopt his requested findings.\nThe trial court orally determined that plaintiff was not entitled to compensatory and punitive damages. This is a determination that defendant was not guilty of negligence and bad faith in rescinding the insurance policies. Plaintiff points to no evidence which constituted negligence and bad faith on the part of the defendant.\nI point this out to show how easy it is for a bifurcated trial to lead to error. In a bifurcated trial, \u201cissues\u201d are to be determined, not \u201cliability.\u201d The issues should be carefully stated in the beginning of trial. Evidence must be presented on each issue. At the close of the trial, the court should be requested to determine each issue in its findings and judgment. The plaintiff limited himself to the issue of a declaratory judgment. The court made such findings and entered a declaratory judgment for plaintiff.\nA bifurcated trial should be requested or ordered only when there are highly persuasive reasons therefor.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "SUTIN, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Tandy L. Hunt, Donald C. Turp\u00e9n, Turp\u00e9n, Hunt & Booth, Albuquerque, for plaintiff and cross-appellant.", "Frank H. Allen, Jr., Dale W. Elc, Mod-rail, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, Albuquerque, for defendant and cross-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "502 P.2d 1011\nGuy MILLER, Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant, v. CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Defendant and Cross-Appellee.\nNo. 953.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nOct. 20, 1972.\nTandy L. Hunt, Donald C. Turp\u00e9n, Turp\u00e9n, Hunt & Booth, Albuquerque, for plaintiff and cross-appellant.\nFrank H. Allen, Jr., Dale W. Elc, Mod-rail, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, Albuquerque, for defendant and cross-appellee." }, "file_name": "0321-01", "first_page_order": 477, "last_page_order": 480 }