{ "id": 2772480, "name": "Clifford NORRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMAX CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Employer and Self-Insurer, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Norris v. Amax Chemical Corp.", "decision_date": "1973-01-19", "docket_number": "No. 981", "first_page": "587", "last_page": "588", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "84 N.M. 587" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "506 P.2d 93" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "84 N.M. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2765891 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5334147 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.M. 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2740742 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/79/0711-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 264, "char_count": 3803, "ocr_confidence": 0.682, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3022358842768954e-07, "percentile": 0.6224160173044838 }, "sha256": "9b997e63ba94533cb8d2870fd9b0c791cf6679ee4e77d15e5b9e129ee21886d0", "simhash": "1:b5c6216280979d9b", "word_count": 596 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:55:55.751115+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HERNANDEZ and LOPEZ, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Clifford NORRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMAX CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Employer and Self-Insurer, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWOOD, Chief Judg-e.\nThe propriety of the summary judgment in favor of defendant in this workmen\u2019s compensation case involves the question of \u201cactual knowledge\u201d of a compensable injury.\n\u25a0 On November 25, 1970, while at work, plaintiff was struck across the left eye by a cable. Pie was taken to a doctor, treated for cuts (two stitches were taken) and returned to work the next day.\nDefendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment was supported by the affidavit of defendant\u2019s safety engineer. The affidavit states that the treating physician reported \u201cno disability\u201d and the accident report was closed. The affidavit states: \u201c * * * nothing further by way of \u2018notice\u2019 of any compensable injury * * * was received * * * \u201d until defendant received two medical bills for treatment of plaintiff\u2019s eye in November, 1971.\nPlaintiff contends his deposition testimony raises an issue of fact as to defendant\u2019s knowledge of a compensable injury. He relies on testimony that he spoke about his eye trouble, and of not being able to see, to several persons associated with the company.\nAssuming the persons to whom plaintiff spoke were superintendents, foremen or agents in charge of the work, see \u00a7 59\u201410\u2014 13.4(B), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 1), these conversations do not raise a factual issue as to actual knowledge of a compensable injury.\n? 59-10-13.4(A), N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 1) provides that written notice is to be given of the accident and injury. Written notice is excused if there is actual knowledge, but the actual knowledge which excuses written notice must have been acquired within the time \u2022allotted for the written notice. Rohrer v. Eidal International, 79 N.M. 711, 449 P.2d 81 (Ct.App.1968).\nIn this case, defendant made a prima facie showing that no actual knowledge of a compensable injury was acquired within the time provided for written notice. See \u00a7 59-10-13.4(A), supra. With this showing, plaintiff had the burden of showing that a factual issue existed as to the time when actual knowledge of a compensable injury was acquired by defendant. Goodman v. Brock, 83 N.M. 789, 498 P.2d 676 (1972). One conversation referred to by plaintiff in his deposition affirmatively shows that conversation occurred long after expiration of the time for giving written notice. Plaintiff\u2019s deposition does not indicate when the other conversations occurred. Nor can the time of these other conversations be inferred.\nIn this posture, plaintiff failed to show that a genuine factual issue existed as to when defendant acquired actual knowledge of a compensable injury. Under Goodman v. Brock, supra, summary judgment was proper if actual knowledge of a compensable injury is required under \u00a7 59-10-13.4(B), supra.\nIn Beckwith v. Cactus Drilling Corporation, (Ct.App.), 84 N.M. 565, 505 P.2d 1241, decided November 30, 1972, this court held that the statutory provision for \u201cactual knowledge,\u201d \u00a7 59\u201410\u201413.4(B), supra, was satisfied when the employer had actual knowledge of the accident. Although defendant did not have actual knowledge of a compensable injury, the notice requirement was satisfied since defendant had actual knowledge of the accident.\nThe only issue presented in this appeal was the question of actual knowledge. On the basis of Beckwith, supra, the summary judgment is reversed. The cause is remanded with instructions to set aside the summary judgment and proceed in accordance with this opinion.\nIt is so ordered.\nHERNANDEZ and LOPEZ, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WOOD, Chief Judg-e." } ], "attorneys": [ "Dick A. Blenden, Michael F. McCormick, Carlsbad, for plaintiff-appellant.", "C. A. Feezer, Dow & Feezer, Carlsbad,, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "506 P.2d 93\nClifford NORRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMAX CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Employer and Self-Insurer, Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 981.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJan. 19, 1973.\nDick A. Blenden, Michael F. McCormick, Carlsbad, for plaintiff-appellant.\nC. A. Feezer, Dow & Feezer, Carlsbad,, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0587-01", "first_page_order": 743, "last_page_order": 744 }