{ "id": 2771435, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald McHORSE, a/k/a Duke McHorse, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "State v. McHorse", "decision_date": "1973-11-14", "docket_number": "No. 1252", "first_page": "753", "last_page": "758", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "85 N.M. 753" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "517 P.2d 75" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "4 L.Ed.2d 1023", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 S.Ct. 1082", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 U.S. 991", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6281189, 6279527, 6280374, 6280663, 6280126, 6279839 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/362/0731-06", "/us/362/0731-01", "/us/362/0731-04", "/us/362/0731-05", "/us/362/0731-03", "/us/362/0731-02" ] }, { "cite": "343 P.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Cal.App.2d 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4383282 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/173/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 A.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.J.L. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.L.", "case_ids": [ 103306 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/njl/137/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3001", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1716", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 U.S. 410", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8300340 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1847, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/46/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 L.Ed.2d 301", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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Ct.", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "385 U.S. 205", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11336078 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/385/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 N.W.2d 287", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Wis.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8670124 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/30/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 U.S. 284", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8292255 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1906, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/203/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 U.S. 88", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6156306 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/326/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 U.S. 476", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6160660 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/354/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 S.E. 117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1908, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 Ga.App. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 1260959 ], "year": 1908, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/4/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 S.Ct. 242", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 6142629, 6142454 ], "year": 1898, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/168/0651-01", "/us/168/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 U.S. 640", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6142454 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1898, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/168/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 845", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 903", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 L.Ed.2d 400", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 S.Ct. 1900", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "411 U.S. 938", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 10149, 9894, 10250, 9721, 9774, 10064, 9969, 10034, 10041 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/411/0938-05", "/us/411/0938-06", "/us/411/0938-09", "/us/411/0938-04", "/us/411/0938-07", "/us/411/0938-03", "/us/411/0938-02", "/us/411/0938-08", "/us/411/0938-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2768763 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5334932 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 F.2d 176", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1338211 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/462/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 N.M. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2719808 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/68/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 P.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 1580725, 1580726 ], "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/53/0052-01", "/nm/53/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 N.M. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580725 ], "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/53/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 A.L.R. 618", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 S.W. 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ark. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1366068 ], "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/151/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 P. 262", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1930, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Wash. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash.", "case_ids": [ 837068 ], "year": 1930, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash/157/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Pittsb.Leg.J. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pitts L.J.", "year": 1922, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Pa.Dist. & Co. 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. D. & C.", "case_ids": [ 8734920 ], "year": 1922, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-d-c/2/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 S.W.2d 194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10141437 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/443/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 N.M. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2805520 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 L.Ed. 1239", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 S.Ct. 426", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 U.S. 503", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1484680, 1484689 ], "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/247/0503-02", "/us/247/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 A.L.R. 170", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "year": 1917, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 P. 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1917, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 N.M. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2394293 ], "year": 1917, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/23/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 N.M. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5356710 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/80/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.M. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2735536 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/79/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 N.M. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5329456 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/82/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2802354 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0061-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 766, "char_count": 12482, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.579778132048586e-07, "percentile": 0.9614979483359841 }, "sha256": "4bbce00ff0b1d5d2adde4c16866eac189e3569df307d7b782b18b6ee8c11e0bf", "simhash": "1:038e5af2bded5451", "word_count": 2017 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:38:26.265107+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SUTIN and LOPEZ, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald McHORSE, a/k/a Duke McHorse, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWOOD, Chief Judge.\nThe indictment charges defendant, in three counts, of distributing a controlled substance to a person under eighteen years of age, contrary to \u00a7 54 \u2014 11-21, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl.Vol. 8, pt. 2, Supp.1973). Two of the counts involve marijuana. See \u00a7 54 \u2014 11-21 (A), supra. One count involves peyote. See \u00a7 54 \u2014 11-21 (B), supra, and \u00a7 54-ll-6(C), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 8, pt. 2, Supp.1973). In response to a defense motion, the district attorney filed a statement of facts. Section 41-23-9, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, Supp.1973). As to each count, the district attorney stated the controlled substance was placed in an envelope which was mailed to a juvenile in Alamogordo, New Mexico and that the offense was committed in Taos, New Mexico. The trial court dismissed the indictment on three grounds: (1) neither the defendant nor a juvenile is a \u201cperson\u201d within the meaning of the controlled substances act; (2) sending a controlled substance through the mail is not a \u201cdistribution;\u201d and (3) if there was a distribution by use of the mail, State authority to regulate has been \u201cfederally preempted.\u201d We review each ground and reverse.\n\u201cPerson\" under the controlled substances act.\nSection 54-11-21, supra, uses the word \u201cperson\u201d in relation to the one distributing the controlled substance and the one to whom the substance is distributed. Section 54-11-2, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 8, pt. 2, Supp.1973) defines various terms used in the controlled substances act. Subparagraph (R) reads:\n\u201c \u2018person\u2019 includes a partnership, corporation, association, institution, political subdivision, government agency or other legal entity;\u201d\nAs defendant points out, this definition does not contain \u201cthe words \u2018one or more individuals\u2019 or \u2018human being.\u2019 \u201d\nDefendant compares the New Mexico controlled substances act with similar acts of other jurisdictions. In the other jurisdictions cited, the statutory definition of \u201cperson\u201d expressly refers to \u201cindividuals.\u201d Defendant also cites other New Mexico statutes which use \u201cindividual\u201d in defining \u201cperson.\u201d On the basis of these comparisons, defendant asserts the New Mexico Legislature failed to place \u201cindividual\u201d or \u201chuman being\u201d within its definition of \u201cperson.\u201d This comparison is not dispositive because our concern is with the words used in the legislation under consideration. Legislation is to be read and given effect as written. Gonzales v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int. U., 77 N.M. 61, 419 P.2d 257 (1966).\nDefendant also claims that the definition of \u201cperson\u201d is clear and unambiguous and, thus, not subject to interpretation by this Court. On this basis,, defendant asserts there is \u201cno need to determine legislative intent.\u201d Defendant\u2019s statement is incomplete in that it omits the requirement that the meaning of a statute is to be ascertained primarily from the words used in the statute.\nWe look first to the words used. If those words are plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction. Southern Union Gas Co. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Com\u2019n, 82 N.M. 405, 482 P.2d 913 (1971); Fort v. Neal, 79 N.M. 479, 444 P.2d 990 (1968). Where there is ambiguity interpretation is required, but that interpretation is for the purpose of determining legislative intent. State v. Clark, 80 N.M. 340, 455 P.2d 844 (1969). Legislative intent is to be determined primarily from the language used in the statute. Fort v. Neal, supra.\nIn this case, we agree there is no ambiguity. Accordingly, we look no further than the meaning of the words used in the statute. Those words are \u201c \u2018person\u2019 includes.\u201d\n\u201cPerson\u201d is a generic term of comprehensive nature, embracing natural and artificial persons. State ex rel. v. Huller, 23 N.M. 306, 168 P. 528, 1 A.L.R. 170 (1917), appeal dismissed, 247 U.S. 503, 38 S.Ct. 426, 62 L.Ed. 1239 (1918). \u201cPerson\u201d is inclusive rather than exclusive; its meaning includes individuals. Gonzales v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int. U., supra. The word \u201cincludes\u201d in \u00a7 54\u201411-2(R), supra, added to the definition of \u201cperson\u201d by extending the meaning to the entities listed. This addition is just that, an extension, rather than an entire definition of \u201cperson.\u201d State v. Romero, 74 N.M. 642, 397 P.2d 26 (1964).\nSince the word \u201cperson\u201d includes individual natural persons, both the defendant and the juvenile are \u201cpersons\u201d within the meaning of \u00a7 54-11-21, supra.\nIs there a \u201cdistribution1\u2019 when a controlled substance is sent through the mail?\nSection 54\u201411-21, supra, applies to distribution of a controlled substance. Section 54\u201411-2 (J), supra, states: \u201c\u2018distribute\u2019 means to deliver other than by administering or dispensing. * * * \u201d Section 54\u2014 11-2(G), supra, states: \u201c\u2018deliver\u2019 means the actual, constructive or attempted transfer from one person to another * * * whether or not there is an agency relationship. * * * \u201d\nThe issue argued under this point is the meaning of \u201cconstructive transfer.\u201d Defendant asserts \u201ctransfer\u201d means a direct person-to-person handover. With this0 asserted m'eaning, he contends that \u201cdeliver\u201d defined as a \u201cconstructive transfer\u201d is void for vagueness because \u201cwhat on earth is a \u2018constructive transfer.\u2019 \u201d\n\u201cTransfer\u201d means making over the possession or control. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951); Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (1966).\n\u201cConstructive\u201d is defined in Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, supra, as \u201c * * * that which has not the character assigned to it in its own essential nature, but acquires such character in consequence of the way in which it is regarded by a rule or policy of law. * * * \u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary, supra, defines \u201cconstructive\u201d as \u201c * * * often used in law of an act or condition assumed from other acts or conditions which are considered by inference or by public policy as amounting to or involving the act or condition assumed. * * * \u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, supra, under \u201cdelivery\u201d states that a \u201cconstructive delivery\u201d occurs when the conduct of the parties is such as to be inconsistent with any other supposition than that there has been a change in the nature of the holding. See Galemore v. Mid-West National Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 194 (Mo.App.1969).\n\u201cThe delivery (of a check) to the post office (for final delivery to the addressee) is a constructive and technical delivery.\u201d Commonwealth v. Ballante, 2 Pa.Dist. & Co. 538, 71 Pittsb.Leg.J. 112 (1922). The deposit of an insurance policy in the mail, addressed to the insured, is a constructive delivery to the insured. See Frye v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 157 Wash. 88, 288 P. 262 (1930). See also New York Life Ins. Co. v. Mason, 151 Ark. 135, 235 S.W. 422, 19 A.L.R. 618 (1921). Compare the effect of mailing or shipping in unilateral contracts. Williston on Contracts \u00a7 81 (3d ed. Jaeger 1957).\nThe statement of facts is to the effect that defendant mailed the controlled substance to the juvenile. If this is true, defendant selected the mails as his delivery agent. Associated Petroleum Transport v. Shepard, 53 N.M. 52, 201 P.2d 772 (1949). If properly mailed, there was a presumption of delivery. Adams v. Tatsch, 68 N.M. 446, 362 P.2d 984 (1961). Placing the controlled substance in the mail had the effect of turning the controlled substance over to an agent for delivery. This amounts to a constructive transfer which, under \u00a7\u00a7 54\u201411-2 (G) and (J), supra, is a distribution. Compare United States v. Alvarez, 462 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1972).\nA person of common intelligence does not have to guess at the meaning of statutes which prohibit \u201cdistribution\u201d of a controlled substance, define \u201cdistribution\u201d in terms of \u201cdeliver\u201d and define \u201cdeliver\u201d in terms of a constructive transfer of the controlled substance. \u201cConstructive transfer\u201d is not void under the due process clause on the grounds of vagueness. State v. Orzen, 83 N.M. 458, 493 P.2d 768 (Ct.App.1972).\nFederal preemption.\nBy \u201cfederal preemption\u201d we mean a situation where federal law so occupies the field that state courts are prevented from asserting jurisdiction. Gonzales v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int. U., supra; compare Sangre de Cristo Dev. Corp., Inc. v. City of Santa Fe, 84 N.M. 343, 503 P.2d 323 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938, 93 S.Ct. 1900, 36 L.Ed.2d 400 (1973).\nThe federal controlled substances act does not raise a preemption question. 21 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 903 (1972) states: \u201cNo provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter * * * unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter -and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.\u201d The subchapter referred to in the quotation includes 21 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 845 (1972), which is a provision similar to \u00a7 54-11-21, supra. There is no positive conflict between 21 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 845, supra, and \u00a7 54-11-21, supra, and none is claimed.\nDefendant\u2019s contention is that federal postal laws are exclusive. This preemption claim is based on the stated fact that the controlled substances were mailed. The claim is based on two items: (1) U.S. Const. Art. I, \u00a7 8, Clause 7 and (2) 18 U. S.C.A. \u00a7 1716 (1970).\nThe constitutional provision gives the Congress power to establish post offices. In Crossley v. California, 168 U.S. 640, 18 S.Ct. 242, 42 L.Ed. 610 (1898) it was asserted that California had no jurisdiction over a murder charge because the murder of a railway engineer was committed by derailing a train engaged exclusively in transporting the mail. The contention was rejected on the basis that an act may constitute an offense against both the United States and an individual state and the guilty party may be punished under the laws of each government. The derailment could be punished under federal law; the murder under state law.\nRose v. State, 4 Ga.App. 588, 62 S.E. 117 (1908) involved the use of the mails to sell liquor during prohibition. The opinion states: \u201c * * * the state may punish for a crime committed through the mails as a medium, without in any sense impinging the undoubted right of the national government to control the mails. * * * \u201d\nIn this case the operation of the mails is not affected by New Mexico\u2019s controlled substances act. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L. Ed.2d 1498 (1957); Railway Mail Association v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 65 S.Ct. 1483, 89 L.Ed. 2072 (1945); Martin v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co., 203 U.S. 284, 27 S.Ct. 100, 51 L.Ed. 184 (1906); Ministers Life and Casualty Union v. Haase, 30 Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287 (1966); appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 205, 87 S.Ct. 407, 17 L.Ed.2d 301 (1966). Compare Fox v. The State of Ohio, 46 U.S. 410, 12 L.Ed. 213 (1847). The federal constitutional provision did not preempt New Mexico jurisdiction.\n18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1716, supra, establishes a criminal offense for depositing for mailing, or delivery by mail, anything declared to be nonmailable in that section. See also 39 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3001 (1962). The section contains provisions regulating the mailing of poisonous drugs. Assuming marijuana and peyote classify as poisonous drugs (a point unnecessary to decide), 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1716, supra, does not purport to make a federal offense of the distribution of controlled substances. The statute is limited to the mailing of nonmailable items. The mail offense is different from the distribution offense. The fact that defendant may have violated the federal statute does not prevent New Mexico from prosecuting a violation of the state statute. State v. Seaman, 137 N.J.L. 405, 60 A.2d 275 (1948). 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1716, supra, does not preempt New Mexico jurisdiction. People v. Gaither, 173 Cal.App.2d 662, 343 P.2d 799 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 991, 80 S.Ct. 1082, 4 L.Ed.2d 1023 (1960).\nEach of the grounds on which the indictment was dismissed is erroneous. The order of dismissal is reversed. The cause is remanded with instructions to set aside the order of dismissal and reinstate the indictment on the docket of the court.\nIt is so ordered.\nSUTIN and LOPEZ, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WOOD, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "David L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., F. Scott MacGillivray, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Margaret W. Lamb, Taos, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "517 P.2d 75\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald McHORSE, a/k/a Duke McHorse, Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 1252.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nNov. 14, 1973.\nDavid L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., F. Scott MacGillivray, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellant.\nMargaret W. Lamb, Taos, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0753-01", "first_page_order": 815, "last_page_order": 820 }