{ "id": 2771479, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George Neil HANKS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hanks", "decision_date": "1973-12-05", "docket_number": "No. 1148", "first_page": "766", "last_page": "769", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "85 N.M. 766" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "517 P.2d 750" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "82 N.M. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5328719 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/82/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5333582 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5335699 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 L.Ed.2d 98", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 S.Ct. 190", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 854", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6248226, 6245926, 6246566, 6245640, 6247499, 6245360, 6247187, 6247827, 6248501, 6245080, 6246874, 6246234 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0854-11", "/us/409/0854-04", "/us/409/0854-06", "/us/409/0854-03", "/us/409/0854-09", "/us/409/0854-02", "/us/409/0854-08", "/us/409/0854-10", "/us/409/0854-12", "/us/409/0854-01", "/us/409/0854-07", "/us/409/0854-05" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5340107 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5337587 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 N.M. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2714178 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/67/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 5", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2765703 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0005-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 N.M. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5366107 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/81/0674-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 373, "char_count": 6054, "ocr_confidence": 0.706, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.12982294956584e-08, "percentile": 0.3225218922029817 }, "sha256": "0476c1fbd6b4ad80f7f88d9dfadb4b5c4b0085d26652c76922cac387c6b15a89", "simhash": "1:253d52a1637db540", "word_count": 978 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:38:26.265107+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WOOD, C. J., and SUTIN, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George Neil HANKS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nLOPEZ, Judge.\nDefendant purchased a vehicle from one Beaty, a/k/a Harry Jorgenson. He was tried and convicted of receiving a stolen vehicle contrary to \u00a7 64-9-5, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 9, pt. 2). He raises six points for reversal relating to the relevancy and sufficiency of the evidence and to the refusal of certain of his requests for instructions.\nWe affirm.\nRelevancy\nThe major issue before the trial court was whether defendant knew or had reason to believe that the automobile which he admittedly purchased was stolen. The State introduced testimony which indicated that the average fair value of automobiles of the type and model purchased was far greater than the price defendant actually paid for it. Defendant argues that value is not an element of the crime charged as it is under \u00a7 40A-16-11, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 6), relating to receiving stolen property. Therefore, he- concludes that testimony concerning fair value was irrelevant and prejudicial. We disagree. A substantial discrepancy between fair value of an item and the price actually paid for it tends to prove defendant\u2019s guilty knowledge and was relevant to that issue. State v. Zarafonetis, 81 N.M. 674, 472 P.2d 388 (Ct.App.1970).\nAn issue at trial was whether the automobile had been damaged before defendant purchased it. If it had been damaged before defendant\u2019s purchase, then the discrepancy between value and purchase price tended to disappear. The State introduced evidence that the car was involved in a collision with some cattle after the date of defendant\u2019s purchase. This evidence included the testimony of an officer who investigated the collision, photographs of portions of the car after the collision and animal hair found on the car. Defendant claims the evidence was irrelevant. We disagree. The evidence was relevant to the question of the value of the car at the time defendant purchased it. Defendant claims the photographs were not admissible because they did not accurately portray the car. Again, we disagree. There was proper authentication of the photographs. State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498 P.2d 697 (Ct.App.1972). The fact that portions of the car were not photographed did not render inadmissible the pictures that were in fact taken; pictures which had been properly authenticated.\nSufficiency of the Evidence\nDefendant contends that there was insufficient evidence that he knew or should have known that the automobile he purchased was stolen. The court in State v. Follis, 67 N.M. 222, 354 P.2d 521 (1960), indicated the quantum of proof necessary to sustain a conviction, when it stated:\n\". . . the mere possession of recently stolen property is not sufficient in and of itself to warrant the conviction of a defendant on a charge of having stolen property in his possession, but that such possession, if not satisfactorily explained, is a circumstance to be taken into consideration with all of the other facts and circumstances in the case in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. There must be other proof showing the defendant had knowledge the property was stolen. . . .\u201d\nDefendant assumes that the above statement, made in a prosecution under \u00a7 40A-16-11, supra, correctly outlines the knowledge requirement under \u00a7 64-9-5, supra. He then argues that the State\u2019s evidence was totally circumstantial, that he has satisfactorily explained his possession and in the light of that explanation, the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction. We disagree. See State v. Madrid, 83 N.M. 603, 495 P.2d 383 (Ct.App.1972).\nHere, there is more than evidence of possession of recently stolen property. There is the evidence of the car thief that defendant knew the car was stolen when he purchased it; evidence that the papers transferring the car to defendant were signed by the thief with an assumed name and that defendant knew this at the time the papers were signed; there is the evidence of the discrepancy between the sale price and the value of the car. The foregoing is evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction apart from the evidence of possession.\nInstructions\nDefendant complains of the trial court\u2019s refusal to give three of his requested instructions. Two of the refused requests are asserted by defendant to have been proper theory of the case instructions. That was not defendant\u2019s objection in the trial court. The denial of these two requests, numbers 4 and 9, was objected to in the trial court on the basis that they were not covered in instructions given by the court. This is the objection we consider. Request 4, on circumstantial evidence, was adequately covered by the instruction on that subject. State v. Cranford, 83 N.M. 294, 491 P.2d 511 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854, 93 S.Ct. 190, 34 L.Ed.2d 98 (1973). Request 9, concerning two equal factual hypotheses as not fulfilling the State\u2019s burden of proof, was adequately covered by instructions on reasonable doubt and was properly refused under State v. Gruender, 83 N.M. 327, 491 P.2d 1082 (Ct.App.1971).\nRefused request number 8 would have told the jury that guilty knowledge could not be inferred merely from the inadequacy of the price paid. This request was confusing and would have misled the jury because there was other evidence on the question of guilty knowledge. We need not decide whether the requested instruction was a proper statement of the law; the request was properly refused because it was confusing and misleading. See State v. Garcia, 83 N.M. 51, 487 P.2d 1356 (Ct.App.1971); State v. Buhr, 82 N.M. 371, 482 P.2d 74 (Ct.App.1971).\nJudgment and sentence is affirmed.\nIt is so ordered.\nWOOD, C. J., and SUTIN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "LOPEZ, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "R. W. Gallini, Heidel, Samberson, Gallini & Williams, Lovington, for defendant-appellant.", "David L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., Randolph B. Felker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "517 P.2d 750\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George Neil HANKS, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 1148.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nDec. 5, 1973.\nCertiorari Denied Jan. 3, 1974.\nR. W. Gallini, Heidel, Samberson, Gallini & Williams, Lovington, for defendant-appellant.\nDavid L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., Randolph B. Felker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee." }, "file_name": "0766-01", "first_page_order": 828, "last_page_order": 831 }