{ "id": 2825584, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fred A. RALEY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Raley", "decision_date": "1974-03-13", "docket_number": "No. 1274", "first_page": "190", "last_page": "192", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "86 N.M. 190" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "521 P.2d 1031" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "85 N.M. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2769108 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Neb. 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 594247 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/73/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 N.M. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1562302 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/47/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 N.M. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582002 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/54/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 N.M. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582983 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/55/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 N.M. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1556145 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1929, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/34/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2770362 ], "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 N.M. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1556145 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1929, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/34/0419-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 460, "char_count": 7914, "ocr_confidence": 0.818, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.9596936624162673e-07, "percentile": 0.9042280071154728 }, "sha256": "40dc1e3ef6f64bee3947039d8005f19d4f62e84b404fb639b5b9e5b947ff2df6", "simhash": "1:1082a87bf2471529", "word_count": 1306 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:44:27.328252+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HENDLEY, J., specially concurs.", "HERNANDEZ, J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fred A. RALEY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSUTIN, Judge.\nDefendant was convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor contrary to \u00a7 64-22-2(A), N.M.S.A. 1953 (2nd Repl. Vol. 9, pt. 2). He appeals. We reverse.\nDefendant contends: (1) The State violated magistrate court rules and denied defendant due process, and (2) defendant was not given a reasonable opportunity to arrange for a chemical test by someone of his own choosing. .\nSection 36-15-3(A), N.M.S.A. 1953 (2nd Repl. Vol. 6) provides that in de novo appeals, \u201c . . . all laws, rules and regulations governing the magistrate court shall govern the trial in the district court.\u201d\n(1) There was a violation of statutory magistrate court rules.\nDefendant presents five reasons for violation of magistrate court rules: (1) The complaint contains no facts other than the date and venue. (2) The complaint does not contain the common name of the offense. (3) The complaint does not give the specific section number. (4) The complaint is not a sworn statement. (5) No amendment of the complaint was sought and none was allowed.\nThe criminal complaint reads as follows: Complainant says that on 2-19, 1973, in Dona Ana county of this state, the defendant committed the crime of D.W.I. (common name of offense) contrary to Section 64 \u2014 22-2, New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953 Compilation, in that\nThe complaint was signed and subscribed and sworn to before the magistrate. The space provided for facts was left blank. The common name of the offense was \u201cD. W.I.\u201d\nRule 21(a) [\u00a7 36-21-21, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2nd Repl.Vol. 6)] reads as follows:\n(a) A criminal action is commenced by filing with the Court a complaint consisting of a sworn statement containing the facts, common name of the offense charged and, when applicable, a specific section number of New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953 Compilation, which contains the offense. [Emphasis added].\nThe contents of Rule 21(a), supra, are mandatory requirements.\nThe record is clear that the complaint (1) was a sworn statement; (2) \u00a7 64-22-2 was a specific section number which did \u201ccontain\u201d the claimed offense; (3) no amendment of the complaint was sought. We are left with two claims of error.\n(1) The complaint contains no facts other than the date and venue.\nDefendant contends the complaint contains no facts other than the date and venue. We agree. The complaint does not \u201ccontain the facts\u201d required under Rule 21(a), supra. State v. Vigil, 85 N.M. 328, 512 P.2d 88 (Ct.App.1973) ; State v. McMath, 34 N.M. 419, 283 P. 51 (1929); State v. Ardovino, 55 N.M. 161, 228 P.2d 947 (1951).\nThe facts to be set forth in the complaint are contained in \u00a7 64-22-2(A), supra, that the defendant unlawfully drove his vehicle or was in actual physical control of his vehicle, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The purpose of a sufficient complaint is to avoid res judicata. State v. Sena, 54 N.M. 213, 216, 219 P.2d 287 (1950).\nUnder the alternative rule in State v. Vigil, supra, the complaint failed to charge a crime and was invalid.\n(2) The complaint does not contain the common name of the offense.\nThe defendant contends the complaint does not contain the common name of the offense as provided in Rule 21(a), supra.\nIn the district court, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. The motion was denied.\nIn the complaint, the initials \u201cD.W.I.\u201d were used to designate the common name of the offense. To our knowledge, the phrase \u201ccommon name of the offense\u201d has not been defined. There is a difference of opinion whether \u201cstatutory rape\u201d constitutes a common name of that offense. State v. Vigil, supra. Certainly, the initials \u201cS.R.\u201d cannot be considered a common name of a statutory offense.\nWebster\u2019s definition of \u201ccommon\u201d has been adopted in New Mexico. It means, among other things, \u201c. . . generally or prevalent. * * * of frequent or ordinary occurrence or appearance; familiar by reason of frequency.\u201d Webb v. New Mexico Pub. Co., 47 N.M. 279, 141 P.2d 333 (1943).\nThe word \u201cname\u201d has many definitions. See Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary, p. 1501 (1966). One of the definitions is \u201cto mention or identify by name\u201d.\nTo indicate identity, \u201cA name is a word or words, designation or appellation to distinguish a person or thing or class from others, and words indicated by single letters are only less adapted to that purpose than words indicated by several letters.\u201d Griffith v. Bonawitz, 73 Neb. 622, 103\nN.W. 327, 329 (1905); 65 C.J.S. Names \u00a7 1; 28 Words and Phrases, Name, pp. 11, 12.\n\u201cCommon name of the offense\u201d means a word or words generally or frequently used to identify the offense.\nThe initials \u201cD.W.I.\u201d do not constitute a name. They are not a word or words.\n\u201cD.W.I.\u201d are initials which may be construed to mean \u201cDriving While Influenced\u201d. What influence \u2014 intoxicating liquor or drugs? See \u00a7 64 \u2014 22-2, supra. The influence could be manifold. See State v. McMath, supra.\nThe initials may be construed to mean \u201cDriving While Intoxicated.\u201d Intoxicated by what \u2014 liquor or a narcotic or some other chemical agent? The only known abbreviation of \u201cD.W.I.\u201d legally is \u201cdied without issue\u201d. See dissenting opinion, City of Hobbs v. Sparks, 85 N.M. 277, 511 P.2d 763 (Ct.App.1973). Neither do we find \u201cD.W.I.\u201d to be initials of which a court will take judicial notice. 31A C.J.S. Evidence \u00a7 68.\nWe cannot approve the use of initials instead of words in a criminal complaint to identify the offense. It can lead to absurdity, uncertainty, vagueness, unidentifiability and mistake.\nDue process of law requires a specific description of the offense for which a defendant is to be put on trial.\nIt is not necessary to determine defendant\u2019s second contention.\nThe complaint did not state the facts or the common name of the offense. It was not a complaint upon which a criminal action could be commenced.\nThe judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with a direction to the district court to dismiss the complaint.\nIt is so ordered.\nHENDLEY, J., specially concurs.\nHERNANDEZ, J., dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "SUTIN, Judge." }, { "text": "HENDLEY, Judge\n(specially concurring).\nI concur in the result reached by Judge Sutin. I disagree with the reasoning because of the implication that Rule 21(a), [\u00a7 36-21-21 (a), N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 1972)], must be so narrowly construed. I see no reason why the requirements of the statement cannot be read together in a common sense manner without technicalities.\nRule 21(a) requires that the statement contain the facts, common name and, when applicable, the specific section number. One essential function of a criminal complaint is to give notice of the crime with which the individual is charged. State v. McMath, 34 N.M. 419, 283 P. 51 (1929). Accordingly, had the complaint referred to subsection (A) of \u00a7 64 \u2014 22-2, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 1972, pt. 2), relating to driving while \u201cunder the influence of intoxicating liquor,\u201d I would have no problem in affirming. That subsection of the statute would supplement \u201cD.W.I.\u201d as the common name and would also supply the facts, \u201cdriving while intoxicated.\u201d However, since subsection (B) of \u00a7 64-22-2, supra, refers to driving while under the influence of any narcotic drug the complaint as worded, without the specific subsection, could relate to either.", "type": "dissent", "author": "HENDLEY, Judge" }, { "text": "HERNANDEZ, Judge,\ndissenting.\nI respectfully dissent. In my opinion it is common knowledge that the initials, D. W.I., stand for driving while intoxicated and their use constitutes compliance with that part of Rule 21 requiring \u201c. . .a sworn statement containing the facts, common name of the offense charged .\u201d since they are both a statement of facts and a name.", "type": "dissent", "author": "HERNANDEZ, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "David L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., George A. Morrison, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Anthony F. Avallone, Las Cruces, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "521 P.2d 1031\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fred A. RALEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 1274.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nMarch 13, 1974.\nDavid L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., George A. Morrison, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.\nAnthony F. Avallone, Las Cruces, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0190-01", "first_page_order": 220, "last_page_order": 222 }