{ "id": 2822056, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lorenzo CHAVEZ, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Chavez", "decision_date": "1974-02-27", "docket_number": "No. 1338", "first_page": "199", "last_page": "202", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "86 N.M. 199" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "521 P.2d 1040" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "401 U.S. 395", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11712570 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/401/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 U.S. 235", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6169466 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/399/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2774574 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2775911 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 L.Ed.2d 100", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 S.Ct. 145", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 851", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11744736, 11745542, 11745415, 11745609, 11745485, 11744686, 11745103, 11745264, 11744790, 11745335, 11745016, 11744854, 11745178 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/0851-02", "/us/414/0851-12", "/us/414/0851-10", "/us/414/0851-13", "/us/414/0851-11", "/us/414/0851-01", "/us/414/0851-06", "/us/414/0851-08", "/us/414/0851-03", "/us/414/0851-09", "/us/414/0851-05", "/us/414/0851-04", "/us/414/0851-07" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2776846 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 N.M. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566936 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1940, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/44/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 N.M. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1587529 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/58/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 A.L.R.2d 908", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 N.M. 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2848430 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/66/0289-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 565, "char_count": 10130, "ocr_confidence": 0.806, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5779353739456166e-07, "percentile": 0.8168844978992984 }, "sha256": "139efa59222e1e53b17f0a63b1064653fffea462beb62268aed3c476d8b2d59a", "simhash": "1:2740f9a00a7ff0c3", "word_count": 1650 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:44:27.328252+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HERNANDEZ and LOPEZ, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lorenzo CHAVEZ, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWOOD, Chief Judge.\nConvicted of murder in the second degree, defendant appeals. Section 40A-2-1 (B), N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6). The issues concern: (1) insanity as a matter of law; (2) exhibits to the jury during its deliberation; and (3) validity of imprisonment for costs.\nInsanity as a matter of law.\nAt the close of the evidence, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the basis that he was insane at the time of commission of the offense. There is no issue as to the legal definition of insanity. See State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312, 78 A.L.R.2d 908 (1959); State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727 (1954). The claim is that defendant was insane as a matter of law. In support of this claim, defendant would apply the uncontradicted evidence rule stated in Medler v. Henry, 44 N.M. 275, 101 P.2d 398 (1940).\nThe contention is based on language in State v. Gardner, 85 N.M. 104, 509 P.2d 871 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 851, 94 S.Ct. 145, 38 L.Ed.2d 100 (1973), which states:\n\u201cWe can accept the proposition, at least guardedly, that cases may arise where, absent evidence to the contrary, the defendant\u2019s evidence on the issue of insanity may be so clear and of such overpowering and persuasive force that reasonable minds can move only in the direction of a finding of insanity. In such a case, a court need not hesitate to rule on the issue as a matter of law.\nSee also, State v. Wilson, 85 N.M. 552, 514 P.2d 603 (1973).\nA defense witness, Dr. Shankel, testified that defendant was insane at the time of the killing. Asserting that Dr. Shankel\u2019s evidence is uncontradicted, defendant examines rebuttal evidence of the State, and contends this evidence failed to contradict the testimony of Dr. Shankel. We do not concern ourselves with whether evidence introduced by the State directly contradicted. Dr. Shankel\u2019s conclusion. Rather, we examine the evidence to determine whether the uncontradicted evidence rule is applicable.\nMedler v. Henry, supra, states that the uncontradicted evidence rule does not apply where the facts and circumstances of the case cast reasonable doubt upon the truth or accuracy of the oral testimony. Facts and circumstances casting doubt on the accuracy of Dr. Shankel\u2019s conclusion are as follows:\n(a) Dr. Shankel, a psychiatrist, testified that psychiatry is not \u201ca precise science I have no way of knowing with certainty what his mental condition was.\u201d His testimony of insanity was the doctor\u2019s \u201cconsidered opinion.\u201d\n(b) Dr. Shankel testified that defendant suffered from a mental illness known as schizophrenia. The schizophrenia was described as chronic, paranoid type. Dr. Shankel, and Dr. Rosenstein, who testified for the State, agreed that a diagnosis of schizophrenia does not necessarily mean that the schizophrenic is criminally insane.\n(c) According to Dr. Shankel, defendant stated he had no memory of the events surrounding the killing. There is evidence casting doubt on defendant\u2019s lack of memory. Dr. Shankel testified that whether defendant had lied about his lack of memory would not be pertinent; that it made no difference whether or not defendant remembered the crime. Dr. Rosenstein stated that amnesia was \u201cone of the elements that you use in coming to your conclusion.\u201d Dr. Rosenstein also testified that if a defendant were unable to give any recollection of the events which had transpired, this lack of memory affects the examiner\u2019s ability to come to a conclusion as to sanity or insanity.\n(d) Dr. Shankel referred to defendant\u2019s hallucinations in his first report and stated the hallucinations had ceased in a subsequent report. Dr. Shankel testified that whether or not defendant had had hallucinatory experiences made no difference on the question of legal insanity. Dr. Shankel also testified that his diagnosis of schizophrenia was not based on hallucinations. Dr. Rosenstein approached the legal definition of insanity on the basis that the definition involved a psychosis and testified that hallucinations were primarily symptoms of psychosis.\n(e) Dr. Rosenstein testified that if the legal definition of insanity equated with psychosis, then Dr. Shankel\u2019s diagnosis of schizophrenia did not fit within the legal definition. \u201cBy definition, the schizophrenia does not preclude the ability to preceive [sic] reality with some accuracy.\u201d Whether a chronic schizophrenic was capable of understanding the nature and quality of his actions \u201cwould depend on his mental state at any particular time.\u201d\nIn light of the foregoing circumstances, the uncontradicted evidence rule was not applicable. In the light of the foregoing, Dr. Shankel\u2019s testimony was neither so clear nor of such persuasive force that it required a ruling of law that defendant was insane. State v. Gardner, supra. The trial court did not err in denying the motion for a directed verdict; it correctly submitted the insanity issue to the jury.\nExhibits to jury during its deliberation.\nWhile deliberating, the jury requested \u201cto see the Doctors [sic] reports that were introduced as evidence.\u201d The record indicates all exhibits, except clothing and a mannequin, were sent to the jury. Defendant claims this was error, relying on State v. Ross, 85 N.M. 176, 510 P.2d 109 (Ct.App.1973).\nRoss, supra, considered the question of sending exhibits to the jury during its deliberation under the law existing prior to the effective date of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. This case is subject to the Rules of Criminal Procedure.\nSection 41-23-42(c), N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, Supp.1973) states: \u201cUpon its request to review any exhibit during its deliberations, the jury shall be furnished all exhibits received in evidence.\u201d Under this rule, all exhibits, received in evidence, are to be furnished to the jury if the jury requests any exhibit.\nDefendant does not complaint of the failure to send the clothing and mannequin to the jury. His complaint concerns the exhibits that were furnished. Since \u00a7 41-23^42 (c), supra, authorized sending those exhibits to the jury, there was no error in doing so.\nValidity of imprisonment for costs.\nDefendant was sentenced to not less than ten nor more than fifty years in the penitentiary. Section 40A-2-1, supra; \u00a7 40A-29-3(B), N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 6). He was also ordered to pay all court costs incurred as a result of the trial. Section 41 \u2014 13\u20144, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 6). The district court clerk certified costs of $4,050.86. The amended commit-merit, directs penitentiary officials to confine'defendant until the sentence is served and the costs are paid.\nThe showing in this record is that defendant is an indigent. On the basis of this indigency, defendant claims that he will be imprisoned, pursuant to the amended commitment, because he is ttnable to pay the costs assessed against him.\nOur statutes provide for imprisonment for costs.\nSection 42-2-9, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 6) deals with commitments to prison for nonpayment of costs. Subdivision (A) states a prisoner will be credited with $5.00 \u201ca day in reduction thereof for each day or portion of a day of imprisonment.\u201d Subdivision (B) states that if the person in custody makes an affidavit that he has no property out of which to pay the costs, he is not to be retained in custody longer than three months.\nSection 42-1-60, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6) states that convicts sentenced to the penitentiary who have costs attached to their sentence shall not be required to serve more than thirty days for such costs.\nThe parties agree that \u00a7 42-1-60, supra, is the statute applicable to defendant. The State contends the sentence and commitment is valid and the only corrective action needed is to make it clear that the commitment to prison for costs is subject to the provisions of \u00a7 42-1-60, supra. Defendant asserts that imprisonment, based solely on his inability to pay costs, deprives him of equal protection of the law. We agree with defendant.\nWilliams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S. Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970) states: \u201cBy making the maximum confinement contingent upon one\u2019s ability to pay, the State has visited different consequences on two categories of persons since the result is to make incarceration in excess of the statutory maximum applicable only to those without the requisite resources to satisfy the money portion of the judgment.\u201d In holding such different consequences violate equal protection of the law, Williams v. Illinois, supra, states: \u201conce the State has defined the outer limits of incarceration necessary to satisfy its penological interests and policies, it may not then subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely by reason of their indigency.\u201d See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971).\nWe do not hold that alternatives may not be employed by the State in seeking to collect court costs. That issue is not before us. See Tate v. Short, supra; Williams v. Illinois, supra. Our holding is that defendant may not be imprisoned beyond the maximum statutory sentence because of his inability to pay the costs assessed against him.\nWhat is the effect of this holding in this case? The penitentiary sentence of not less than ten nor more than fifty years is valid. The provision in the judgment and sentence, directing defendant to pay costs, is valid. The provision in the amended commitment directing penitentiary officials to confine defendant until the costs are paid is invalid.\nThe judgment and sentence is affirmed. The amended commitment is set aside. The trial court is instructed to issue an amended commitment consistent with this opinion.\nIt is so ordered.\nHERNANDEZ and LOPEZ, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WOOD, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Chester H. Walter, Jr., Chief Public Defender, Pedro G. Rael, Special Asst. Public Defender, Santa Fe, for appellant.", "David L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., George A. Morrison, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "521 P.2d 1040\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lorenzo CHAVEZ, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 1338.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nFeb. 27, 1974.\nCertiorari Denied April 1, 1974.\nChester H. Walter, Jr., Chief Public Defender, Pedro G. Rael, Special Asst. Public Defender, Santa Fe, for appellant.\nDavid L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., George A. Morrison, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0199-01", "first_page_order": 229, "last_page_order": 232 }