{ "id": 2836400, "name": "Robert Terry PETERSON and Bursch Trucking, Inc., Plalntiffs-Appellees, v. J. M. ROMERO, as Administrator of the Estate of Joe M. Romero, Deceased, and J. M. Romero, Individually, Defendants and Third-Party Plalntiffs-Appellants, v. The HERTZ CORPORATION and Royal Globe Insurance Company, Third-Party Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Peterson v. Romero", "decision_date": "1975-10-28", "docket_number": "No. 1854", "first_page": "483", "last_page": "486", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "88 N.M. 483" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "542 P.2d 434" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "280 N.W. 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "year": 1938, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Minn. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 270405 ], "year": 1938, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/203/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 N.W. 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Wis. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis.", "case_ids": [ 8696809 ], "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis/224/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.C. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "S.C.", "case_ids": [ 2051274 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/185/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 S.C. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "S.C.", "case_ids": [ 2036241 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1934, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/173/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 P.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.M. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2741995 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/79/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 P.2d 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Hawaii 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Haw.", "case_ids": [ 1444766 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/haw/53/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.W.2d 739", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10139877 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/418/0739-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.W.2d 152", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10123374 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/406/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 S.W.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10124752 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/497/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 N.M. L.Rev. 11", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N.M. L. Rev.", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2767003 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2774253 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0062-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 528, "char_count": 8991, "ocr_confidence": 0.813, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.21076190263479e-08, "percentile": 0.47662103080140966 }, "sha256": "1066152f08d0f49d764b7c34468bc1a8332d5cfea761780240a4ab74480cbe74", "simhash": "1:59446f56101730cd", "word_count": 1492 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:34:46.516747+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WOOD, C. J., and LOPEZ, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "Robert Terry PETERSON and Bursch Trucking, Inc., Plalntiffs-Appellees, v. J. M. ROMERO, as Administrator of the Estate of Joe M. Romero, Deceased, and J. M. Romero, Individually, Defendants and Third-Party Plalntiffs-Appellants, v. The HERTZ CORPORATION and Royal Globe Insurance Company, Third-Party Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSUTIN, Judge.\nSummary judgment was entered in favor of The Hertz Corporation and Royal Globe Insurance Company, its insurer, third-party defendants, and against J. M. Romero, administrator of the estate of Joe M. Romero, deceased (decedent), and J. M. Romero, individually (Romero), third-party plaintiffs. Romero appeals. We affirm.\nOn June 10, 1972, decedent was killed in an automobile accident. His estate and Romero were sued by plaintiffs for damages. Romero requested Hertz to defend the action under the rental contract and Hertz refused.\nThe trial court found that (1) decedent, at the time of the accident, was 18 years of age and he was driving a Hertz car rented by Romero; that the rental contract provided in part:\n7. Vehicle shall NOT be operated by any person except Customer and the following Authorized Operators, each of whom must be duly qualified and licensed to drive and must have received Customer's advance permission:\n(a) persons of full age (21 years) who are members of the immediate family of Customer and permanently residing in Customer\u2019s household. [Emphasis added.]\n(2)Because decedent was below 21 years of age, no genuine issue of material fact existed and an interlocutory summary judgment was entered.\nRomero and decedent complied with the requirements of paragraph 7, supra, except for the age of decedent.\nThe first issue is whether Romero and decedent\u2019s estate were covered by the insurance provisions of the rental contract. This is a matter of first impression.\nA. Section 13-13-1(A), (B) does not modify the rental contract as to age.\nSection 13-13-1 (A), (B), N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl.Vol. 3, 1973 Supp.) was in effect at the time of the rental contract by virtue of the enactment of the New Mexico Age of Majority Act of 1971. It provided in pertinent part that:\nA. Except as provided in Subsection B * * * notwithstanding any law to the contrary:\n(1) any person whp has reached his eighteenth birthday shall be considered to have reached his majority and is an adult for all purposes the same as if he had reached his twenty-first birthday;\n(2) any law conferring any right or privilege, or imposing any duty or obligation, upon any person who has reached his twenty-first birthday shall apply to any person who has reached his eighteenth birthday;\n(3) any law which denies any right or privilege to persons who have not reached their twenty-first birthday shall apply only to persons who have not reached their eighteenth birthday; and\n(4) any law, except the Liquor Control Act [\u00a7\u00a7 46-1-1 to 46-11-4], which differentiates between treatment to be accorded persons who have reached their twenty-first birthday and those who have not, shall differentiate between treatment to be accorded persons who have reached their eighteenth birthday and those who have not.\nB. It is the intent of the legislature that this general law shall control over any conflicting prior special law except that it shall not apply to or change any age requirements for exercising the elective franchise.\nDoes this statute modify the Hertz rental contract by substituting \u201c18 years\u201d for \u201c21 years\u201d ? The answer is \u201cno\u201d.\nThus far, \u00a7 13-13-1 has been applied in two divorce cases. Phelps v. Phelps, 85 N.M. 62, 509 P.2d 254 (1973); Mason v. Mason, 84 N.M. 720, 507 P.2d 781 (1973). In each case, it was held that, for purposes of paying support for minor children, support stops when the children reach eighteen years of age.\nIt has been said that \u201can unmarried 18-year-old of either sex, . . . under the Age of Majority Act passed by the 1971 New Mexico Legislature, has full powers to contract * * Bingaman, The Effects of an Equal Rights Amendment on the New Mexico System of Community Property: Problems of Characterization, Management and Control, 3 N.M. L.Rev. 11, 39 (1973) (footnote omitted).\nNo authority has been cited and we have found none which determines what effect, if any, \u00a7 13-13-1 (A) has on the rental contract entered into by Romero.\nKentucky and Michigan have similar Age of Majority Acts. Ky.Rev.Stat. \u00a7 2.-015 (1970); 37 Mich.Compiled Laws Ann. \u00a7 722.52 (Supp.1972). The closest analogy we can find comes from Kentucky in a number of divorce cases. These cases involved the situation in which, at the time of the divorce and before the enactment of the Age of Majority Act, the father agreed to support his minor children until they reached \u201cmajority\u201d. In each case, the court held that the agreement between the parties would control, not the statutory provision, and that the father had to support the children until age 21. Showalter v. Showalter, 497 S.W.2d 420 (Ky.1973). \u201cIn construing a contract, the intention of the parties govern.\u201d Wilcox v. Wilcox, 406 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Ky.1966). \u201cThe enactment of the statute made no change in this contract.\u201d Collins v. Collins, 418 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Ky.1967).\nThe statute is broad when it states that decedent \u201cis an adult for all purposes the same as if he had reached his twenty-first birthday.\u201d What is meant by the phrase \u201cfor all purposes\u201d ? We believe that the phrase \u201cfor all purposes\u201d does not bar the right of parties to a contract to agree that \u201cof full age\u201d may be stipulated to mean 21 years.\nThe intent of the legislature is clear. Subsection B declared that the purpose of the statute was to substitute the age of 18 for the age of 21 when any prior special law fixed an adult age of 21 years, subject to the specific exception of liquor control.\n\u201cFor all purposes\u201d means that when a prior special law fixes the age of 21 years, a person of the age of 18 years is an adult, and subject to the provisions of the special law, \u201cfor all purposes\u201d of that special law.\nWe can find no analogical or interpretive basis for the contention that \u201cfor all purposes\u201d means that a person 18 years of age is an adult in every phase of law, including the law of contracts and the modification of contracts.\n\u201cThe phrase \u2018for any purpose\u2019 * * * is not all-encompassing, but is restricted to a reasonable construction by the context of the entire statute and the purposes of the act. [Citation omitted.]\u201d Pacific Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Oregon Auto Ins. Co., 53 Hawaii 208, 212, 490 P.2d 899, 902 (1971). The Hawaiian Court held that where the interpretation of the phrase \u201cfor any purpose\u201d was totally inconsistent with the purposes of the Act as well as unreasonable and absurd, a departure from a literal construction is justified even in the absence of statutory ambiguity.\nWe hold that a reasonable construction of \u00a7 13-13-1 (A) should not lead to the unreasonable and absurd result that the contract language \u201cof full age (21 years)\u201d means \u201c18 years\u201d. Romero and decedent were not covered by the Hertz rental agreement.\nB. Other issues raised do not create an issue of fact.\nPlaintiff contends provisions of the contract which read \u201cfull age (21 years)\u201d is ambiguous and on the basis of the asserted ambiguity we should hold that \u201cfull age\u201d means 18 years. There is no ambig\u00faity. \u201cTwenty-one years\u201d dearly and unambiguously shows the meaning of \u201cfull age\u201d.\nPlaintiff contends paragraph 6(a) of the rental contract is void and unenforceable because it violates \u00a7 64-24-87, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 2). This section contains a provision stating who is to be an insured under our Financial Responsibility Law. There is nothing in this record indicating the Financial Responsibility Law was applicable. Larson v. Occidental Fire and Casualty Company, 79 N.M. 562, 446 P.2d 210 (1968).\nPlaintiff contends summary judgment was improper because there is nothing showing the presence or absence of a causal connection between the age of the decedent and the accident. This contention is based on decisions to the effect that the purpose was to relieve the insurance company of liability from accidents caused by the exclusion. See McGee v. Globe Indemnity Co., 173 S.C. 380, 175 S.E. 849 (1934); Bailey v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 185 S.C. 169, 193 S.E. 638 (1937). The \u201ccausal connection\u201d argument overlooks the fact that the issue is rights under a'contract and not a matter of tort liability. Causal connection between decedent\u2019s age and the accident did not have to be shown. Witzko v. Koenig, 224 Wis. 674, 272 N.W. 864 (1937); Giacomo v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 203 Minn. 185, 280 N.W. 653 (1938).\nAffirmed.\nIt is so ordered,\nWOOD, C. J., and LOPEZ, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "SUTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Rolando J. Matteucci, Albuquerque, for defendants and third-party plaintiffs-appellants.", "Paul L. Butt, Alan C. Torgerson, Shaffer, Butt, Jones & Thornton, Albuquerque, for third-party defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "542 P.2d 434\nRobert Terry PETERSON and Bursch Trucking, Inc., Plalntiffs-Appellees, v. J. M. ROMERO, as Administrator of the Estate of Joe M. Romero, Deceased, and J. M. Romero, Individually, Defendants and Third-Party Plalntiffs-Appellants, v. The HERTZ CORPORATION and Royal Globe Insurance Company, Third-Party Defendants-Appellees.\nNo. 1854.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nOct. 28, 1975.\nRolando J. Matteucci, Albuquerque, for defendants and third-party plaintiffs-appellants.\nPaul L. Butt, Alan C. Torgerson, Shaffer, Butt, Jones & Thornton, Albuquerque, for third-party defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0483-01", "first_page_order": 513, "last_page_order": 516 }