{ "id": 2865581, "name": "Boyce D. EDENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, a Department of the State of New Mexico, Employer, and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, a corporation, Insurer, Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Edens v. New Mexico Health & Social Services Department", "decision_date": "1976-03-16", "docket_number": "No. 10512", "first_page": "60", "last_page": "63", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "89 N.M. 60" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "547 P.2d 65" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "48 N.M. 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1560819 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/48/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 A. 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "year": 1938, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 N.J.Misc. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Misc.", "case_ids": [ 452632 ], "year": 1938, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-misc/16/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 N.M. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582960 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "90" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "92" }, { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/55/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8502922 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 F. 2d 673", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 533741 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/215/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2762329 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 N.M. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2852077 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/70/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2838017 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0366-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 615, "char_count": 11400, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.07776894289908e-07, "percentile": 0.9377994624397021 }, "sha256": "69caba862ac19b50f63006eff79b2d39d987f54928630f874b1f722316aeae73", "simhash": "1:3be0a0c238abef6f", "word_count": 1926 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:56:52.908635+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "OMAN, C. J., and McMANUS, STEPHENSON and SOSA, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Boyce D. EDENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, a Department of the State of New Mexico, Employer, and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, a corporation, Insurer, Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nMONTOYA, Justice.\nThis appeal arises from a denial of a claim under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. Plaintiff is the surviving spouse of Betty Jean Edens (Edens) who was fatally injured in a car accident in Albuquerque. At the time of the accident, Edens was employed in Albuquerque by defendant New Mexico Health and Social Services Department (HSSD).\nThe Bernalillo County District Court denied all relief sought under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, \u00a7\u00a7 59-10-1 to 37, N.M. S.A., 1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 9, Pt. 1, 1974). The judgment of the District Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Edens v. New Mexico Health & Social Serv. Dept., 88 N.M. 366, 540 P.2d 846 (Ct.App.1975). We granted certiorari.\nAt the time of the accident, Edens was employed by defendant HSSD as Director of its Bernalillo County North Valley Office in Albuquerque. The deceased and three other employees from Bernalillo County were ordered by the defendant-employer to attend a special two-day HSSD meeting in Santa Fe on October 3^1, 1973. They were requested by their respective supervisors to form a car pool and to return overnight to Albuquerque between the two sessions in order to save fuel and reduce travel costs. Consequently, on the morning of October 3, 1973, Edens and the three other employees met at the Gulf Mart parking lot on San Mateo Boulevard in Albuquerque and proceeded as a group to Santa Fe in Edens\u2019 car. At the close of the first day\u2019s session, the four returned to the Gulf Mart parking lot. After discharging her three colleagues from her car, Edens drove out of the parking lot and immediately thereafter was involved in the accident which resulted in her death.\nPlaintiff-appellant contests the three findings of fact by the trial court, that (1) Edens had completed all the duties of her employment before the accident; (2) she was not performing any duties of her employment and was not acting within the scope and course of her employment at the time of the accident; and (3) the accident did not arise out of, nor was it incidental to, her employment.\nThe defendants-appellees, on the other hand, contend that the findings of the trial court are supported by substantial evidence. They contend that this case comes within the longstanding \u201cgoing and coming\u201d rule which precludes compensation for injuries sustained on the way to work and on the way home from work.\nThe pertinent provisions of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act are \u00a7\u00a7 59-10-2 and 59-10-12.12, supra, which declare in part:\n(\u00a7 59-10-2)\n\u201cThe state * * * shall become liable to, and shall pay to any * * * workman injured by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment [with the state] * * * and, in case of his death being occasioned thereby, to such person as may be appointed by the court to receive the same for the benefit of his dependents, compensation in the manner and amount, at the times herein required.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\n(\u00a7 59-10-12.12)\n\u201cAs used in the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act [59-10-1 to 59-10-37], unless the context otherwise requires, the words \u2018injuries sustained in extra-hazardous occupations or pursuit\u2019 shall include death resulting from injury, and injuries to workmen, as a result of their employment and while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer, .and injuries occurring elsewhere while at work in any place where their employer\u2019s business requires their presence and subjects them to extra-hazardous duties incident to the business, but shall not include injuries to any workman occurring while on his way to assume the duties of his employment or after leaving such duties, the approximate cause of which injury is not the employer\u2019s negligence.\u201d\nSee also \u00a7 59-10-13.3, supra.\nThe question before us is whether the fatal injuries to Edens arose out of and in the course of her employment.\nWe now turn to the scope of review to be exercised in reviewing the District Court\u2019s decision. All cases arising under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, like the one before us, are tried to the court without a jury. Section 59-10-13.1, supra. The Rules of Civil Procedure apply to these cases except where the Act provides otherwise. Section 59-10-13.9, supra. Consequently, in workmen\u2019s compensation cases findings of fact are reviewable only to the extent of determining whether they are supported by substantial evidence, whereas conclusions of law are freely reviewable. Whitehurst v. Rainbo Baking Company, 70 N.M. 468, 374 P.2d 849 (1962).\nAre the determinations of the District Court appealed from findings of fact or conclusions of law? The District Court concluded, and the parties and the Court of Appeals assumed, that they are findings of fact. This court is not bound, however, by the labels attached below to these determinations. In re McCain, 84 N.M. 657, 506 P.2d 1204 (1973); Houck v. Hinds, 215 F. 2d 673 (10th Cir. 1954). The issue whether a determination is a finding of fact or a conclusion of law is itself a question of law and, therefore, freely reviewable in this court.\nWe have previously held that, where the historical facts of the case are undisputed, the question whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment is a question of law. Ward v. Halliburton Company, 76 N.M. 463, 415 P. 2d 847 (1966); Whitehurst v. Rainbo Baking Company, supra. See generally, 100 C.J.S Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 611, at 869-71 (1958); 58 Am.Jur. Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 461 at 872-73 (1948). There was no material dispute as to the historical facts of this case in the court below. Therefore, under our precedents, the District Court should have determined whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment as a matter of law, and such determination is freely reviewable on appeal.\nTurning to the merits, we find no holding in this jurisdiction directly on point. However, in the case of Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 55 N.M. 81, 94, 227 P.2d 365, 373 (1950), this court said:\n\u201cWe are committed to the doctrine that the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act must be liberally construed, and reasonable doubts resolved in favor of employees. [Citations omitted.] So construing the act, we conclude that when an employee is sent by his employer on a special mission away from his regular work; or by the terms of his contract of employment he is burdened with a special duty incidental to, but aside from the labor upon which his wages are measured; while on such mission, or in the performance of such duty, the employee is acting within the course of his employment; notwithstanding no wages or remuneration is specified as applicable to such mission or duty; and notwithstanding an automobile is required for such performance which is furnished by the employee without cost to the employer. If an employee is accidently injured while on such mission, or in the performance of such duty, the injury arises out of and in the course of his employment. * * * \u201d\nEdens was sent on a special mission to the meeting in Santa Fe, away from her regular work at the Bernalillo County North Valley Office. The question remains, however, whether she was performing that special mission at the time of the fatal accident. The Wilson case is helpful on this point as well. It quoted the case of Rafferty v. Dairymen\u2019s League Co-op Ass\u2019n, 16 N.J.Misc. 363, 200 A. 493 (Work. Comp. Bur: 1938), and stated (55 N.M. at 90, 227 P.2d at 371):\n\u201c \u2018An employe, authorized or required to use an automobile by his employer in the fulfilling of his contract of service, is still within the course of his employment while driving from the point of last call to his home where the car is garaged. * * *\u2019 \u201d\nIt is instructive here also to consider the words of this court in the case of McKinney v. Dorlac, 48 N.M. 149, 146 P. 2d 867 (1944), quoted in Wilson (55 N.M. at 92, 227 P.2d at 372):\n\u201c * * * an injury to an employe arises in the course of his employment if at a place where he may reasonably be, \u2018and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or engaged in doing something incidental [thereto].\u2019\u201d\nWhen did the special mission begin? At the moment Edens left home that morning ? When she picked up her colleagues? When she left the city limits of Albuquerque? When the meeting began in Santa Fe? The logical point at which her special mission began was at the moment she left her home for Santa Fe. This conclusion is amply supported by the authority cited above. The defendants would have us hold that the beginning of her duties of employment came when she met her colleagues in the Gulf Mart parking lot. However, the scope of employment is to be determined from the directions of her employer, and not from any agreement between her and her fellow employees. Thus, the fact that she agreed with her fellow employees to form a car pool at Gulf Mart was of no consequence to the scope of her employment.\nIn this regard, the following rules, as stated in 1 Larson on Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law, \u00a7 14.00 Meaning of \u201cCourse of Employment\u201d (1972), are applicable:\n\u201cAn injury is said to arise in the course of the employment when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto.\u201d\nIn considering the special errand rule, which is an exception to the \u201cgoing and coming rule,\u201d Larson, supra, \u00a7 16.10 defines it as follows:\n\u201cThe special errand rule may be stated as follows: When an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises journey which would normally not be covered under the usual going and coming rule, the journey may be brought within the course of employment by the fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in the particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the service itself.\u201d\nWe agree that the special errand rule is applicable to this case.\nEach of the four employees who went that day to Santa Fe was the on a special mission for their employer HSSD, and each was within the scope of his employment from the moment he left home until the moment he returned home at the end of the day. Therefore, we hold that the fatal injuries suffered by Betty Jean Edens arose out of and in the course of her employment, and that the \u201cgoing and coming\u201d rule is inapplicable to these facts.\nThe judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court, with instructions to make such further findings as are necessary to determine the amount of recovery and to whom payable, to consider the question of attorneys\u2019 fees at both the trial and appellate level, and to enter judgment accordingly.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nOMAN, C. J., and McMANUS, STEPHENSON and SOSA, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MONTOYA, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "David W. Bonem, Clovis, Scott H. Mabry, David F. Boyd, Jr., Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, James A. Parker, Judy A. Fry, Albuquerque, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "547 P.2d 65\nBoyce D. EDENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, a Department of the State of New Mexico, Employer, and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, a corporation, Insurer, Defendants-Appellees.\nNo. 10512.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nMarch 16, 1976.\nDavid W. Bonem, Clovis, Scott H. Mabry, David F. Boyd, Jr., Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant.\nModrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, James A. Parker, Judy A. Fry, Albuquerque, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0060-01", "first_page_order": 96, "last_page_order": 99 }