{ "id": 2864373, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Petitioner, v. Donald RASCON, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Rascon", "decision_date": "1976-04-14", "docket_number": "No. 10603", "first_page": "254", "last_page": "261", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "89 N.M. 254" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "550 P.2d 266" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "422 U.S. 806", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9431 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 719", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12047240 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729" }, { "page": "1779" }, { "page": "733-734" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 U.S. 478", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6166688 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/378/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 F.2d 217", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 208099 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/489/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 U.S. 682", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173132 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" }, { "page": "1882" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/406/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168076 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/388/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167869 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/399/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 U.S. 45", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 369864 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/287/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 P.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2841081 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8500300 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2840236 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0395-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1059, "char_count": 24763, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1661625939898174e-07, "percentile": 0.7704904803330233 }, "sha256": "0121c5ebd9213efd04f6f6836f91d33882ff5c969c7d0811f7589f468795a98f", "simhash": "1:baea8412b8935f4e", "word_count": 4074 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:56:52.908635+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "OMAN, C. J., and McMANUS, MONTOYA and SOSA, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Petitioner, v. Donald RASCON, Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSTEPHENSON, Justice.\nRasc\u00f3n was charged by criminal complaint with assault with intent to commit rape. Arrested on a warrant, he was twice given Miranda warnings, made inculpatory statements and was later indicted. The trial court granted Rascon\u2019s motion to suppress the statements because of failure by the police to notify the public defender that the defendant was in custody as provided by \u00a7 41-22A-12(C) N.M.S.A. (Supp.1975). The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Rascon, 88 N.M. 395, 540 P.2d 875 (Ct.App.1975). We granted certiorari and reverse the Court of Appeals and the district court.\nAccording to Rascon\u2019s trial counsel, a public defender, Rascon\u2019s name came to the attention of the district public defender\u2019s office on June 18, 1974. A great deal of the record can be summarized by saying that the public defender does not have the vaguest notion how this occurred. In any case, on the same day the district defender supposedly assigned counsel to Rasc\u00f3n, and counsel telephoned the jail to inquire about his new client. He was told that Rasc\u00f3n was not in custody, which was true. On June 20, 1974, the district attorney\u2019s office filed a criminal complaint against Rasc\u00f3n in magistrate court and a warrant issued. Rasc\u00f3n was apprehended the same day. He was immediately given Miranda warnings by reading his rights to him from the \u201crights card.\u201d When booked he was again given his rights by use of the \u201cadvice of rights form.\u201d In pertinent part, this form was divided into seven separate paragraphs, each of which Rasc\u00f3n initialed, and then signed an acknowledgement that he had been advised of, read and understood his constitutional rights. He then signed a waiver of rights. The police never complied with \u00a7 41-22A-12(C).\nThere is neither evidence nor inference that the advice of rights and waiver of rights forms were not intelligently and voluntarily executed. Rasc\u00f3n thereafter on June 20th made the statements in question. They are not claimed to have been other than voluntary. On July 17th he was indicted and later filed his motion to suppress. The motion set forth several grounds for relief, one of which was a failure on the part of the police to comply with \u00a7 41-22A-12(C). The trial court, after finding that Rasc\u00f3n had been advised of his rights, sustained the motion on the grounds that the police had failed to comply with the mentioned statute. The Court of Appeals held that the statute granted an \u201cextension\u201d of \u201cnormal\u201d constitutional rights and that suppression of the statements was required.\nInasmuch as the Court of Appeals did not specify the particular constitutional, rights which it considered to have been extended by \u00a7 41-22A-12(C), we will consider the array. We are concerned with the rights granted by the sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States \u201cto have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense\u201d and the similar rights mentioned in Article II, \u00a7 14 of the New Mexico Constitution (hereafter \u201csixth amendment rights\u201d). We are also concerned with the right of a defendant not \u201cto be a witness against himself\u201d granted by the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and the similar right granted by Article II, \u00a7 15 of the New Mexico Constitution not to \u201cbe compelled to testify against himself in a criminal proceeding\u201d (hereafter \u201cfifth amendment rights\u201d).\nThe statutory scheme for furnishing lawyers to those financially incapable of employing counsel is embodied in the Indigent Defense Act, \u00a7\u00a7 41-22-1 through -10 N.M.S.A.1953, as amended, and the Public Defender Act, \u00a7\u00a7 41-22A-1 through -12 N.M.S.A. (Supp.1975). These acts are in pari materia. See State v. New Mexico State Authority, 76 N.M. 1, 411 P.2d 984 (1966); New Mexico Mun. L., Inc. v. New Mexico Envir. Imp. Bd., 88 N.M. 201, 539 P.2d 221 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248 (1975). They are, in the main, responses to sixth amendment rights to counsel for the actual defense of criminal charges. Sixth amendment rights entitle an accused to defense counsel at any \u201ccritical stage\u201d of the prosecution. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). However, the right is not recognized by the United States Supreme Court to come into play prior to arraignment [Powell v. Alabama, supra], preliminary hearing [Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970)] or lineups after the initiation of formal charges [United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967)]. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L. Ed.2d 411 (1972).\nConsistent with such concepts, the Indigent Defense Act, while recognizing in general terms that a \u201cneedy person\u201d has a right to be \u201ccounseled and defended\u201d at earlier times, nevertheless requires a judicial determination of whether a person is \u201cneedy.\u201d This determination shall be \u201cdeferred until his first appearance in court.\u201d \u00a7 41-22-5(A). If the court determines that the person is \u201cneedy,\u201d the district court shall promptly assign counsel. \u00a7 41-22-4 (C). It is in this manner that the attorney-client relationship commences for the defense in response to the sixth amendment. Provision is also made for the waiver of counsel in \u00a7 41-22-6. That section refers to the waiver of Sixth Amendment Rights.\nThe Public Defender Act creates an agency or arm of the State which undertakes representation of persons \u201cfinancially unable to obtain counsel.\u201d \u00a7 41-22A-10(B). The representation commences \u201cnot later than the time of the initial appearance of the person before any court\u201d and continues throughout, including appeal. Id. It is implicit in the Act that a judicial determination of indigency is necessary. These procedures relate to the sixth amendment and may be waived. Section 41-22A~12(D) provides:\nAny person entitled to representation by the district public defender may intelligently waive his right to representation.\nThe waiver may be for all or any part of the proceedings. The waiver must be in writing and countersigned by a district public defender.\nThis subsection clearly relates to waiver of sixth amendment rights to counsel.\nWe turn to the examination of fifth amendment rights. This is the right against self-incrimination and does not directly involve right to counsel. The touchstone is Miranda v. Arizona, supra. It neither created nor expanded upon the constitutional right to counsel. It dealt with the right to be informed of rights against self-incrimination. It does not obligate the State to furnish counsel; rather, it creates a series of choices on the part of the law enforcement officers and the accused. If the officers wish to question the suspect and be able to make use of statements which he may make, they should give him the warnings laid down in Miranda or their equivalent. The next move is up to the person detained. If he wishes to assert such rights, he may elect to consult with counsel, to have counsel present during questioning or both. The ball is then back in the officers\u2019 court. They may elect to question the suspect no further, in which event the State is under no obligation to provide counsel at that point in response to fifth amendment rights. But if the officers elect to interrogate the person and wish to be able to use his statements, the suspect should be accorded his rights to consult with counsel or to have counsel present, or both, as he chooses. The consequences of continued questioning on the part of the officers without implementation of such an election is, according to Miranda :\nIf the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel (citation omitted).\n384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628.\nSuch were Rascon's rights under the fifth and sixth amendments to the Constitution of the United States. No useful purpose would be served by holding that his rights were less under the parallel provisions of the New Mexico Constitution, and we are not disposed to hold that they were greater.\nRasc\u00f3n effectively waived his fifth amendment rights. The statutory scheme we have outlined accorded to him his sixth amendment rights in full measure. He was provided with an attorney at arraignment, has had one ever since and has one now. None of his federal or state constitutional rights in respect to counsel were violated.\nIf some right of Rasc\u00f3n regarding counsel was violated, it must of necessity have been a right arising under the provisions of the Indigent Defense Act or the Public Defender Act. Because of the factual foundation upon which Rascon\u2019s argument is constructed, involving interrogation rather than defense of a formal charge, and the relief he seeks which is suppression of a presumably incriminating statement, we are concerned with a supposed statutory extension of fifth amendment rights or some statutory right closely akin to them. We are convinced that the Indigent Defense Act, couched throughout in terms of representation, deals exclusively with sixth amendment rights for the defense of criminal charges \u2014 rights which we have said were accorded to Rasc\u00f3n and which he does not assert were denied to him. We turn our attention to the Public Defender Act.\nRascon\u2019s argument centers on \u00a7 41-22A-12(C) coupled with \u00a7 41-22A-10(E). It is urged that these two statutes together create a right to consult with counsel, or perhaps even an attorney-client relationship, from the instant of forcible detention. We do not so view them.\nThis court and our legislature have created an elaborate and carefully structured arrangement for the protection of rights of persons detained in respect to assistance of counsel from the time of commencement of detention. But the arrangements so created do not in terms provide for such early consultation as is contended by Rasc\u00f3n. The Public Defender Act is not self-executing insofar as rendition of services by the defender is concerned. The ultimate decision as to whether such services will be rendered is left to the district courts within guidelines established by statute, court rule or judicial decision. Conversely, it is clear the decision is not left either to the person detained or to the public defender.\nThe Public Defender Act not only spells out the powers and duties of the defender, but restricts them as well. He is not generally authorized or empowered to consult with or represent persons detained, nor to volunteer his services or advice, except in accordance with the Act. In fact, should he do so, he might confront the normal dangers of counseling persons with whom no attorney-client relationship exists and who have evinced no desire to confer in response to the Miranda warnings. See Rule 2-103, Code of Professional Responsibility. One notable freedom is the right to be free of unsought lawyers.\nMoreover, we see no need for any such right of early consultation or representation, nor any purpose to be served thereby. Our Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 provides, inter alia, that the arresting officer shall make a return to the court which issued the warrant and that \u201c[u]pon arrest the defendant shall be brought before the court without unnecessary delay.\u201d Rule 16 applied both to magistrate and district courts, was doubtless patterned on Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and antedated the Public Defender Act. At the expeditious initial appearance required by Rule 16, Rule 19 of those rules requires certain explanations of rights to be given to the defendant, including rights to counsel for assistance and defense at every stage \u201cof the proceedings,\u201d obviously sixth amendment rights.\nIn order to implement those rights, \u00a7 41-22A-12(A) provides that at any court appearance, obviously including the initial one, the person detained be advised of his rights to confer with the defender and \u201cif he is financially unable to obtain counsel,\u201d to be represented by the defender. Inasmuch as the benefits of the Public Defender Act accrue only to those who are \u201cfinancially unable to obtain counsel\u201d and who are charged with certain crimes [\u00a7 41-22A-10(B)], obviously a determination of indigency is required. Inquiry into this feature is accomplished by the court, and the public defender is assigned to the case where indigency appears. Although \u00a7 41-22A-12(B) is somewhat inartfully worded, such is its clear import, particularly when considered in conjunction with \u00a7 41-22A-12(A). There is thus no occasion for earlier consultations between the person detained and the defender upon the subject of indigency, since the initial hearing presumably occurs without unnecessary delay, and the defender would of necessity know if indigency is determined to exist. Naturally, if the initial appearance is in magistrate court and indigency is found to exist, the matter must be brought to the attention of a district judge for assignment of the defender, whether by \u00a7 41-22-4 or otherwise. This is an administrative detail with which we are not presently concerned.\nThe method of assignment of the defender without unnecessary delay which we have reviewed thus accounts for the specific provision of \u00a7 41-22A-10(B) that \u201c[t]he representation shall begin not later than the time of the initial appearance of the person before any court . . ..\u201d The phrase \u201cnot later than\u201d recognizes that under certain circumstances, earlier contacts between the defender and the person detained may be permitted by the court, as we shall presently see.\nWhat then is the purpose and meaning of \u00a7 41-22A-12(C) ? We are of the opinion that \u00a7 41-22A-12(C) was intended to advise the public defender of the names and whereabouts of persons who are being forcibly detained so that if they are not brought before a court for an initial appearance without unnecessary delay, the public defender may make inquiries, with demands upon the State to bring forth the prisoner if appropriate and with application to a court if necessary. During such inquiries the defender might think it needful to consult with the person detained. In that event the defender must request the court\u2019s authorization to conduct an interview. Section 41-22A-10(E) would sanction such a procedure.\nSection 41-22A-12(C) may well have other purposes of an administrative nature. Compliance with it would serve to alert the public defender that he might be .called upon to confer with a detained person who has elected to consult with an attorney or have one present during questioning in response to Miranda warnings. And by \u00a7 41-22A-7 the public defender is required to conduct research and studies that will improve the operation of the department and the administration of the Act; to maintain records and statistical data which reflect the operation and administration of the department; and to submit an annual report covering such matters. Moreover, under \u00a7 41-22A-9 in connection with the establishment and revision of public defender districts, he is required to take into account, inter alia, case load statistics.\nWe hold that \u00a7 41-22A-12(C) does not expand upon or extend the constitutional rights of a person forcibly detained, under the Constitutions of the United States or New Mexico. - Rather, its prime purpose is to protect and implement the right of persons detained to be brought before a court without unnecessary delay.\nWe will not recognize or create by tortured construction of the Public Defender Act some early right of consultation or representation which is not provided by the Act, either in its terms or by implication, which lies outside the scope of Rascon\u2019s fifth or sixth amendment rights and which serves no useful purpose. We will not close our eyes to reality. We do not doubt that were we to countenance such early and unsought consultations, zealous defenders would on occasion counsel the person detained to remain silent, thus chilling the ability of the State to obtain statements or confessions. We do not believe the legislature had any such intention, and any reasonable judicial policy would mitigate against it.\nAnd what of \u00a7 41-22A-10(E) ? Is it a blanket authorization to confer with all indigent persons who are forcibly detained? It is not. In our opinion, \u00a7 41-22A-10(E) authorizes the public defender to confer with a person detained (1) when that person has evinced a desire to consult with an attorney or have one present during questioning in response to Miranda warnings and law enforcement personnel have asked the defender to do so; (2) when the defender is conducting inquiries into whether the initial appearance has been unnecessarily delayed or attempting to have the person detained brought before the court for such an appearance, and the district court has authorized him to do so; (3) when authorized or directed in other circumstances by a district judge or (4) when defending a criminal charge following the initial appearance.\nWe consider now the effect of the peace officers\u2019 failure to comply with \u00a7 41-22A-12(C). Rasc\u00f3n contends that suppression was required. We do not reach that question today. Rascon\u2019s sixth amendment rights were not involved and his fifth amendment rights were not violated, entirely apart from the consideration that they were waived. In addition, there is a total absence of any showing of prejudice.\nWe would not ordinarily require suppression of a statement or confession, unless the failure to comply resulted in the person detained being deprived of his right to an initial appearance without unnecessary delay. Moreover, such delay must have resulted in a violation of a constitutional right. A demonstration of actual prejudice would also be required.\nSuppression of evidence, which is to say suppression of facts and truth, on grounds which have nothing to do with the defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence, seems to have become fashionable. We apply federal constitutional law as announced by the United States Supreme Court in this regard without demurrer or voicing our reservations as to its wisdom or whether it achieves the objectives sought. However, we have no intention of expanding upon the suppression of evidence one whit further than is required of us.\nSimilarly, we do not reach the issue of whether one who is represented by an attorney and is in custody can be questioned before indictment by law enforcement officers after Miranda warnings. We observe that the law appears to favor such interrogations. See United States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d 217 (2nd Cir.1973).\nThe pendulum has swung so far and paused so long in the direction of supposed protection of the rights of criminal defendants that a distrust of confessions seems to have been generated \u2014 a visceral feeling that confessions are unfair; should be viewed with suspicion; and are somehow reprehensible because the person charged was not bound to speak. This is absurd. Confessions and inculpatory statements are useful and desirable in the detection and prosecution of crime. The search for truth and the achievement of justice are eased and facilitated, and efficiencies in law enforcement and the judicial process are encouraged. We are not disposed to distort the statutes we have cited beyond their terms so as to hamper the obtaining of statements and confessions within the parameters of constitutional safeguards.\nThe Court of Appeals is reversed. The order of the trial court is reversed. We remand to the trial court to continue with proceedings against the defendant.\nOMAN, C. J., and McMANUS, MONTOYA and SOSA, JJ., concur.\n. Section 40A-3-3 N.M.S.A.1953.\n. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).\n. \u201cPeace officers shall notify the district public defender of any person not represented by counsel who is being forcibly detained and who is charged with, or under suspicion of, the commission of any crime that carries a possible sentence of imprisonment, unless the person has previously appeared in court upon that charge.\u201d\n. \u201cYou have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court.\nYou have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have a lawyer present with you while we ask you questions.\nIf you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed at no cost to you before we ask you any questions, if that is your desire. If you decide to answer questions now, without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop answering my questions at any time. You also have the right to stop answering my questions at any time until you talk to a lawyer for advice.\nI have been advised of and understand my constitutional rights.\nI have read and understand my constitutional rights.\u201d\n. \u201cI have read this statement of my rights and understand what my constitutional rights are. (I have been advised of and understand my constitutional rights in this matter).\nI am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.\u201d\n. Ch. 69, \u00a7\u00a7 58-68, [1968] N.M.Laws 355-361, as amended ch. 210, \u00a7 1 [1973] N.M. Laws 682.\n. Ch. 156 [CL973] N.M.Laws 539-48.\n. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972), held the right to counsel at police identifications did not apply to pre-indictment show-ups.\n. A pre-Miranda ease, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), suggests that there is an earlier sixth amendment right, but the United States Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois, supra, stated :\nThe only seeming deviation from this long line of constitutional decisions was Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977. But Escobedo is not apposite here for two distinct reasons. First, the Court in retrospect pereeived that the \u201cprime purpose\u201d of Escobedo was not to vindicate the constitutional right to counsel as such, but, like Miranda, \u201cto guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination ...\u201d Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 1779, 16 L.Ed.2d 882. Secondly, and perhaps even more important for purely practical purposes, the Court has limited the holding of Escobedo to its own facts, Johnson v. New Jersey, supra at 733-734, 86 S.Ct. [1772] at 1780, and those facts are not remotely akin to the facts of the case before us. 406 U.S. at 689, 92 S.Ct. at 1882.\n.The district court still assigns counsel in those counties where there is no public defender or public defender contract attorney, or where conflicts necessitate appointment of outside counsel.\n. \u201cThe district public defender may confer with any person who is not represented by counsel and who is being forcibly detained.\u201d\n. Section 18-5-2 (Rule 2-103) N.M.S.A. (Supp.1975).\n. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).\n. Section 41-23-16 N.M.S.A. (Supp.1975).\n. N.M.R.Crim.P. 16 applied to magistrate courts by virtue of N.M.R.Crim.P. 1 before adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for Magistrate Courts, effective October 1, 1974. Now a comparable provision is found in N.M.R.Crim.P. for Magistrate Courts 4 (d), 12 [\u00a7 36-23-4(d), -12 N.M.S.A. (Supp. 1975)].\n. \u201cAn officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint on any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate . . . .\u201d\n.\u201cUpon the first appearance of a defendant before a court in response to summons or warrant or following arrest, the court shall inform the defendant of the following: (1) the offense charged; (2) the penalty provided by law for the offense charged; (3) the right to bail; (4) the right, if any, to trial by jury; (5) the right, if any, to the assistance of counsel at every stage of the proceedings; (6) the right, if any, to representation by an attorney at state expense; (7) the right to remain silent, and that any statement made by the defendant may be used against the defendant; and (8) the right, if any, to a preliminary examination.\u201d\n. \u201cFollowing notification of any person under subsection A of this section, the judge shall notify the district public defender and continue the proceedings until the person has conferred with the district public defender.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENSON, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "James L. Brandenburg, Dist. Atty., James F. Blackmer, Asst. Dist. Atty., Albuquerque, for petitioner.", "Jerome M. Ginsberg, Santa Fe, for respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "550 P.2d 266\nSTATE of New Mexico, Petitioner, v. Donald RASCON, Respondent.\nNo. 10603.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nApril 14, 1976.\nJames L. Brandenburg, Dist. Atty., James F. Blackmer, Asst. Dist. Atty., Albuquerque, for petitioner.\nJerome M. Ginsberg, Santa Fe, for respondent." }, "file_name": "0254-01", "first_page_order": 290, "last_page_order": 297 }