{
  "id": 2871030,
  "name": "Gordon W. McCLURE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mildred Lucille McCLURE, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "McClure v. McClure",
  "decision_date": "1976-08-13",
  "docket_number": "No. 10767",
  "first_page": "23",
  "last_page": "24",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "90 N.M. 23"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "559 P.2d 400"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.M.",
    "id": 8835,
    "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 52,
    "name_long": "New Mexico",
    "name": "N.M."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "37 N.M. 24",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
      "case_ids": [
        1575351
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1932,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/37/0024-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "86 N.M. 107",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
      "case_ids": [
        2829106
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1974,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/86/0107-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "85 N.M. 517",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
      "case_ids": [
        2775281
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1973,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/85/0517-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "84 N.M. 14",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
      "case_ids": [
        2764227
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1972,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/84/0014-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 364,
    "char_count": 5196,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.757,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.7194332324592236e-07,
      "percentile": 0.7036833035439518
    },
    "sha256": "a735ebbb1919f8c4f1c02836fa1869b7641294086e31e9e6d4890c13324a25d8",
    "simhash": "1:720b962c3537a5d8",
    "word_count": 869
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:34:48.706767+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "OMAN, C. J., and MONTOYA, J., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Gordon W. McCLURE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mildred Lucille McCLURE, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "OPINION\nGENE E. FRANCHINI, District Judge.\nThe present proceeding arises out of a Motion filed by the Plaintiff, Gordon W. McClure, pursuant to Section 22-7-6, N.M.S.A.1953 (Supp.1975), to terminate any further obligation to pay alimony to the Defendant, Mildred Lucille McClure, and a Motion filed by said Defendant pursuant to the same statutory provision to increase Plaintiff\u2019s alimony obligation. The District Court for the Second Judicial District entered its Order reducing and terminating over a period of four (4) years Plaintiff\u2019s obligation to pay alimony to the Defendant.\nThe. original decree was entered on March 4, 1970, at which time the Plaintiff was ordered to pay Defendant alimony in the sum of $350.00 per month as well as support for one minor son in the sum of $250.00 per month and the college education of his daughter in the sum of $3,840.00 per year.\nOn September 9, 1971, pursuant to a Motion filed by the Defendant, the Court increased the alimony to $400.00 per month. The daughter\u2019s support had terminated in June of 1971 as her education was completed and Plaintiff became obligated to pay for his son\u2019s college education in the approximate sum of $3,000.00 per year. By June of 1971, Plaintiff had married his second wife and Plaintiff acquired a stepdaughter who was then in high school. Defendant was then making $8,400.00 per year.\nOn October 10, 1974, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to terminate alimony and on November 12, 1974, Defendant filed a Motion for an increase. (At this time, Defendant was gainfully employed and had income from all sources of $17,439.82 per annum). Plaintiff\u2019s income had increased from $26,500.00 at the time of the divorce to $38,400.00 at the time of this hearing. He was still spending $3,000.00 to $4,000.00 per year for his son\u2019s education who is over 18 years of age and Plaintiff is providing a college education for his stepdaughter. The Defendant inherited $30,000.00 in 1968 and has invested and reinvested these funds in stocks and bonds over the last five (5) years. On April 20, 1975, the Trial Court conducted a hearing and pursuant thereto subsequently filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court below ordered that the monthly alimony payments be decreased by $100.00 on the first day of each July, commencing with July 1, 1975, so that the alimony obligation would be completely terminated by July 1, 1978. Defendant appeals.\nDefendant argues that there has not been such a change in circumstances as to warrant a termination of alimony even over a period of three (3) years. We disagree.\nThe Court\u2019s Finding of Fact number 10 states:\n\u2018\u2018The Defendant, while gainfully employed, has an income sufficient to take care of her support and maintenance in a manner to which she has become accustomed, and is not in need of additional sums of alimony from the Plaintiff\u201d.\nFindings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14, 498 P.2d 1357 (1972).\nThe award or denial of alimony is discretionary with the trial Court and will be reversed only if that discretion has been abused. Burnside v. Burnside, 85 N.M. 517, 514 P.2d 36 (1973). We find no abuse of discretion.\nIn Michelson v. Michelson, 86 N.M. 107, 520 P.2d 263 (1974) this Court set down a number of circumstances to be considered by the Trial Court in this type of case. These were, \u201cthe needs of the wife, her age, health, and the means to support herself, the earning capacity and future earnings of the husband, the duration of the marriage, and the amount of property owned by the parties\u201d. To these we would add the element or circumstance of time. The Appellee here has paid alimony to a former spouse for over five (5) years. This circumstance of time, taken into consideration with the other circumstances is sufficient for the Trial Court to consider a change in the alimony provisions of the original decree. Alimony is a personal right and not a property right. Burnside v. Burnside, supra. As such, it should not continue without end if the circumstances have changed due to the passage of time, as they have here, and the recipient is able to support herself.\nAppellant quotes extensively from Lord v. Lord, 37 N.M. 24, 16 P.2d 933 (1932) that a husband\u2019s remarriage and support of a stepchild are by themselves insufficient changes of circumstances to justify the modification of the award of alimony. These facts exist in the present case; however, they are combined with other facts which together and as a whole do show a sufficient change of circumstances to eventually terminate alimony. This is precisely what was done by the Trial Court. There is no error.\nThe Appellant\u2019s second point, i.e., error of the Trial Court in denying her Motion to increase alimony is without merit.\nAFFIRMED:\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nOMAN, C. J., and MONTOYA, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "GENE E. FRANCHINI, District Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, Gene C. Walton, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant.",
      "Paul P. Shwartz, Jon T. Kwako, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "559 P.2d 400\nGordon W. McCLURE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mildred Lucille McCLURE, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 10767.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nAug. 13, 1976.\nRodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, Gene C. Walton, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant.\nPaul P. Shwartz, Jon T. Kwako, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0023-01",
  "first_page_order": 59,
  "last_page_order": 60
}