{ "id": 2874228, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John DOE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Doe", "decision_date": "1977-03-01", "docket_number": "No. 2804", "first_page": "249", "last_page": "251", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "90 N.M. 249" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "561 P.2d 948" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "73 N.M. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5322433 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/73/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 N.M. 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2802933 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2838266 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 N.M. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2836897 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/87/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2803477 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0369-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 266, "char_count": 5359, "ocr_confidence": 0.794, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.842114463684807e-07, "percentile": 0.9323427736520546 }, "sha256": "c2500df740001ebdb557ffe65984731ddbf1425919e487d9ed4f9fffa766f588", "simhash": "1:ee48b2d1fa24c97b", "word_count": 860 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:34:48.706767+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HENDLEY and HERNANDEZ, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John DOE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWOOD, Chief Judge.\nThe child appeals from an order of the Children\u2019s Court which revoked probation and committed the child to the Boys School at Springer. We discuss two jurisdictional problems: (1) validity of the order placing the child on probation, and (2) effect of the order revoking the probation. The jurisdictional issues involved the power or authority of the Children\u2019s Court to decide the particular matter presented. Heckathorn v. Heckathorn, 77 N.M. 369, 423 P.2d 410 (1967). Statutory citations are to the Children\u2019s Code, \u00a7\u00a7 13-14-1 through 13-14-45, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl. Vol. 3, pt. 1).\nValidity of the Probation Order\nThe petition charged that the child had committed two delinquent acts which would be crimes if committed by an adult. The petition also charged that the child was in need of supervision, care or rehabilitation. In Re Doe, III, 87 N.M. 170, 531 P.2d 218 (Ct.App.1975).\nAfter a hearing, the Children\u2019s Court found that the child had committed the delinquent acts. Section 13-14-3(N), supra. The Children\u2019s Court did not find that the child was in need of care or rehabilitation. Section 13-14-28(E), supra, requires such a finding. See also \u00a7 13-14-28(H), supra.\nThe Children\u2019s Court ordered a sixty-day diagnostic evaluation. Diagnostic evaluations are authorized for \u201ca child adjudicated as a delinquent child\u201d. Section 13-14-29(D), supra. Delinquent child is defined as a child \u201cwho has committed a delinquent act and is in need of care or rehabilitation\u201d. Section 13-14-3(0), supra. Although the child committed delinquent acts, there was no finding that the child was in need of care or rehabilitation, or a finding that the child was a delinquent child. See Doe v. State, 88 N.M. 627, 545 P.2d 93 (Ct.App.1976). The Children\u2019s Court lacked authority to order the diagnostic evaluation. However, it is unnecessary to consider the effect of the unauthorized diagnostic evaluation.\nAfter receiving the diagnostic evaluation, the Children\u2019s Court placed the child on probation. This order was also entered without a finding that the child was in need of care or rehabilitation. Section 13-14-31(B)(3), supra, authorizes probation for a child \u201cfound to be delinquent\u201d.. Under \u00a7 13-14-3(0), supra, a child is not delinquent unless in need of care or rehabilitation. There being no finding that the child was in need of care or rehabilitation, the order placing the child on probation was unauthorized.\nThe deficiency in the proceedings against the child was the failure to recognize that there are two aspects to the determination that a child is a delinquent child \u2014 the act, and the need for care or rehabilitation. Section 13-14-28(E), supra; Compare Rule 38 of the Children\u2019s Court Rules and the Committee Commentary to Rule 38. The Children\u2019s Court failed to consider one of these aspects. The result was that it had no authority to order the probation. The order placing the child on probation was void because the order was entered without authority. Heckathorn v. Heckathorn, supra.\nEffect of the Revocation Order\nThe petition to revoke probation alleged the child had violated certain terms and conditions of his probation. The child admitted the violation. In the order revoking probation and committing the child to the Boys School, there is a finding, for the first time, that the child is in need of care and rehabilitation. The revocation order contains a finding that \u201cthe child has committed the offense as charged in the Petition To Revoke Probation, a delinquent act, that he is by reason thereof a delinquent child and is in need of care, supervision and rehabilitation.\u201d\nGenerally, proceedings to revoke probation are governed by the procedure applicable to proceedings on a delinquency petition. Section 13-14^40, supra. The order revoking probation contains the requisite findings.\nDoes the order revoking probation validate the void order which placed the child on probation? Section 13-14-40, supra, states:\n\u201cA child on probation incident to an adjudication . . as a delinquent child . who violates a term of the probation . may be proceeded against in a probation . . . revocation proceeding.\u201d\nThe child was not placed on probation as an incident of an adjudication that he was a delinquent child, because there was no determination that he was in need of care or rehabilitation. Section 13-14-40, supra, contemplates a valid probation order; it cannot be construed as validating a void order of probation.\nThe order placing the child on probation being void, the situation is as if no probation order had been entered. See Heckathorn v. Heckathorn, supra. There being no probation order, the order revoking probation was without legal effect. See Heckathorn v. Heckathorn, supra; Eaton v. Cooke, 74 N.M. 301, 393 P.2d 329 (1964); Elwess v. Elwess, 73 N.M. 400, 389 P.2d 7 (1964).\nThe order revoking probation and committing the child to the Boys School is reversed. The cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nHENDLEY and HERNANDEZ, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WOOD, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Barbara Nobel Farber, Sante Fe, for defendant-appellant.", "Toney Anaya, Atty. Gen., Suzanne Tanner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "561 P.2d 948\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John DOE, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 2804.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nMarch 1, 1977.\nBarbara Nobel Farber, Sante Fe, for defendant-appellant.\nToney Anaya, Atty. Gen., Suzanne Tanner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee." }, "file_name": "0249-01", "first_page_order": 285, "last_page_order": 287 }