{ "id": 2866959, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John DOE, a child, and John Doe, a child, Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Doe", "decision_date": "1977-06-14", "docket_number": "Nos. 2941 and 2942", "first_page": "572", "last_page": "576", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "90 N.M. 572" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "566 P.2d 121" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "85 N.M. 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2775148 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 N.M. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5375434 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/75/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 P. 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1913, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 N.M. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4696590 ], "year": 1913, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/18/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 N.M. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590410 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/60/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2874890 ], "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2836508 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 N.M. 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5374280 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/75/0730-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 539, "char_count": 13179, "ocr_confidence": 0.807, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0523142362121835e-07, "percentile": 0.7555121939541649 }, "sha256": "ebb74a0ace7c2c06bf6358d593b282b940906d77e94434c62967d40dd74e4c76", "simhash": "1:b60975775c4cb471", "word_count": 2161 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:34:48.706767+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "LOPEZ, J., concurs.", "HENDLEY, J., specially concurs." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John DOE, a child, and John Doe, a child, Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWOOD, Chief Judge.\nThese consolidated appeals involve delinquent children committed to the Boy\u2019s School at Springer, New Mexico, after an unchallenged finding that they were mentally ill. The appeals were taken by the Secretary of Corrections and the Superintendent of the Boy\u2019s School. We discuss: (1) the party appellant, (2) the issues on appeal, (3) commitment of mentally ill delinquents, (4) treatment of the children, and (5) release of the children.\nThe first two issues are procedural; the last three issues are substantive. The substantive issues arise because of the effort of the Children\u2019s Court to provide an appropriate disposition for the mentally ill delinquents. Two decisions are background for the substantive issues. Carter v. Montoya, 75 N.M. 730, 410 P.2d 951 (1966) held that under the old juvenile law, the juvenile court could not order the Los Lunas Hospital and Training School to admit a mentally retarded juvenile. Matter of Doe, 88 N.M. 632, 545 P.2d 491 (Ct.App.1976) held that \u00a7 13-14-32(B), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 3, pt. 1) limits the authority of the Children\u2019s Court to transfer a child in need of psychiatric treatment to a state agency. The transfer of the child to the custody of the Health and Social Services Department was limited to the thirty-day time period and for the purposes stated in \u00a7 13-14-32(B), supra.\nBoth of the children involved in these consolidated appeals admitted the delinquent acts charged in the petition and both admitted to being a delinquent child. The Children\u2019s Court found that each child was in need of supervision, care or rehabilitation. Both children were committed to the Department of Corrections at Springer. Insofar as they may be isolated from the matters in the following paragraph, no challenge is made to the propriety of the matters identified in this paragraph. See \u00a7 13 \u2014 14\u201431(B)(2), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 3, pt. 1).\nAn unchallenged finding as to each child reads: \u201cThat said Child is a mentally ill Child and there are no facilities in New Mexico able to provide care for him in a psychiatric milieu.\u201d The judgment as to each child provides that the child be provided psychiatric care while in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The judgment in No. 2942 also orders that the Department of Hospitals and Institutions become involved in providing psychiatric care to the child in that case. In No. 2941, the judgment orders that the child not be released from the Boy\u2019s School without prior approval of the Children\u2019s Court. In No. 2942, the judgment orders the child to come before the Children\u2019s Court before being released or granted parole. The matters referred to in this paragraph are the basis for the substantive issues in this appeal.\nParty Appellant\nSection 13-14-36(A), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 3, pt. 1) states that any party may appeal the Children\u2019s Court judgment. Children\u2019s Court Rule 9(a) states that in proceedings in petitions alleging delinquency, the parties are the respondent and the State, unless otherwise ordered by the court. In this case, up through entry of the judgment, the parties were the State and the children.\nAfter entry of judgment, in each case, the Department of Corrections sought, and the Children\u2019s Court granted, an extension of time for filing notices of appeal. The notices of appeal were filed within the time authorized for extensions by the trial court. N.M.Crim.App. 202(c).\nThe notices of appeal were filed by the Secretary of Corrections and the Superintendent of the Boy\u2019s School. The reference to these two positions means the Department of Corrections. See \u00a7\u00a7 42-9-3 and 42-9-9, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, Supp. 1975). We hold the notice of appeal was filed by the Department of Corrections.\nWe are not required to determine whether the State, a party at the time judgment was entered, is a party different from the Department of Corrections. Children\u2019s Court Rule 9(d)(1) permits intervention, with leave of court, by the custodian of the child. The judgments placed the children in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Assuming the State and the Department of Corrections are separate parties, intervention occurred when the Children\u2019s Court granted the Department of Corrections an extension of time in which to file the notice of appeal.\nWe hold that the Department of Corrections is the party appellant.\nIssues on Appeal\nN.M.Crim.App. 205(a) requires the docketing statement to list the issues presented by the appeal, \u201cincluding a statement of how they arose in the trial court . .\u201d The docketing statement for each child states that the substantive issues presented in the appeal \u201cdid not arise in the Children\u2019s Court\u201d, but that the issues could be raised on appeal. The docketing statements do not say on what basis they can be raised on appeal.\nN.M.Crim.App. 308 states exceptions to the requirement that for an issue to be reviewed, the issue must have been raised in the trial court. One exception is a question of general public interest. The questions here affect the interest of the State at large. We consider them properly before us for review. Compare State v. John Doe (Ct.App.) 90 N.M. 536, 565 P.2d 1053, decided May 24, 1977.\nCommitment of Mentally Ill Delinquents\nThe Children\u2019s Court found each child was mentally ill. These findings are unchallenged. No contention is made that the question of mental illness was not before the court or that the findings of mental illness were procedurally deficient. See \u00a7 13-14-37(A), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 3, pt. 1).\nThe Department of Corrections contends that the findings of mental illness are surplusage and can be disregarded. No authority is cited in support of this claim. We do not understand how the findings can be treated as surplusage since the judgments direct the Department to provide psychiatric care and the findings of mental illness are the factual basis for this direction. The Department of Corrections also asserts that the Children\u2019s Court exceeded its jurisdiction in committing the children to the Department. This argument is based on the view that \u00a7 13-14-31, supra, and \u00a7 13-14-32, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 3, pt. 1) \u201cprovide for the mutually exclusive disposition of children.\u201d Section 13-14-31(B)(2), supra, authorizes the transfer of the legal custody of a child found to be delinquent to an agency responsible for the care and rehabilitation of delinquent children. Section 13-14-32, supra, states what the Children\u2019s Court \u201cmay\u201d do in a situation where there is a question of mental illness.\nSection 13-14-32, supra, states:\n\u201cA. If in a hearing at any stage of a proceeding on a petition under the Children\u2019s Code [13-14-1 to 13-14-45] the evidence indicates that the child is mentally retarded or mentally ill, the court may:\n\u201c(1) order the child detained if appropriate under the criteria established under the Children\u2019s Code; and\n\u201c(2) initiate proceedings for the commitment of the child as a mentally ill or mentally retarded minor.\n\u201cB. If in a hearing at any stage of a proceeding on a petition under the Children\u2019s Code the evidence indicates that the child may be suffering from mental retardation or mental illness, the court may transfer legal custody of the child for a period not exceeding thirty [30] days to an appropriate agency for further study and a report on the child\u2019s condition. If it appears from the report and study that the child is committable under the laws of this state as a mentally retarded or mentally ill minor, the court may order the child detained if appropriate under the criteria established by the Children\u2019s Code and shall initiate proceedings for the commitment of the child as a mentally retarded or mentally ill minor.\n\u201cC. If a child is committed as a mentally retarded or mentally ill child under this section, the petition shall be dismissed.\u201d\nWe do not agree that the two statutes are mutually exclusive. The word \u201cmay\u201d in \u00a7 13-14-32, supra, is \u201cpermissive or directory\u201d. Section 1-2-2, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 1, Supp.1975). When the court proceeds under \u00a7 13-14-32, supra, its authority as to what it may do is limited as stated in that section. Matter of Doe, supra. Thus, if a child is committed as mentally ill, the Children\u2019s Court petition is to be dismissed. Section 13-14-32(C), supra. However, the Children\u2019s Code does not make \u00a7 13-14-32, supra, the exclusive method of handling a mentally ill child who is also a delinquent child.\nSection 13-14-2(D), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 3, pt. 1) states a legislative purpose of providing \u201cappropriate and distinct dispositional options for treatment and rehabilitation\u201d of delinquent children. In these appeals, the delinquent children are in need of care and rehabilitation, and the Boy\u2019s School is an appropriate facility to provide care and rehabilitation. However, the children are mentally ill and the unchallenged findings are that there are no New Mexico facilities able to care for them in a \u201cpsychiatric milieu\u201d. Thus, the Children\u2019s Court fashioned \u201can appropriate and distinct\u201d dis-positional option; it ordered that psychiatric care be provided while at the Boy\u2019s School. Section 13-14-32, supra, does not prohibit such a disposition; \u00a7 13-14-2(D), supra, authorizes this disposition.\nThe Children\u2019s Court did not err in committing mentally ill, delinquent children to the Boy\u2019s School and in ordering that psychiatric care be provided.\nTreatment of the Children\nThe judgments order that psychiatric care be provided to the children while they are in the custody of the Boy\u2019s School. We have held this was a permissible disposition. We add that this is treatment ordered by the court, the cost of which is to be paid from court funds. Section 13-14-38, N.M. S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 3, pt. 1); Matter of Doe, supra.\nThe judgment in No. 2942 ordered D.H.I. (Department of Hospitals and Institutions) \u201cto become involved in providing psychiatric care\u201d while the child is in the custody of the Department of Corrections. We doubt that this provision has any legal effect upon D.H.I. Custody has not been transferred to D.H.I. Matter of Doe, supra. There is nothing before us indicating that D.H.I. was involved in any \u201cmatters in issue\u201d in this case. See Bell v. Odil, 60 N.M. 404, 292 P.2d 96 (1956). However, we need not decide the legal effect upon D.H.I. of the portion of the judgment stating that D.H.I. was \u201cto become involved.\u201d\nD.H.I. was not a party to the proceedings before the Children\u2019s Court and is not a party to this appeal. D.H.I. is not complaining of the \u201cbecome involved\u201d provision. It is the Department of Corrections that is complaining of this provision; it does not pertain to the Department of Corrections. Since the \u201cbecome involved\u201d provision does not affect the Department of Corrections, its complaint about this provision will not be considered. Edwards v. Fitzhugh, 18 N.M. 424, 137 P. 582 (1913); see Yoakum v. Western Casualty and Surety Company, 75 N.M. 529, 407 P.2d 367 (1965).\nRelease of the Children\nThe judgment in No. 2941 provides that the child is not to be released without prior approval of the Children\u2019s Court. The judgment in No. 2942 provides that the child is to come before the Court before being released or granted parole. The Department of Corrections asserts the Children\u2019s Court had no authority to enter either of these provisions. We agree.\nThe authority of the Children\u2019s Court over the children terminated when it transferred these delinquent children to the Boy\u2019s School for care and rehabilitation. Sections 13-14-12(C) and 13-14-35(A), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 3, pt. 1); In Re Doe, 85 N.M. 691, 516 P.2d 201 (Ct.App. 1973). Under these circumstances, the Boy\u2019s School \u201chas the exclusive power to parole or release the child\u201d. Section 13-14-35(A)(1), supra.\nThe provisions in the judgments involving the Children\u2019s Court in the release or parole of the children (second paragraph 2 of the judgment in No. 2941; second paragraph 5 of the judgment in No. 2942) are reversed. In other respects, the judgments of the Children\u2019s Court are affirmed. Both cases are remanded to the Children\u2019s Court for entry of corrected judgments consistent with this opinion.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nLOPEZ, J., concurs.\nHENDLEY, J., specially concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "WOOD, Chief Judge." }, { "text": "HENDLEY, Judge\n(specially concurring).\nI fully concur in the majority opinion and add the following since it is not properly a part of the opinion.\nThis is not the first time we have seen the Children\u2019s Court Judges attempt to fashion remedies which will meet the needs of the child. We can understand and appreciate their concern and frustration when confronted with these types of problems. In these instances the statute becomes a shackle rather than an instrument of correction. Legislative attention is needed.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "HENDLEY, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ralph W. Muxlow, II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Toney Anaya, Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Richard Jay Grodner, Prelo & Grodner, P. A., Albuquerque, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "566 P.2d 121\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John DOE, a child, and John Doe, a child, Defendants-Appellees.\nNos. 2941 and 2942.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJune 14, 1977.\nRehearing denied June 10, 1977.\nRalph W. Muxlow, II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Toney Anaya, Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellant.\nRichard Jay Grodner, Prelo & Grodner, P. A., Albuquerque, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0572-01", "first_page_order": 608, "last_page_order": 612 }