{ "id": 2869015, "name": "Orlando PADILLA, Petitioner, v. STATE of New Mexico, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Padilla v. State", "decision_date": "1977-08-10", "docket_number": "No. 11465", "first_page": "664", "last_page": "666", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "90 N.M. 664" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "568 P.2d 190" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "78 N.M. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5320188 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/78/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 N.M. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5344679 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/64/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2803177 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" }, { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0528-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 303, "char_count": 5599, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.0852318030896782 }, "sha256": "2959eaeab9503e30f27a8087f12e20563228d7e5d8b40241438f5fb190a1e396", "simhash": "1:0a49d1e213c93e79", "word_count": 903 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:34:48.706767+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SOSA and EASLEY, JJ., concur.", "PAYNE, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Orlando PADILLA, Petitioner, v. STATE of New Mexico, Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nFEDERICI, Justice.\nDefendant was convicted of robbery in 1976 and charged additionally as an habitual offender under \u00a7 40A-29-5, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6,1972). The supplemental information alleged a prior conviction in 1972. Defendant moved to dismiss the supplemental information on the grounds that the sentence for the 1972 conviction was deferred by the court, that defendant had successfully completed the deferred sentence, and that the 1972 case had been dismissed prior to the subsequent habitual-offender charge in 1976.\nThe trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals proposed summary reversal and reversed the trial court. Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which writ was granted by this court. We now affirm the Court of Appeals.\nThe habitual-offender statute, \u00a7 40A-29-5, supra, provides in pertinent part as follows:\nAny person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony, or who has been convicted under the laws of any other state government or country, of a crime or crimes which if committed within this state would be a felony, commits any felony within this state not otherwise punishable by death or life imprisonment, shall be punished as follows: * * *. (Emphasis added.)\nSection 40A-29-15, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, 1972) provides that upon entry of a judgment of conviction and upon certain conditions, a court may enter an order deferring or suspending sentence.\nSection 40A-29-18, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, 1972) sets forth certain conditions which the court shall attach to its order deferring or suspending a sentence.\nSection 40A-29-21, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, 1972) sets forth the effect of termination of a period of suspension without revocation of the order and provides:\nWhenever the period of suspension expires without revocation of the order, the defendant is relieved of any obligations imposed on him by the order of the court and has satisfied his criminal liability for the crime. He shall thereupon be entitled to a certificate from the court so reciting such facts, and upon presenting the same to the governor, the defendant may, in the discretion of the governor, be granted a pardon or a certificate restoring such person to full rights of citizenship.\nSection 40A-29-22, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, 1972) applies to a deferred sentence and is the statute which is more particularly involved in this case. It provides:\nWhenever the period of deferment expires, the defendant is relieved of any obligations imposed on him by the order of the court and has satisfied his criminal liability for the crime, the court shall enter a dismissal of the criminal charges.\nWe note there is a difference in the wording of the statute which applies to suspended sentences and the statute which applies to deferred sentences. Under the suspended sentence statute, \u00a7 40A-29-21, supra, a defendant is entitled to a certificate from the court, reciting satisfactory completion of the sentence. Upon presentation of this certificate to the Governor, the Governor may in his discretion grant a pardon or a certificate restoring such person to full rights of citizenship. Under the deferred sentence statute, \u00a7 40A-29-22, supra, it is provided that upon the expiration of the deferred sentence, the defendant has satisfied his criminal liability for the crime and the court must enter a dismissal of the charge.\nThere is some merit to the contention that upon dismissal of criminal charges under the deferred sentence provision of \u00a7 40A-29-22, supra, there has been no prior conviction. However, this court in previous cases has determined that the contrary is true, holding that a \u201cconviction\u201d refers to a finding of guilt and does not include the imposition of a sentence. State v. Larranaga, 77 N.M. 528, 424 P.2d 804 (1967); Shankle v. Woodruff, 64 N.M. 88, 324 P.2d 1017 (1958); State v. Silva, 78 N.M. 286, 430 P.2d 783 (Ct.App.1967).\nIn State v. Larranaga, 77 N.M. at 529, 424 P.2d at 805, this court stated:\nThe pertinent portion of the statute, \u00a7 41-16-1, supra, under which the sentence was imposed provides: \u201cAny person who, after having been convicted within this state, of a felony, * * * commits any felony, within this state, shall be punished upon conviction of such second offense as follows: * * *\u201d In our opinion, the \u201cconviction\" to which the statute refers is simply a finding of guilt and does not include the imposition of a sentence. (Emphasis added.)\nHabitual offender proceedings are based by statute on prior felony convictions. Since it is not necessary to impose sentence in order to constitute a conviction, the deferred sentence was of no consequence. It is the conviction that is crucial and not the sentence. We therefore hold that the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nSOSA and EASLEY, JJ., concur.\nPAYNE, J., not participating.\nThis matter coming on for consideration by the Court upon Motion of Petitioner for a rehearing, and the Court having considered said motion and brief in support thereof, and being sufficiently advised in the premises;\nNOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Motion of Petitioner for rehearing be and the same is hereby denied.", "type": "majority", "author": "FEDERICI, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jan Alan Hartke, Chief Public Defender, Reginald J. Storment, Appellate Defender, Douglas A. Barr, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for petitioner.", "Toney Anaya, Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "568 P.2d 190\nOrlando PADILLA, Petitioner, v. STATE of New Mexico, Respondent.\nNo. 11465.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nAug. 10, 1977.\nRehearing Denied Aug. 24, 1977.\nJan Alan Hartke, Chief Public Defender, Reginald J. Storment, Appellate Defender, Douglas A. Barr, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for petitioner.\nToney Anaya, Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for respondent." }, "file_name": "0664-02", "first_page_order": 700, "last_page_order": 702 }