{ "id": 1571033, "name": "Ernesto GARZA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. W. A. JOURDAN, INC., and the Hartford Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Garza v. W. A. Jourdan, Inc.", "decision_date": "1977-12-06", "docket_number": "No. 2889", "first_page": "268", "last_page": "274", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "91 N.M. 268" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "572 P.2d 1276" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "41 N.M. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571444 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/41/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2810088 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 N.M. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5316894 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/61/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2764435 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.M. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2738392, 2739033, 2749059, 2740631 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/79/0448-01", "/nm/79/0448-02", "/nm/79/0448-03", "/nm/79/0448-04" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.M. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2745494 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/79/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 N.M. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5321330 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/78/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 N.M. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5359047 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/80/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 N.M. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557957 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1931, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/35/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 N.M. 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2716575 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/67/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 N.M. 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5348363 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/71/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 N.M. 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5317330 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/61/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2869439 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 N.M. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2853555 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/70/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "503 P.2d 1040", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "30 Colo.App. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo. App.", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "197 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "214 Va. 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va.", "case_ids": [ 2120175 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/va/214/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 N.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "54 Ill.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2933302 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 N.M. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841783 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/57/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2870618 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 N.M. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590363 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/60/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2870518 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2868131 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2810088 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 N.M. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557957 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" }, { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/35/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2869439 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0590-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 825, "char_count": 18246, "ocr_confidence": 0.802, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4551090239682025e-07, "percentile": 0.6557915152582254 }, "sha256": "3bc2e762c8dd1753771ff7172364629c5ee09085752266647b8bc5e157c8883f", "simhash": "1:322d0e8e19a05409", "word_count": 2979 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:07:42.064818+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SUTIN, J., specially concurring.", "HERNANDEZ, J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "Ernesto GARZA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. W. A. JOURDAN, INC., and the Hartford Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nLOPEZ, Judge.\nThis suit was brought pursuant to the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act \u00a7\u00a7 59-10-1 through 59-10-37, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 9, pt. 1, 1974) for the recovery of the ten percent [10%] penalty due because of the employer\u2019s failure to provide guard rails or braces on the scaffolds as safety devices. Plaintiff\u2019s claim was dismissed with prejudice, and from this dismissal plaintiff appeals. We reverse.\nThe plaintiff, Ernesto Garza (hereinafter \u201cthe workman\u201d), was employed by the defendant, W. A. Jourdan, Inc. (hereinafter \u201cthe employer\u201d).\nPlaintiff was a cement finisher on building construction projects. He was injured in the course of his employment, while working on a construction project in 1972. The workman was paid regular workmen\u2019s compensation benefits until June 9, 1975. After defendant defaulted in payment, plaintiff filed his complaint in this action. After the complaint was filed the defendant reinstituted payment and continued payment until after the court\u2019s hearing.\nThe court below found that:\n\u201cAt the time of filing of this action, the weekly installments of compensation had been suspended but were later restored and the plaintiff has been paid all installments of disability benefits from the date of the injury through the trial date of January 3, 1977.\u201d\nThe court also found the workman to be totally and permanently disabled.\nAt the beginning of the trial the defendants moved to dismiss the workman\u2019s claim on the ground that it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations contained in \u00a7 59-10-13.6, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 1, 1974). Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss was granted, although the court did receive evidence in the nature of an offer of proof. Plaintiff raises two points on this appeal: (1) the statute of limitations was not raised prior to trial as required for an affirmative defense; and (2) the statute of limitations does not apply to the ten percent [10%] penalty provision set out in \u00a7 59-10-7, N.M. S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 1, 1960).\n(1) The statute of \u00a1imitations section is jurisdictional.\nThe statute of limitations section of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act is set out in \u00a7 59-10-13.6, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 1, 1960) as follows:\n\u201cClaim to be filed for workmen\u2019s compensation \u2014 Effect of failure to give required notice or to file claim within time allowed. \u2014 A. If an employer or his insurer fails or refuses to pay a workman any installment of compensation to which the workman is entitled under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act [59-10-1 to 59-10-37], . . . it is the duty of the workman insisting on the payment of compensation, to file a claim therefor as provided in the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, not later than one [1] year after the failure or refusal of the employer or insurer to pay compensation.\" [Emphasis added].\nPlaintiff argues that the limitations statute must be pleaded as an affirmative defense and failure to do so precludes defendant from raising it at a later time under Rule 8(c) of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure [\u00a7 21-1-1(8)(c), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 4, 1970)]; Chavez v. Kitsch, 70 N.M. 439, 374 P.2d 497 (1962). The Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act is sui generis and creates exclusive rights, remedies and procedures.\nWe wish to correct a misstatement of the law we made in Martinez v. Earth Resources Co., 90 N.M. 590, 566 P.2d 838 (Ct.App.1977), wherein we stated that the statute of limitations is a privilege which may be interposed or waived. Under our Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, the limitation of time for filing is a condition precedent to the right to maintain the action, and as this limitation provision is jurisdictional, it may not be waived.\n\u201cWhere a statute grants a new remedy, and at the same time places a limitation of time within which the person complaining must act, the limitation is a limitation of the right as well as the remedy, and in the absence of qualifying provisions or saving clauses, the party seeking to avail himself of the remedy must bring himself strictly within the limitations.\u201d\nSwallows v. City of Albuquerque, 61 N.M. 265, 298 P.2d 945 (1956).\nPlaintiff\u2019s contention that this action is governed by the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure is without merit.\n\u201cWorkmen\u2019s compensation statutes are sui generis and create rights, remedies and procedure which are exclusive. They are in derogation of the common law and are not controlled or affected by the code of procedure in suits at law or actions in equity except as provided therein.\u201d Swallows, supra.\nThe position that Rule 8(c) of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure is controlling as to the pleading of affirmative defenses is contrary to New Mexico decisions which hold that the filing of a claim within the prescribed time is a jurisdictional matter. Linton v. Mauer-Neuer Meat Packers, 71 N.M. 305, 378 P.2d 126 (1963); Armijo v. United States Casualty Company, 67 N.M. 470, 357 P.2d 57 (1960); Taylor v. Am. Employers\u2019 Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass., 35 N.M. 544, 3 P.2d 76 (1931).\nTherefore, in correcting the misstatement in Martinez v. Earth Resources Co., supra, we conclude that the limitations provision set out in the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act is jurisdictional.\n(2)The statute of limitations does not apply to plaintiff\u2019s claim for the additional 10% penalty.\nThe statutory penalty section for failure to provide or failure to use safety devices reads as follows:\n\u201c59-10-7. Increase or reduction in compensation based on failure of employer to provide or failure of employee to use safety devices.\n\u201cA. In case an injury to, or death of a workman results from his failure to observe statutory regulations appertaining to the safe conduct of his employment, or from his failure to use a safety device provided by his employer, then the compensation otherwise payable under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act [59-10-1 to 59-10-37] shall be reduced ten per cent [10%].\n\u201cB. In case an injury to, or death of a workman results from the failure of an employer to provide safety devices required by law, or in any industry in which safety devices are not prescribed by statute, if an injury to, or death of, a workman results from the negligence of the employer in failing to supply reasonable safety devices in general use for the use or protection of the workman, then the compensation otherwise payable under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act shall be increased ten per cent [10%].\u201d Section 59-10-7, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 1, 1960).\nThe question presented in this appeal is one of first impression in New Mexico: \u201cDoes the one-year statute of limitations section apply to the above-quoted penalty section?\u201d\nThe rule of liberal construction in Workmen\u2019s Compensation cases is well-established in this jurisdiction. Anaya v. City of Santa Fe, 80 N.M. 54, 451 P.2d 303 (1969); Casados v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 78 N.M. 392, 432 P.2d 103 (1967).\nThis rule applies to the interpretation of law not facts. Lopez v. Schultz & Lindsay Construction Company, 79 N.M. 485, 444 P.2d 996 (Ct.App.1968), cert. denied, 79 N.M. 448, 444 P.2d 775 (1968). This case involves a legal dispute over the construction of the applicable statutes and, because no facts are in dispute, the issue concerning the statute of limitations is a matter of law for the Court to decide. Mantz v. Follingstad, 84 N.M. 473, 505 P.2d 68 (Ct.App.1972).\nThe New Mexico Supreme Court has held that the one-year limitations section has a limited application and is \u201cmore restrictive\u201d than similar statutes in other jurisdictions. Garcia v. New Mexico State Highway Department, 61 N.M. 156, 296 P.2d 759 (1956). The Court in Garcia held that medical benefits did not constitute payment of compensation for the purposes of the limitations statute because the word \u201ccompensation\u201d refers to \u201cregular semi-monthly benefits.\u201d\nThe ten percent increase or decrease in the safety device section does not fall within the purview of the limitations section either. The ten percent increase or decrease is a penalty statute. As explained in Baca v. Gutierrez, 77 N.M. 428, 423 P.2d 617 (1967):\n\u201cThe legislature enacted \u00a7 59-10-7, supra, as a penalty system, placing the duty on the employer to furnish adequate safety devices in general use for the use or protection of the workman, and in the event of his failure to do so, making him liable to be found guilty of negligence and subject to the penalty provided.\u201d\nThus, the safety device statute is not compensatory but punitive, and the portion stating \u201cthe compensation otherwise payable . . . shall be increased ten percent [10%]\u201d is the measure of computing the amount of penalty to be levied.\nSupporting this interpretation is the express recognition by the legislature in \u00a7 59-10-36, supra, that an action for the penalty is independent of the payment or non-payment of regular compensation benefits. Section 59-10-36, supra, provides:\n\u201cPremature filings. \u2014 No claim shall be filed by any workman who is receiving maximum compensation benefits; Provided, however, a workman claiming additional compensation benefits, because of his employer\u2019s alleged failure to provide a safety device, may file suit therefor, but in such event only the safety device issue may be determined therein.\u201d\nThus, a workman, pursuant to the exception stated in this statute, may file a suit for the penalty despite the fact that he is receiving \u201cmaximum compensation benefits\u201d or has been receiving regular semimonthly benefits.\nThe New Mexico Supreme Court decision in Norvell v. Barnsdall Oil Co., 41 N.M. 421, 70 P.2d 150 (1937) is applicable by analogy to this case. Although that case involved the continuing jurisdiction of the court in an application for decrease or termination of an award, the question also arose whether the limitation period which applied to an original claim applied equally to an application to reopen:\n\u201c[Application to decrease or terminate compensation under a prior award not being an original proceeding is not affected by the provision of the act fixing the time within which original proceedings for compensation must be instituted . and in the absence of controlling statute or rule may be presented at any time within the period for which compensation is allowable . . . .\u201d Barnsdall, supra, at 423, 70 P.2d at 152.\nPlaintiff\u2019s regular disability compensation had been paid when this claim was filed and he had not yet completed his maximum benefit period under the Act. As this action is not an original proceeding for compensation the limitations provision of the Act is inapplicable.\nThe legislature intended only to limit time for the filing of initial claims for compensation. Had the legislature intended otherwise, the statutory provision would have included or made reference to the time period within which an employer had to file for a reduction of the employee\u2019s compensation for his failure to use the safety devices provided. To interpret the statute of limitations provision to apply only to the benefits of the employee and not concomitantly to the benefits of the employer would surely violate the intent of the legislature.\nTherefore, although the statute of limitations is jurisdictional and need not be raised as an affirmative defense, it nevertheless does not apply to the statutory penalty section relating to increase or reduction in compensation for failure to supply safety devices.\nThe judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded to determine the issue of whether the employer had in fact failed to provide the required safety devices specified and for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nSUTIN, J., specially concurring.\nHERNANDEZ, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "LOPEZ, Judge." }, { "text": "SUTIN, Judge\n(specially concurring).\nI specially concur.\nA. Delay in workmen\u2019s compensation cases should be avoided.\nDelays in workmen\u2019s compensation cases is an occurrence that often violates the spirit and purpose of the law. Weiss v. Hanes Mfg. Co., 90 N.M. 683, 568 P.2d 209 (Ct.App. 1977); Casaus v. Levi Strauss & Co., 90 N.M. 558, 566 P.2d 107, State Bar of New Mexico Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 21, p. 1928. Delays should be noted by district judges. An explanation of the delay should be made a part of the record. Without an explanation, an appellate court cannot determine whether a labor of love was undertaken in the work.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint was filed July 21, 1975. Defendants\u2019 answer was filed August'26, 1976, thirteen months later. The record does not disclose what occurred during the interim period. On January 3,1977, seventeen months after the complaint was filed, the case came on for hearing. On the morning of the hearing, defendants orally raised the defense that the one year limitation period barred plaintiff\u2019s right of action (Section 59-10-13.6(A), N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 1) for the negligent failure of the employer to provide plaintiff with a safety device. (Section 59-10-7).\nIt does not require clairvoyance to state that defendants\u2019 attorney, an able and competent member of the Bar, knew or should have known of this \u201calleged\u201d defense upon receipt of the plaintiff\u2019s complaint. To wait seventeen months to present it to the court on the morning of the hearing indicates to me that serious doubts existed in his mind as to the applicability of \u00a7 59-10-13.6(A). \u201cTo throw the spanner in the works\u201d means to throw a wrench in the proceedings that create difficulties and obstructions to a hearing on the merits. The trial court became confused by the wreckage and ruled in defendants\u2019 favor.\nDefendants had the right to throw the \u201cmonkey wrench,\u201d but it should have been thrown seventeen months earlier. This delay should be avoided.\nB. Section 59-10-13.6 is not applicable to the safety device provision.\nSection 59-10-13.6(A) provides:\n. [I]f the workman fails to file a claim for compensation within the time required by this section [1 year], his claim for compensation, all his right to recovery of compensation and the bringing of any legal proceeding for the recovery of compensation are forever barred. [Emphasis added].\nThis provision is often designated as a statute of limitations. It is not. This statute bars the right as well as the remedy. In civil cases, a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. Section 21-1-1(8)(c), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol.4). Under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, it is not, even though the Rules of Civil Procedure apply. The reason is that \u00a7 59-10-13.6 is jurisdictional and bars the right to bring the action.\nSection 59-10-13.6 is a limitation on the right of action, and not a mere limitation on the right of remedy. It is absolute and unconditional, and it is not subject to pleas of waiver and estoppel. Taylor v. Am. Employers\u2019 Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass., 35 N.M. 544, 3 P.2d 76 (1931). This rule has remained unchanged. Lucero v. White Auto Stores, 60 N.M. 266, 291 P.2d 308 (1956). Taylor quotes the following:\n\u201cA statute which in itself creates a new liability gives an action to enforce it unknown to the common law, and fixes the time within which that action may be commenced, is not a statute of limitations.. It is a statute of creation, and the commencement of the action within the time it fixes is an indispensable condition of the liability and of the action which it permits.\u201d [Emphasis added]. [35 N.M. at 549, 3 P.2d at 78].\nSee also Howell v. Burke, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (Ct.App.1977), (Sutin, J. dissenting).\nIt is wise to recognize this distinction. Else attorneys will continue to claim that a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense to be pleaded in a workmen\u2019s compensation case. The language in \u00a7 59-10-13.6, supra, was included in the original act passed in 1929, 48 years ago. It has never been modified or repealed. In my opinion, the New Mexico rule is too harsh. \u201cThe majority rule is that strict compliance with notice and claim requirements may be waived by the employer or insurer.\u201d 3 Larson\u2019s Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law, Section 78.70 (1976). A change in the rule rests within the discretion of the Supreme Court or the legislature.\nMartinez v. Earth Resources, Inc., 90 N.M. 590, 566 P.2d 838 (Ct.App.1977), by way of dicta, stated that a statute of limitations is not jurisdictional. I agree with the spirit expressed. However, in a special concurring opinion, I stated that \u201cSection 59-10-13.6 applies to the initial claim for compensation. It does not apply to reopening procedures.\" [566 P.2d at 842],\nSection 59-10-7 on the subject of safety devices was also included in the original Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act enacted in 1929. Forty-eight years have passed. The limitation period as a bar has not heretofore been raised in safety device cases. The safety device provision involves a case of negligence \u2014 negligent failure of the employer to supply reasonable safety devices. Apodaca v. Allison & Haney, 57 N.M. 315, 258 P.2d 711 (1953); Baca v. Gutierrez, 77 N.M. 428, 423 P.2d 617 (1967). It contains no limitation period in which to commence proceedings for the recovery of a 10% penalty. This penalty is not compensation. If the legislature intended to make \u00a7 59-10-13.6 applicable to a negligence action, it would have so provided.\nIt is wise for the legislature to confine the limitation period to the initial claim for compensation. Some statutes provide for specific provisions as to the time for the institution of proceedings for review and modification of an award. Various conclusions in statutory construction have occurred. See, Creel v. Industrial Commission, 54 Ill.2d 580, 301 N.E.2d 275 (1973); Binswanger Glass Company v. Wallace, 214 Va. 70, 197 S.E.2d 191 (1973); Ball v. Industrial Commission, 30 Colo.App. 583, 503 P.2d 1040 (1972); 82 Am.Jur.2d Workmen\u2019s Compensation, \u00a7 605 (1976).\nIn my opinion, \u00a7 59-10-13.6 is applicable only to the initial claim for compensation and not otherwise.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "SUTIN, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "J. E. Gallegos, Steven L. Tucker, Jones, Gallegos, Snead & Wertheim, P. A., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Lowell Stout, Hobbs, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "572 P.2d 1276\nErnesto GARZA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. W. A. JOURDAN, INC., and the Hartford Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees.\nNo. 2889.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nDec. 6, 1977.\nRehearing Denied Dec. 13, 1977.\nWrit of Certiorari Denied Dec. 30, 1977.\nJ. E. Gallegos, Steven L. Tucker, Jones, Gallegos, Snead & Wertheim, P. A., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellant.\nLowell Stout, Hobbs, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0268-01", "first_page_order": 304, "last_page_order": 310 }