{
  "id": 1557271,
  "name": "CITY OF FARMINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "City of Farmington v. Phillips",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "HERNANDEZ and LOPEZ, JJ., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "CITY OF FARMINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "OPINION\nHENDLEY, Judge.\nConvicted of keeping a disorderly house contrary to Farmington\u2019s municipal ordinance \u00a7 21-17 which was in effect on February 5, 1978, appellant appeals asserting the ordinance is either unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.\nThe evidence showed that during a periodic all-day observation by the police there were between fifteen to twenty people in various stages of intoxication in defendant\u2019s yard and house. There was loud music and some of the people were shouting, quarrelling, shoving and fighting. During the day the area became littered with alcoholic beverage cans and bottles. There were young children playing in the immediate area where the shoving and fighting occurred.\nSection 21-17, supra, states:\n\u201c. . . DISORDERLY HOUSE.\n\u201cIt shall be unlawful for any person to keep any common, ill-governed or disorderly house, or to suffer any drunkenness, quarrelling, fighting, gambling or any riotous or disorderly conduct whatever on his premises, or the premises under his direct possession or control.\u201d\nThe vagueness rule is based on notice and applies when a potential actor is exposed to criminal sanctions without a fair warning as to the nature of the proscribed activity. State v. Marchiondo, 85 N.M. 627, 515 P.2d 146 (Ct.App.1973); State v. Ferris, 80 N.M. 663, 459 P.2d 462 (Ct.App.1969).\nIn approaching the question of the constitutionality of a statute every presumption is indulged in favor of the validity and regularity of the legislative act. Board of Trustees of Town of Las Vegas v. Montano, 82 N.M. 340, 481 P.2d 702 (1971); State v. Armstrong, 31 N.M. 220, 243 P. 333 (1924). State v. Strance, 84 N.M. 670, 506 P.2d 1217 (Ct.App.1973) states:\n\u201c \u2018It is well established in this jurisdiction that a part of a law may be invalid and the remainder valid, where the invalid part may be separated from the other portions, without impairing the force and effect of the remaining parts, and if the legislative purpose as expressed in the valid portion can be given force and effect, without the invalid part, and, when considering the entire act it cannot be said that the legislature would not have passed the remaining part if it had known that the objectionable part was invalid. . . . \u2019 \u201d\nSee also State v. Spearman, 84 N.M. 366, 503 P.2d 649 (Ct.App.1972); Bradbury & Stamm Const. Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 70 N.M. 226, 372 P.2d 808 (1962).\nGiven the foregoing rules of statutory construction, we examine the ordinance. The words \u201ccommon\u201d and \u201cill-governed\u201d are not words of precise definition. They have a wide variety of interpretations and meanings. They are such that a person of ordinary intelligence would have to guess at their meanings. See Random House Dictionary (Unabridged Ed. 1969). These words are unconstitutionally vague.\nThe fact that the words are unconstitutionally vague does not void the entire ordinance. We only declare the words unconstitutional and sever them from the ordinance. State v. Strance, supra. We then view the statute as a whole and give words their ordinary meaning unless a different intent is clearly established. State v. Sierra, 90 N.M. 680, 568 P.2d 206 (Ct.App.1977).\nWebster\u2019s Third International Dictionary (Unabridged Ed. 1971) defines \u201cdisorderly house\u201d as a brothel. Random House, supra, defines it as \u201ca house of prostitution\u201d, \u201cbrothel\u201d or \u201cgambling place.\u201d The meaning of \u201cdisorderly house\u201d is plain. It is not ambiguous or vague.\nThe words \u201cto suffer\u201d implies a willingness of the mind, to approve, to consent to, or permit and not to hinder. Bouvier\u2019s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.). The remainder of the ordinance uses words of common meaning which are not subject to a variety of interpretations. There is nothing vague in prohibiting a person from knowingly allowing conduct on his premises inconsistent with peaceable and orderly conduct. It is clear what the ordinance as a whole prohibits. Due process was not violated in forbidding the proscribed activity. Persons of common intelligence would not have to guess at the meaning of the ordinance. State v. Orzen, 83 N.M. 458, 493 P.2d 768 (Ct.App.1972).\nDefendant\u2019s overbroad argument is misplaced. A statute is overbroad when constitutionally permissible behavior is made illegal. The ordinance does not restrict the freedom of speech. It only places restrictions on the time, place and manner. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).\nWe have considered defendant\u2019s other arguments and find them to be without merit.\nAffirmed.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nHERNANDEZ and LOPEZ, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HENDLEY, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John B. Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Michael Dickman, Asst. App. Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant.",
      "Dwight D. Arthur, Farmington, for plaintiff-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "587 P.2d 451\nCITY OF FARMINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 3667.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nNov. 14, 1978.\nJohn B. Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Michael Dickman, Asst. App. Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant.\nDwight D. Arthur, Farmington, for plaintiff-appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0304-01",
  "first_page_order": 340,
  "last_page_order": 342
}