{ "id": 1557154, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Danny R. COE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Coe", "decision_date": "1978-10-17", "docket_number": "No. 3639", "first_page": "320", "last_page": "322", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "92 N.M. 320" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "587 P.2d 973" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "81 N.M. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5363859 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/81/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 N.M. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2832191 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/87/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5334932 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2777575 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2868024 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/89/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2767892 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2864880 ], "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/89/0737-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 373, "char_count": 4995, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4109058673955797e-07, "percentile": 0.7999447072010762 }, "sha256": "1bd8fa8c3fe115f159663f1a03d8f1e4763db86b10927fea92d319410069f762", "simhash": "1:099c1ef140d10af4", "word_count": 802 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:13.817562+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HERNANDEZ and LOPEZ, JJ., concurs." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Danny R. COE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nHENDLEY, Judge.\nConvicted of child abuse resulting in death contrary to \u00a7 40A-6-l(C), N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 6, 1972, Supp.1975) defendant appeals. He asserts two grounds for reversal: (1) failure of the trial court to grant a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence; (2) whether \u00a7 40A-6-l(C), supra, is unconstitutional. We affirm.\nSubstantial Evidence\nDefendant asserts that at the time of his motion for dismissal the state had failed to offer any evidence that defendant either abused the child or had any reason to be aware that the child was being abused. We disagree.\nThe evidence established that the child was abused; that defendant was living with the child and the child\u2019s mother, Esther Smith; that defendant abused the child; that defendant was alone with the child when it became unconscious; and, that the abuse resulted in death. The medical evidence supports the conclusion indicating child abuse and not injuries from falling down the stairs. State v. Adams, 89 N.M. 737, 557 P.2d 586 (Ct.App.1976).\nConstitutionality of \u00a7 40A-6-l(C), supra.\nDefendant was charged and convicted only under \u00a7 40A-6-l(C)(l) and (2), supra. Consequently, he has standing to challenge only those particular sections. State v. Herrod, 84 N.M. 418, 504 P.2d 26 (Ct.App.1972). Therefore, any contention by defendant that \u00a7 40A-6-l(C)(3), supra, is vague will not be considered.\nDefendant maintains that \u00a7 40A-6-l(C), supra, is unconstitutionally vague so as to violate due process. State v. Najera, 89 N.M. 522, 554 P.2d 983 (Ct.App.1976) held that a statute violates due process \u201c * * * if it is so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning * * The underlying doctrine is one of notice and fair warning as to the nature of the proscribed activity. State v. Marchiondo, 85 N.M. 627, 515 P.2d 146 (Ct.App.1973). In determining questions of vagueness that court considers the statute as a whole. State v. Orzen, 83 N.M. 458, 493 P.2d 768 (Ct.App.1972).\nSection 40A-6-1(C), supra, is not vague. It clearly sets forth and segregates the type of conduct proscribed by the law. It contains specific sections on neglect, abandonment, and abuse. Each section contains its own definition. Section 40A-6-l(C), supra, defines abuse as conduct which:\n\u201c * * * consjsts of a person knowingly, intentionally, or negligently, and without justifiable cause, causing or permitting a child to be:\n\u201c(1) placed in a situation that may endanger the child\u2019s life or health; or\n\u201c(2) tortured, cruelly confined or cruelly punished; or\n\u201c(3) exposed to the inclemency of the weather.\n\u201cWhoever commits abuse of a child is guilty of a fourth degree felony, unless the abuse results in the child\u2019s death or great bodily harm, in which case he is guilty of a second degree felony.\u201d [Emphasis added].\nReasonable adults of common intelligence would have no difficulty in ascertaining the type of conduct proscribed by the statute and the type not so restricted. Defendant\u2019s contention, that because of its negligence requirement the statute covers any and all harm that might befall the child, is without substance. State v. Lucero, 87 N.M. 242, 531 P.2d 1215 (Ct.App.1975), held that \u00a7 40A-6-1, supra, to be a strict liability statute. State v. Adams, 89 N.M. 737, 557 P.2d 586 (Ct.App.1976) sustained a conviction of child abuse resulting in death upon a negligence theory where the father had knowledge of the child abuse and failed to take any action to halt that abuse.\nThe statute then does not apply to ordinary situations where a child is injured, but only to those where the parent performs or fails to perform some abusive act. The statute requires abuse and not mere normal parental action or inaction. The statute gives fair warning to any reasonable person that child abuse is prohibited and punishable behavior.\nIn construing legislative enactments State v. Pacheco, 81 N.M. 97, 463 P.2d 521 (Ct.App.1969) stated:\n\u201cEvery presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity and regularity of legislation, and it will not be declared unconstitutional, unless the court is satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the Legislature went outside the Constitution in enacting it. [Citations omitted].\u201d\nThe legislature in enacting \u00a7 40A-6-l(C)(l) and (2), supra, acted within its province to protect abused children. The legislature did not act outside its constitutional limits.\nDefendant\u2019s contention that the punishment under this statute is cruel and unusual is without merit. It is based on matters which are not a part of this case.\nAffirmed.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nHERNANDEZ and LOPEZ, JJ., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "HENDLEY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hank Farrah, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant.", "Toney Anaya, Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, Charlotte Hetherington Roosen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "587 P.2d 973\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Danny R. COE, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 3639.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nOct. 17, 1978.\nWrit of Certiorari Denied Dec. 4, 1978.\nHank Farrah, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant.\nToney Anaya, Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, Charlotte Hetherington Roosen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellee." }, "file_name": "0320-01", "first_page_order": 356, "last_page_order": 358 }