{ "id": 1557043, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John DOE, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Doe", "decision_date": "1978-12-05", "docket_number": "No. 3710", "first_page": "354", "last_page": "359", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "92 N.M. 354" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "588 P.2d 555" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "92 N.M. 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557264 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 N.M. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2829555 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/86/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2772204 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 P. 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557289 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2866959 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2841645 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2867096 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/89/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 P.2d 1089", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "585 P.2d 1352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 1557291 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571008 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0745-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 560, "char_count": 13466, "ocr_confidence": 0.8, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6120063968661822e-07, "percentile": 0.6857492463846347 }, "sha256": "4fff60acedb347c38163fc905b3404bf2d1f3678353d8493f205530c4304d05a", "simhash": "1:cb1033d7f65635df", "word_count": 2181 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:13.817562+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HERNANDEZ and LOPEZ, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John DOE, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWOOD, Chief Judge.\nAfter the district attorney refused to provide information requested by the Children\u2019s Court in connection with a proposed consent decree and after considering a proposed juvenile agreement, the court dismissed the petition for delinquency. The State appealed. We affirm, discussing (1) the district attorney\u2019s refusal, (2) right to appeal, (3) the proposed consent decree, (4) court\u2019s authority to dismiss, and (5) propriety of the dismissal. References to the Children\u2019s Court rules are to the rules effective November 1, 1978.\nA petition was filed charging that the child was delinquent and in need of care or rehabilitation. The alleged factual basis was misdemeanor aggravated battery. See \u00a7 40A-3-5(B), N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl. Yol. 6).\nOn May 30, 1978 at the child\u2019s first appearance, the child denied the allegations of the petition. A proposed consent decree was presented to the court. This proposal consisted of: (a) a motion for a consent decree signed by the Children\u2019s Court attorney, the juvenile probation officer, the child and the child\u2019s attorney, and (b) a juvenile agreement signed by the juvenile probation officer, the child and the child\u2019s parents. In addition, there was a form of consent decree which would have required the child to obey the terms and conditions of the juvenile agreement.\nThe proposed juvenile agreement was, primarily, a probation agreement. In reviewing the probation agreement, the court pointed out that the agreement would require the child to \u201ccomply with all regulation\u2019s [sic] set by the Childrens Court.\u201d The court commented: \u201cI do not know the child and do not know what regulations . would be appropriate.\u201d The court remarked that the information presented to the court was incomplete. The court asked for a pre-disposition report and continued the hearing until additional information could be supplied.\nThe continued hearing was held on June 8, 1978. At that hearing the court pointed out that the pre-disposition report showed the child had been arrested in November, 1977 on a complaint of possession of stolen property. The court remarked that it had asked the juvenile probation officer for information concerning the stolen property matter, and the probation officer had reported that the district attorney had refused to furnish the information. At the continued hearing, the Children\u2019s Court attorney stated that the district attorney still refused to supply information to the court concerning the stolen property matter. The court\u2019s order reads:\n[ I]t appearing to the Court that the District Attorney\u2019s Office had refused to furnish information about the child for the Court\u2019s use in this matter, and it further appearing from the Juvenile Agreement that the child was not in need of care of [sic] supervision .\nIT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Motion for Consent Decree be and it hereby is denied; and\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that conditioned upon restitution being made as stated, the cause be and it hereby is dismissed.\nThe restitution, stated in the proposed juvenile agreement, was for $142.50 for medical expenses, presumably the cost of medical services to the victim. On appeal, the State asserts the court had no authority to condition dismissal upon restitution. We do not consider this contention because the child makes no complaint concerning the restitution provision.\nDistrict Attorney\u2019s Refusal\nThe Children\u2019s Court attorney stated the district attorney\u2019s position as follows: The child was arrested for receiving stolen property; further investigation revealed an adult had been responsible; the child \u201cwas offered total immunity from any prosecution, no record, no nothing, in exchange for his testimony in the prosecution of the adult. He cooperated fully, testified. The matter went to a conclusion and on that basis . . . [the district attorney\u2019s] position is that nothing associated with that should be used against\u201d the child. The district attorney seemed to be of the view that making the information available to the court would be a use of the information against the child but, regardless of any such use, supplying the information to the court would violate the district attorney\u2019s agreement with the child and \u201cwould jeopardize agreements with other potential witnesses later on in other cases\u201d.\nThe propriety of the district attorney\u2019s refusal is not an issue in this appeal; rather, the issue involves the consequences of the refusal. However, we point out: (a) immunity is not granted by the district attorney but by the court, Campos v. State, 91 N.M. 745, 580 P.2d 966 (1978); (b) prosecutors\u2019 agreements are enforced on due process grounds, State v. Gabaldon, (N.M.Ct.App.) 585 P.2d 1352 decided September 26, 1978, cert. denied N.M., 586 P.2d 1089 (1978); (c) upon failure to obey a discovery order, the court may enter such order as is appropriate under the circumstances, Rule of Crim.Proc. 30; and (d) dismissal may be an appropriate order, see Pizza Hut of Santa Fe, Inc. v. Branch, 89 N.M. 325, 552 P.2d 227 (Ct.App.1976); Beverly v. Conquistadores, Inc., 88 N.M. 119, 537 P.2d 1015 (Ct.App.1975). Concerning nondisclosure of an informer, Evidence Rule 510 authorizes the trial court to dismiss the charges to which the non-disclosed testimony would relate.\nRight to Appeal\nThe appeal is by the State. It had a right to appeal. Appeals from dispositions on petitions alleging delinquency are govrned by the Rules of Appellate Procedure for Criminal Cases. Children\u2019s Court Rule 50(c). N.M.Crim.App. 201(a) provides for appeals \u201cpermitted by law\u201d.' Section 13-14-36(A), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 3, pt. 1) states that any party may appeal from a judgment in the manner provided by law. See State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 572, 566 P.2d 121 (Ct.App.1977). The State is a party. Children\u2019s Court Rule 9(a).\nProposed Consent Decree\nChildren\u2019s Court Rule 44(a) reads:\n(a) Admissions. The respondent may make an admission by:\n(1) admitting sufficient facts to permit a finding that the allegations of the petition are true; or\n(2) declaring his intention not to contest the allegations in the petition.\nChildren\u2019s Court Rule 44(b) states: \u201cA consent decree is an order of the court, after an admission has been made, that suspends the proceedings on the petition\u201d.\nThe child made no admission under Children\u2019s Court Rule 44(a)(1); he denied the allegations of the petition. The only statement by the child, or on his behalf, in connection with the proposed consent decree, is found in the motion for a consent decree signed by the child and his attorney. The motion stated \u201cthe child does not object to the entrance of a Consent Decree.\u201d We consider this statement as declaring the child\u2019s intention not to contest the allegations in the petition and, thus, an admission under Children\u2019s Court Rule 44(a)(2) sufficient to authorize a consent decree under Children\u2019s Court Rule 44(b).\nChildren\u2019s Court Rule 44(f) authorizes the court to do one of three things: (a) accept the proposed consent decree as negotiated, (b) provide for a disposition more favorable to the child, or (c) reject the proposed consent decree. The State contends that the trial court\u2019s request for information about the stolen property matter was a \u201cdemand for disclosure\u201d and \u201cwas an act outside its authority and had no legal effect.\u201d Compare Eller v. State, 92 N.M. 52, 582 P. 824 (1978).\nThere are two reasons why the court\u2019s request for information was not a violation of Children\u2019s Court Rule 44(f).\nFirst, the court could properly call for information in deciding whether to accept or reject the consent decree or provide for a more favorable disposition of the child. Although \u00a7 13-14-29, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 3, pt. 1) does not expressly refer to pre-disposition reports in connection with consent decrees, the import of that section is that pre-disposition reports are relevant in deciding an \u201cappropriate disposition of the case.\u201d Calling for information on the child\u2019s background is also consistent with the legislative purpose of providing a \u201cprogram of supervision, care and rehabilitation\u201d. Section 13-14\u20142(B), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 3, pt. 1).\nSecond, the State\u2019s argument is necessarily based on the view that the court was considering action not authorized by Children\u2019s Court Rule 44(f). This view is incorrect. The transcript shows the court was considering the provision of the juvenile agreement which would have required the child to \u201ccomply with all regulation\u2019s [sic] set by the Childrens Court.\u201d The proposed consent decree required the child to obey such regulations. The court remarked: \u201cI do not know the child and do not know what regulations . . . would be appropriate.\u201d After this remark, the trial court called for a pre-disposition report and then learned of the district attorney\u2019s refusal to provide the requested information. Since the court was seeking to determine what, if any, restrictions would be appropriate as to the child, the court\u2019s request was consistent with the proposed consent decree and was consistent with the action of the court authorized by Children\u2019s Court Rule 44(f).\nCourt\u2019s Authority to Dismiss\nThe State contends the court had no authority to dismiss the petition. We have previously pointed out that the court has authority to dismiss a case for failure to obey a discovery order. This authority exists in Children\u2019s Court cases as well as in other proceedings.\nThe State\u2019s contention is based on the view that the court may not dismiss a Children\u2019s Court petition absent a statutory grant of authority to dismiss. See State v. Madrigal, 85 N.M. 496, 513 P.2d 1278 (Ct.App.1973). This statutory power argument is presented as separate from, and overlooks, the authority of the district court (of which the Children\u2019s Court is a division, \u00a7 13-14-3(C), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 3, pt. 1)) to dismiss for noncompliance with its order.\nSection 13-14-28(E), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 3, pt. 1) provides:\nIf the court finds that a child alleged to be delinquent or in need of supervision is not in need of care or rehabilitation, it shall dismiss the petition and order the child released from any detention or legal custody imposed in the proceedings.\nThis action is authority for that portion of the court\u2019s order which dismissed the petition on the basis that the child was not in need of care or supervision.\nPropriety of the Dismissal\nThe court dismissed the petition for two reasons \u2014 the refusal of the district attorney\u2019s office to furnish information and on the basis that the child was not in need of care or supervision. If either reason was correct, the dismissal was proper. See State v. Ross, 86 N.M. 212, 521 P.2d 1161 (Ct.App.1974). Here, both reasons for dismissal were correct.\nThe district attorney had refused to provide information requested by the court in connection with the stolen property matter. This information was relevant to whether the consent decree should be approved and was relevant to the child\u2019s need for care or supervision. The district attorney\u2019s position was that the information would not be provided. In view of this position, the court was not required to reject the proposed consent decree, conduct an adjudicatory hearing, determine that the child was delinquent, and then take up the question of the child\u2019s need for care or supervision. See Children\u2019s Court Rule 44(f), supra, and Doe v. State, 92 N.M. 74, 582 P.2d 1287 (1978). Knowing that relevant information would not be provided, the court could properly dismiss on the basis of the refusal to disclose.\nNor was the court required to go through the procedural steps stated in the preceding paragraph before dismissing on the basis that the child was not in need of care or supervision. The juvenile agreement, in effect, provided for an unsupervised probation. The child was to reside with an uncle in California and report by mail, each week, to the probation officer in Deming, New Mexico. There are other terms such as allowing visits by the probation officer and complying with regulations set by the probation office in California, but the effect of the agreement, essentially, was an unsupervised probation. The Children\u2019s Court attorney represented to the court that these provisions were acceptable to the probation officer.\nThe record supports the court\u2019s ruling that it appeared \u201cfrom the Juvenile Agreement that the child was not in need of care of [sic] supervision\u201d. The State\u2019s claim is that there is no substantial evidence to sustain dismissal on this ground; the juvenile agreement is substantial evidence. The State does not contend that it was denied the opportunity to present additional evidence on the child\u2019s need for care or supervision; that issue is not before us. When the State\u2019s representatives took the position. that an appropriate disposition was that the child be placed on unsupervised probation, the trial court could properly rule that the child was not in need of care or supervision and dismiss the petition.\nThe order of dismissal is affirmed.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nHERNANDEZ and LOPEZ, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WOOD, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Toney Anaya, Attorney General, Charlotte Hetherington Roosen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellant.", "J. Kent Cooper, Gary M. Jeffreys, P. C., Deming, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "588 P.2d 555\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John DOE, Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 3710.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nDec. 5, 1978.\nWrit of Certiorari Denied Jan. 4, 1979.\nToney Anaya, Attorney General, Charlotte Hetherington Roosen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellant.\nJ. Kent Cooper, Gary M. Jeffreys, P. C., Deming, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0354-01", "first_page_order": 390, "last_page_order": 395 }