{ "id": 1557044, "name": "Barbara J. RUDISAILE, Personal Representative, Surviving Spouse and Executrix of the Estate of Stanley E. Rudisaile, Deceased, Petitioner, v. HAWK AVIATION, INC., a New Mexico Corporation, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, Inc.", "decision_date": "1979-02-14", "docket_number": "No. 12214", "first_page": "575", "last_page": "578", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "92 N.M. 575" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "592 P.2d 175" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "462 Pa. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 485148 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/462/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 P.2d 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10559139 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/479/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2874422 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2868200 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/89/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 P.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Wash.App. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 473893 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/19/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 P.2d 774", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Wash.2d 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1117355 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/86/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 So.2d 128", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9651730 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/335/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 P.2d 1085", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2842052 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" }, { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 P.2d 249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2837378 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5336986 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" }, { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0730-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 572, "char_count": 9083, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.1045414447379114e-07, "percentile": 0.8595694189120678 }, "sha256": "5d27981ba71ac552808ca3cc7997a0954d811ff769961f84382f0ae2227de802", "simhash": "1:68569e0e51b5a922", "word_count": 1467 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:13.817562+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SOSA, C. J., and EASLEY and FEDERI-CI, JJ., concur.", "PAYNE, J., respectfully dissenting." ], "parties": [ "Barbara J. RUDISAILE, Personal Representative, Surviving Spouse and Executrix of the Estate of Stanley E. Rudisaile, Deceased, Petitioner, v. HAWK AVIATION, INC., a New Mexico Corporation, Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nMcMANUS, Senior Justice.\nBarbara J. Rudisaile brought a wrongful death action against Hawk Aviation, Inc., for the death of her husband. The trial court sitting without a jury found for plaintiff and awarded $235,000.00 in damages. Defendant appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed. We granted plaintiff\u2019s petition for a writ of certiorari and now reverse the Court of Appeals.\nThis action arose from an airplane accident which occurred on September 30, 1974 near Farmington, New Mexico. Defendant owned and operated a FAA certified field operation at the Farmington Municipal Airport. Plaintiff\u2019s decedent, Dr. Rudisaile, was a qualified pilot and the sole occupant of a Piper Cherokee 140 E which he rented from defendant.\nOn September 30, 1974 Alan Hawkinson, defendant\u2019s acting flight instructor, flew the Cherokee 140 E on three separate flights. After the third flight Hawkinson delivered the aircraft to Mr. Maxwell, one of defendant\u2019s employees, for a scheduled oil and oil filter change. Maxwell drained the oil and replaced the oil filter, but he failed to replenish the oil. Maxwell did, however, make an entry into the aircraft engine log book that the oil filter and oil had been changed. Dr. Rudisaile arrived at the office of defendant, conversed with Hawkinson, and proceeded to the aircraft. Dr. Rudisaile took the log book from Maxwell, climbed into the aircraft, started the engine, and taxied to the runway. The doctor did not make the customary preflight check of the aircraft prior to take-off. He left the Farmington Airport at about 3:36 p. m. and crashed a few minutes later.\nThe trial court determined that defendant, as lessor of an airplane which was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to Dr. Rudisaile, was strictly liable in tort for Dr. Rudisaile\u2019s death. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the doctrine of strict liability did not apply to this case because the airplane was not \u201cdefective\u201d.\nThe issues before this Court are: (1) whether an airplane rented without oil is \u201cdefective\u201d within the meaning of Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 402A (1965), and (2) whether decedent\u2019s failure to make a pre-flight check constitutes an affirmative defense to the tort of strict products liability.\nNew Mexico accepted the doctrine of strict products liability by adopting \u00a7 402A in Stang v. Hertz Corporation, 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972). See also Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 88 N.M. 355, 540 P.2d 835 (Ct.App.1975), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 319, 540 P.2d 249 (1975). Section 402A of the Restatement reads as follows:\n(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if\n(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and\n(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.\nThe doctrine of strict liability was evolved to promote product safety by placing liability on the party primarily responsible for the injury occurring. Stang, supra. The imposition of \u00a7 402A liability \u201c \u2018has a beneficial effect on manufacturers of defective products both in the care they take and in the warning they give.\u2019 (Citation omitted.)\u201d First Nat. Bk., Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agr. Prod., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 87, 537 P.2d 682, 695 (Ct.App.1975), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 29, 536 P.2d 1085 (1975).\nSection 402A was extended to lessors in Stang v. Hertz Corporation, supra. In Stang, Hertz Corporation was held strictly liable for deaths resulting from a tire blow out. The tire, mounted with previous impact damage, was deemed to be unreasonably dangerous. This Court stated:\nSo long as the bailor is in the business of leasing then he will be held to. the same standard of care as a manufacturer or retailer for the protection of the consumer.\nId., 83 N.M. at 734, 497 P.2d at 736.\nThe Court of Appeals, in holding that the doctrine of strict liability did not apply to this case, reasoned that the airplane was not \u201cdefective\u201d because \u201cthe airplane rented to the decedent had no hidden or latent defects which could not be discovered by the exercise of reasonable care.\u201d Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, No. 3096 (N.M.Ct.App., filed Sept. 5, 1978). We disagree with this rationale. In our opinion, the Court of Appeals has substantially changed the meaning of \u201cdefect\u201d as defined by \u00a7 402A and existing case law.\nDefinitional concepts of \u201cdefective condition unreasonably dangerous\u201d are set out in \u00a7 402A Comments (g) and (I). Comment (g) entitled \u201cDefective condition\u201d states:\nThe rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller\u2019s hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him. (Emphasis added.)\nComment (/) entitled \u201cUnreasonably dangerous \u201d states:\nThe article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. (Emphasis added.)\nCourts have generally equated \u201cdefective\u201d with \u201cunreasonably dangerous\u201d. See Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So.2d 128 (Ala.1976); Seattle-First National Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash.2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975); Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 19 Wash.App. 515, 576 P.2d 426 (1978). The Washington Supreme Court stated the following rule in Seattle-First National Bank:\nIf a product is unreasonably dangerous, it is necessarily defective. The plaintiff may, but should not be required to prove defectiveness as a separate matter.\n[Ljiability is imposed under section 402A if a product is not reasonably safe.\n542 P.2d at 779. The Supreme Court of Alabama stated in Casrell:\n[A] \u201cdefect\u201d is that which renders a product \u201cunreasonably dangerous,\u201d i. e., not fit for its intended purpose, and . all \u201cdefective\u201d products are covered. .\nThe product either is or is not \u201cunreasonably dangerous\u201d to a person who should be expected to use or to be exposed to it. . . . The important factor is whether it is safe or dangerous when the product is used as it was intended to be used.\n335 So.2d at 133.\nAs these cases indicate, to prove liability under \u00a7 402A the plaintiff need only show that the product was dangerous beyond the expectations of the ordinary consumer. The reasonableness of the acts or omissions of the plaintiff is never considered in determining whether a product is \u201cdefective.\u201d It is the opinion of this Court that an airplane leased without oil in the engine is dangerous beyond the expectations of the ordinary consumer. Therefore, the product is \u201cdefective\u201d within the meaning of \u00a7 402A, and defendant is strictly liable for all resulting damages.\nThe next issue we address is whether decedent\u2019s own conduct should be a defense to strict tort liability. At trial, defendant requested the court to find that \u201cdecedent ... by the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that the aircraft did not have oil . . . , and such act or omission was a proximate cause.\u201d Defendant\u2019s argument stems from the fact that decedent failed to pre-flight his aircraft. Defendant is seeking to establish conventional contributory negligence as a defense to strict liability. We refuse to accept this argument.\nConventional contributory negligence is not an affirmative defense to strict liability. Bendorf, supra. See also Jasper v. Skyhook Corporation, 89 N.M. 98, 547 P.2d 1140 (Ct.App.1976), rev\u2019d on other grounds, Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977). \u201c[Cjontributory negligence, as a defense to strict liability in tort, should be limited to those cases where the plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably encounters a known risk. (Footnote omitted.)\u201d (Emphasis added.) Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 329-30 (Alaska 1970). The existence of due care on the part of the consumer is irrelevant. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corporation, 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).\nIn this case, the record indicates that Dr. Rudisaile was not aware that the airplane had no oil in the engine before he took off. His failure to discover the absence of oil is not a defense to strict liability.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the decision and judgment of the trial court.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nSOSA, C. J., and EASLEY and FEDERI-CI, JJ., concur.\nPAYNE, J., respectfully dissenting.", "type": "majority", "author": "McMANUS, Senior Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Palmer & Frost, Reed L. Frost, John E. Schindler, Farmington, Byrd, Davis & Eisenberg, Tom H. Davis, George M. Fleming, Austin, Tex., for petitioner.", "Tansey, Rosebrough, Roberts & Gerding, Byron Cat\u00f3n, Farmington, for respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "592 P.2d 175\nBarbara J. RUDISAILE, Personal Representative, Surviving Spouse and Executrix of the Estate of Stanley E. Rudisaile, Deceased, Petitioner, v. HAWK AVIATION, INC., a New Mexico Corporation, Respondent.\nNo. 12214.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nFeb. 14, 1979.\nRehearing Denied March 14, 1979.\nPalmer & Frost, Reed L. Frost, John E. Schindler, Farmington, Byrd, Davis & Eisenberg, Tom H. Davis, George M. Fleming, Austin, Tex., for petitioner.\nTansey, Rosebrough, Roberts & Gerding, Byron Cat\u00f3n, Farmington, for respondent." }, "file_name": "0575-01", "first_page_order": 611, "last_page_order": 614 }