{
  "id": 1557175,
  "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John DOE, a child, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Doe",
  "decision_date": "1979-02-20",
  "docket_number": "No. 3745",
  "first_page": "589",
  "last_page": "591",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "92 N.M. 589"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "592 P.2d 189"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.",
    "id": 9025,
    "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 52,
    "name_long": "New Mexico",
    "name": "N.M."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:13.817562+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "LOPEZ, J., concurs.",
      "WALTERS, J., specially concurring."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John DOE, a child, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "OPINION\nHERNANDEZ, Judge.\nJohn Doe, a minor, appeals from an order of the Children\u2019s Court extending the period of his parole supervision for an additional year.\nDoe was committed to the New Mexico Boy\u2019s School on July 25, 1977, for a period of one year. He was paroled on March 20, 1978. On July 11, 1978, his parole was revoked for violation of the terms and conditions of his parole and he was ordered re-committed to the Boy\u2019s School. On July 13, 1978, the New Mexico Division of Corrections by Ms. Kelly Robbins, probation-parole officer, filed a petition stating that Doe was in need of care extending beyond the one year period provided in the court\u2019s original order. A hearing was held on this petition and the court subsequently granted the petition and entered the order appealed from.\nDoe\u2019s sole point of error is that the court erred in denying his motion to strike the petition for extension of parole supervision because the probation-parole officer was \u201cnot a person vested with legal custody or responsibility of protective supervision.\u201d Doe contends that Section 32-l-38(E)(2), N.M.S.A.1978 (formerly \u00a7 13-14-35(E)(2), N.M.S.A.1953) of the Children\u2019s Code is controlling:\n\u201cE. At any time prior to expiration, a judgment vesting legal custody or granting protective supervision may be modified, revoked or extended on motion by: * * * * * *\n(2) a person vested with legal custody, or responsibility of protective supervision, who requests the court for an extension of the judgment on the g[r]ounds that the requested action is necessary to safeguard the welfare of the child or the public interest.\u201d\nDoe argues that since he was in legal custody of the Boy\u2019s School it was the only one authorized to file such a petition. In support of this, he cites the following part of Section 32-l-3(J) (formerly \u00a7 13-14-3 J, N.M.S.A.1953) of the Children\u2019s Code:\n\u201cJ. \u2018legal custody\u2019 means a legal status created by the order of a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction * *. an individual granted legal custody of a child shall exercise his rights and responsibilities as custodian personally unless otherwise authorized by the court or tribunal entering the order * * *.\u201d [Emphasis added.]\nHe goes on to argue that the emphasized part of this subsection demonstrates that this was the Legislature\u2019s intention. This argument is ingenious but the Children\u2019s Code is not so restrictive. All that the emphasized subsection says to us is that if an individual, as distinct from an agency, is given legal custody, he cannot delegate his responsibility but must act personally.\nThe petition recites that it was made under authority of Section 32-l-38(F), N.M.S.A.1978:\n\u201cPrior to the expiration of a judgment transferring legal custody, the court may extend the judgment for additional periods of one year if it finds that the extension is necessary to safeguard the welfare of the child or the public interest.\u201d\nSection 32-l-38(E), supra, speaks of the authority of \u201cpersons\u201d to request \u201cthe court for an extension of the judgment.\u201d Section 32-l-38(F), supra, speaks of the authority of the court to extend the judgment.\nAs to the authority of the probation-parole officer to initiate such a proceeding, that is contained in Section 32-l-8(A)(3), N.M.S.A.1978 (formerly \u00a7 13-14-8(A)(3), N.M.S.A.1953):\n\u201cA. To carry out the objectives and provisions of the Children\u2019s Code, but subject to its limitations, probation officers have the power and duty to:\n(3) make predisposition studies and submit reports and recommendations to the court.\" [Emphasis added.]\nThe court did not err in denying Doe\u2019s motion to strike the petition.\nWe affirm.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nLOPEZ, J., concurs.\nWALTERS, J., specially concurring.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HERNANDEZ, Judge."
      },
      {
        "text": "WALTERS, Judge\n(specially concurring).\nI agree with the result reached, but upon a different ground.\nSection 33-1-3, N.M.S.A.1978, recites the legislative purpose for establishing a \u201ccorrections division,\u201d and the purpose is said to be\nto create a single, unified division within the criminal justice department to administer all laws and exercise all functions formerly administered and exercised by the penitentiary of New Mexico, the state board of probation and parole . . . , the New Mexico boy\u2019s school, the girl\u2019s welfare home and the juvenile probation services division of the administrative office of the courts.\nMrs. Kelly, being a juvenile probation-parole officer, was a member of the unified division to whom legal custody of the minor had been committed. Thus, her petition was proper as one filed by a \u201cperson,\u201d as statutorily defined, vested with legal custody who may move for modification or extension of a judgment granting protective supervision under \u00a7 32-l-38(E)(2), N.M.S. A.1978.\nI do not believe Ms. Kelly\u2019s authority to petition is covered by \u00a7 32 \u2014 1\u20148(A)(3), since that provision refers to submitting reports and recommendations to the court based upon pre disposition studies made by the probation officer. The instant petition was not a recommendation; nor did it precede the court\u2019s disposition of the petition to revoke parole. I do not think \u00a7 32-1-8(A)(3) can be read as anything less than a complete and related series of duties falling upon the officer to be performed prior to disposition, not afterward.",
        "type": "concurrence",
        "author": "WALTERS, Judge"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Morris Stagner, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant.",
      "Jeff Bingaman, Atty. Gen., Jacob G. Vigil, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiffappellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "592 P.2d 189\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John DOE, a child, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 3745.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nFeb. 20, 1979.\nMorris Stagner, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant.\nJeff Bingaman, Atty. Gen., Jacob G. Vigil, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiffappellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0589-01",
  "first_page_order": 625,
  "last_page_order": 627
}