{ "id": 1557284, "name": "Ruben BAZALDUA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Michael HANRAHAN, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Bazaldua v. Hanrahan", "decision_date": "1979-03-26", "docket_number": "No. 12143", "first_page": "596", "last_page": "599", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "92 N.M. 596" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "592 P.2d 512" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "64 N.E. 825", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 N.Y. 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 2306874, 1187052 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/172/0176-01", "/ny-crim/17/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 U.S. 691", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11729345 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/188/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 U.S. 364", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8292063 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" }, { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/196/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 U.S. 412", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3916450 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417, 419-22" }, { "page": "669-671" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/289/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 U.S. 386", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3642220 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1908, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" }, { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/208/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 U.S. 222", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8291801 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1906, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" }, { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/203/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 U.S. 128", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3693390 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1917, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132-133" }, { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/245/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 S.Ct. 530", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 11329864 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534-536" }, { "page": "536" }, { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/439/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3182", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 578, "char_count": 12144, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8782009931873592e-07, "percentile": 0.7272244443594974 }, "sha256": "6adb23872a765a85569b28829ffe5f2e2d1d5fb46a91fe0c0e97c190d00a65a2", "simhash": "1:1e28eb4ed20cdc44", "word_count": 2018 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:13.817562+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SOSA, C. J., and EASLEY, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "Ruben BAZALDUA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Michael HANRAHAN, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nFEDERICI, Justice.\nAppellee Bazaldua was indicted by a Texas Grand Jury for aggravated robbery. The Governor of Texas issued a requisition for the extradition of appellee from the State of New Mexico to the State of Texas to stand trial for the crime, alleged by the Texas Governor to have been committed in Texas. Appellee was arrested in' Albuquerque, New Mexico, on a warrant issued in Dallas County, Texas, and was subsequently arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the New Mexico Governor directing his rendition to the State of Texas.\nAppellee filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was not a fugitive from justice because he was not present in the State of Texas at the time the alleged offense was committed.\nThe district court held a hearing on the writ. Five witnesses testified under oath to the effect that appellee could not have been in the State of Texas at the time the alleged offense was committed. The five witnesses were related to, or friends of, appellee. After hearing testimony from the witnesses, the trial court granted the writ and released appellee to the custody of his brother. But, the court allowed the State fifteen days within which to produce Eduardo Sanchez, the victim of the alleged crime, to testify in court. The State did not produce Sanchez or any other evidence. The court, by final order and judgment, sustained the writ of habeas corpus and ordered appellee discharged from custody.\nThe State argues that it proved its prima facie case after it presented the extradition documents, including an affidavit from the victim of the crime. Further, the State argues that appellee has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not in Texas and therefore not a fugitive at the time the alleged crime was committed. The documents produced from the demanding state made out a prima facie case and this was not overcome by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.\nOn the subject of extradition, Article IV, \u00a7 2, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution provides:\nA Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.\nCongress has implemented the constitutional provision. The relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3182 reads:\nWhenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the State, District or Territory to which such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. (Emphasis added.)\nNew Mexico has adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, \u00a7\u00a7 31-4-1 through 31-4-30, N.M.S.A.1978 (formerly \u00a7\u00a7 41-19-1 through 41-19-30, N.M.S.A. 1953). Section 31-4-2 of the New Mexico Act provides:\nSubject to the provisions of this act [31-4-1 to 31-4-30 N.M.S.A.1978], the provisions of the constitution of the United States controlling, and any and all Acts of Congress enacted in pursuance thereof, it is the duty of the governor of this state to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state of the United States any person charged in that state with treason, felony, or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this state. (Emphasis added.)\nIn Michigan v. Doran, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521, decided by the United States Supreme Court on December 18, 1978, the respondent had been arrested in Michigan and charged with a crime. Michigan had notified Arizona and Arizona charged respondent with theft. An Arizona justice of the peace issued an arrest warrant which recited that there was \u201cprobable cause\u201d to believe that respondent had committed the crime. The Governor of Arizona issued a requisition for extradition accompanied by an arrest warrant, supporting affidavits and the original complaint. The Governor of Michigan issued an arrest warrant and ordered extradition. Upon arraignment on the Michigan warrant, respondent petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the extradition warrant was invalid because it did not comply with the Michigan Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. After reviewing the constitutional provision, the Act of Congress and Michigan\u2019s Uniform Extradition Act, the Court, through Chief Justice Burger, set out the intent and purpose of the extradition clause of the Constitution:\nThe Extradition Clause was intended to enable each state to bring offenders to trial as swiftly as possible in the state where the alleged offense was committed. Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 132-133, 38 S.Ct. 41, 42, 62 L.Ed. 193 (1917); Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 227, 27 S.Ct. 122, 123, 51 L.Ed. 161 (1906). The purpose of the Clause was to preclude any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from the justice of another state and thus \u201cbalkanize\u201d the administration of criminal justice among the several states. The Clause never contemplated that the asylum state was to conduct the kind of preliminary inquiry traditionally intervening between the initial arrest and trial.\nUnder Art. IV, \u00a7 2, the courts of the asylum state are bound to accept the demanding state\u2019s judicial determination since the proceedings of the demanding state are clothed with the traditional presumption of regularity. In short, when a neutral judicial officer of the demanding state has determined that probable cause exists, the courts of the asylum state are without power to review the determination.\n-\u2014 U.S. at ------, 99 S.Ct. at 534-536.\nThe Court concluded:\nWe hold that once the governor of the asylum state has acted on a requisition for extradition based on the demanding state\u2019s judicial determination that probable cause existed, no further judicial inquiry may be had on that issue in the asylum state.\n-- - U.S. at ------, 99 S.Ct. at 536.\nThe Court placed a limitation upon the power of a court in the asylum state to review the requisition for extradition:\nA governor\u2019s grant of extradition is prima facie evidence that the constitutional and statutory requirements have been met. Cf. Bassing v. Cady, 208 U.S. 386, 392, 28 S.Ct. 392, 393, 52 L.Ed. 540 (1908). Once the governor has granted extradition, a court considering release on habeas corpus can do no more than decide (a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive. These are historic facts readily verifiable.\n\u2014 U.S. at \u2014, 99 S.Ct. at 535.\nA governor\u2019s grant of extradition is prima facie evidence that the constitutional and statutory requirements have been met. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the respondent (appellee here) to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in the asylum state that he is not a fugitive from the demanding state. South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 53 S.Ct. 667, 77 L.Ed. 1292 (1933). In South Carolina, the Court said:\nNo question is raised concerning the form or adequacy of the writ issued by the Governor of North Carolina.\nPrima facie Bailey was in lawful custody and upon him rested the burden of overcoming the presumption by proof. (Citation omitted.)\nThe demanding State asserted a right to the custody of the respondent under the Federal Constitution and statute. He claimed that these impliedly forbade his surrender since the evidence made it clear that he was beyond the limits of South Carolina at the time of the homicide and, therefore, was not a fugitive from the justice of that State.\nThese questions of federal right were properly submitted for consideration by the state court upon the return to the writ of habeas corpus. And it was the duty of that court to administer the law prescribed by the Constitution and statute of the United States\nIn Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 374, 25 S.Ct. 282, 285, 49 L.Ed. 515, through Mr. Justice Peckham, this Court said: \u201cWhen it is conceded, or when it is so conclusively proved, that no question can be made that the person was not within the demanding State when the crime is said to have been committed, and his arrest is sought on the ground only of a constructive presence at the time, in the demanding State, then the court will discharge the defendant. Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691, 23 S.Ct. 456, 47 L.Ed. 657 affirming the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals, 172 N.Y. 176, 64 N.E. 825. But the court will not discharge a defendant arrested under the governor\u2019s warrant where there is merely contradictory evidence on the subject of presence in or absence from the State, as habeas corpus is not the proper proceeding to try the question of alibi, or any question as to the guilt or innocence of the accused.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nConsidering the Constitution and statute and the declarations of this Court, we may not properly approve the discharge of the respondent unless it appears from the record that he succeeded in showing by clear and satisfactory evidence that he was outside the limits of South Carolina at the time of the homicide. Stated otherwise, he should not have been released unless it appeared beyond reasonable doubt that he was without the State of South Carolina when the alleged offense was committed and, consequently, could not be a fugitive from her justice.\n289 U.S. at 417, 419-22, 53 S.Ct. at 669-671.\nWe adopt the rules announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Michigan v. Doran, supra, and South Carolina v. Bailey, supra.\nAfter the hearing on the writ and after the State failed to produce any further evidence showing that appellee was in the State of Texas at the time the alleged crime occurred, the trial court entered a final order which reads:\nAnd the State of New Mexico . having failed to produce any evidence in this matter by July 27, 1978, and the Court having found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Petitioner was not in the State of Texas at the time of the alleged offense, IT IS\nORDERED that the Writ of Habeas Corpus hearing be and is sustained, AND IT IS FURTHER\nORDERED that Ruben Bazaldua, the Petitioner is hereby and permanently discharged from custody in this matter.\nAlthough the trial court\u2019s findings and conclusions favorable to appellee are entitled to great weight, appellee did not overcome the State\u2019s prima facie case by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden upon appellee of overcoming the prima facie case is heavy. Conflicting evidence is not sufficient. The evidence adduced by appellee went not only to his contention that he was not in Texas, but also to the question of alibi. Habeas corpus is not the proper proceeding in which to try the latter question. South Carolina v. Bailey, supra.\nThe order and judgment of the trial court is reversed.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nSOSA, C. J., and EASLEY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "FEDERICI, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jeff Bingaman, Atty. Gen., Michael Kauffman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, Ira S. Robinson, Dist. Atty., Jon A. Feder, Asst. Dist. Atty., Albuquerque, for respondent-appellant.", "John B. Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Gregory Chase, Asst. Public Defender, Mark H. Shapiro, Asst. Appellate Defender, Albuquerque, Reginald J. Storment, Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for petitioner-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "592 P.2d 512\nRuben BAZALDUA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Michael HANRAHAN, Respondent-Appellant.\nNo. 12143.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nMarch 26, 1979.\nJeff Bingaman, Atty. Gen., Michael Kauffman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, Ira S. Robinson, Dist. Atty., Jon A. Feder, Asst. Dist. Atty., Albuquerque, for respondent-appellant.\nJohn B. Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Gregory Chase, Asst. Public Defender, Mark H. Shapiro, Asst. Appellate Defender, Albuquerque, Reginald J. Storment, Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for petitioner-appellee." }, "file_name": "0596-01", "first_page_order": 632, "last_page_order": 635 }