{ "id": 1568720, "name": "ABO PETROLEUM CORPORATION et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. James W. AMSTUTZ et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz", "decision_date": "1979-09-10", "docket_number": "No. 12184", "first_page": "332", "last_page": "335", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "93 N.M. 332" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "600 P.2d 278" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "306 S.W.2d 573", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10173270 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/306/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 Harv.L. Rev. 457", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Harv. L. Rev.", "year": 1897, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Mich.L.Rev. 762", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Mich. L. Rev.", "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Okl. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Okla.", "case_ids": [ 408291 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/okla/203/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2839152 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590" }, { "page": "1155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2770208, 2769266, 2769493 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0592-01", "/nm/84/0592-02", "/nm/84/0592-03" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2763121 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" }, { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0601-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 504, "char_count": 8830, "ocr_confidence": 0.788, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.395031788961833e-07, "percentile": 0.6435409940888446 }, "sha256": "cdd59f632438a472657750a75d5146cee8070c0351a83fb6946f810b77f8db61", "simhash": "1:a7f7ae0bc4c7b486", "word_count": 1460 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:53:36.909287+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SOSA, C. J., and FELTER, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "ABO PETROLEUM CORPORATION et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. James W. AMSTUTZ et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nPAYNE, Justice.\nThis action was brought in the District Court of Eddy County by Abo Petroleum and others against the children of Beulah Turknett Jones and Ruby Turknett Jones to quiet title to certain property in Eddy County. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Abo\u2019s motion, denied the children\u2019s motion, and entered a partial final judgment in favor of Abo. The children appealed, and we reverse the district court.\nJames and Amanda Turknett, the parents of Beulah and Ruby, owned in fee simple the disputed property in this case. In February 1908, by separate instruments entitled \u201cconditional deeds,\u201d the parents conveyed life estates in two separate parcels, one each to Beulah and Ruby. Each deed provided that the property would remain the daughter\u2019s\nduring her natural life, . and at her death to revert, vest in, and become the property absolute of her heir or heirs, m\u00e9aning her children if she have any at her death, hut if she die without an heir or heirs, then and in that event this said property and real estate shall vest in and become the property of the estate of . [her], to be distributed as provided by law at the time of her death. .\nAt the time of the delivery of the deed, neither daughter was married, nor were any children born to either daughter for several years thereafter.\nIn 1911, the parents gave another deed to Beulah, which covered the same land conveyed in 1908. This deed purported to convey \u201cabsolute title to the grantee . . . . \u201d In 1916, the parents executed yet another deed to Beulah, granting a portion of the property included in her two previous deeds. A second deed was also executed to Ruby, which provided that it was a \u201ccorrection deed\u201d for the 1908 deed.\nAfter all the deeds from the parents had been executed, Beulah had three children and Ruby had four children. These children are the appellants herein.\nSubsequent to the execution of these deeds, Beulah and Ruby attempted to convey fee simple interests in the property to the predecessors of Abo. The children of Beulah and Ruby contend that the 1908 deeds gave their parents life estates in the property, and that Beulah and Ruby could only have conveyed life estates to the predecessors in interest of Abo. Abo argues that the 1911 and 1916 deeds vested Beulah and Ruby with fee simple title, and that such title was conveyed to Abo\u2019s predecessors in interest, thereby giving Abo fee simpl\u00e9 title to the property.\nWe begin our inquiry by examining \u2022the nature of the estates James and Amanda Turknett conveyed in the 1908 deeds.\nFirst, the deeds gave each of the daughters property \u201cduring her natural life.\u201d As Abo apparently concedes, these words conveyed only a life estate.\nSecond, each deed provided that upon the daughter\u2019s death, the property would pass to her \u201cheir or heirs,\u201d which was specifically defined as \u201cher children if she have any at her death.\u201d Because it was impossible at the time of the original conveyance to determine whether the daughters would have children, or whether any of their children would survive them, the deeds created contingent remainders in the daughters\u2019 children, which could not vest until the death of the daughter holding the life estate. C. Moynihan, Introduction to the Law of Real Property 123 (1962).\nThird, each deed provided that if the contingent remainder failed, the property would become part of the daughter\u2019s estate, and pass \u201cas provided by law at the time of her death.\u201d The effect of this language would be to pass the property to the heirs of the daughter upon the failure of the first contingent remainder. Because one\u2019s heirs are not ascertainable until death, (C. Moynihan, supra at 127), the grant over to the daughter\u2019s estate created a second, or alternative, contingent remainder.\nThe only issues that remain are whether the parents retained any interest, whether by their subsequent deeds to their daughters they conveyed any interest that remained, and whether those conveyances destroyed the contingent remainders in the children.\nThe grantor-parents divested themselves of the life estate and contingent remainder interests in the property upon delivery of the first deed. Because both remainders are contingent, however, the parents retained a reversionary interest in the property. C. Moynihan, supra at 124, n. 1.\nAbo\u2019s position is that by the subsequent conveyances to the daughters, the parents\u2019 reversionary interest merged with the daughters\u2019 life estates, thus destroying the contingent remainders in the daughters\u2019 children and giving the daughters fee simple title to the property. This contention presents a question which this Court has not previously addressed \u2014 whether the doctrine of the destructibility of contingent remainders is applicable in New Mexico.\nThis doctrine, which originated in England in the Sixteenth Century, was based upon the feudal concept that seisin of land could never be in abeyance. From that principle, the rule developed that if the prior estate terminated before the occurrence of the contingency, the contingent remainder was destroyed for lack of a supporting freehold estate. The one instance in which this could happen occurred when the supporting life estate merged with the reversionary interest.\nAlthough New Mexico has adopted the common law of England by statute, \u00a7 38-1-3, N.M.S.A.1978, it has been repeatedly held that \u201cif the common law is not \u2018applicable to our condition and circumstances\u2019 it is not to be given effect.\u201d Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 603, 506 P.2d 345, 347 (Ct.App.1973), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 592, 506 P.2d 336 (1973). See also Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975). In Hicks this Court held that sovereign immunity \u2014 another doctrine of the common law \u2014 could be \u201cput to rest by the judiciary\u201d once it had reached a point of obsolescence. Id. at 590, 544 P.2d at 1155.\nThe doctrine of destructibility o\u00ed contingent remainders has been almost universally regarded to be obsolete by legislatures, courts and legal writers. See, e. g., Whitten v. Whitten, 203 Okl. 196, 219 P.2d 228 (1950); 1 L. Simes and A. Smith, Law of Future Interests \u00a7 209 (2d ed. 1956). It has been renounced by virtually all jurisdictions in the United States, either by statute or judicial decision, and was abandoned in the country of its origin over a century ago. Section 240 of the Restatement of Property (1936) takes the position that the doctrine is based in history, not reason. Comment (d) to \u00a7 240 states that \u201ccomplexity, confusion, unpredictability and frustration of manifested intent\u201d are the demonstrated consequences of adherence to the doctrine of destructibility. Furthermore, because operation of the doctrine can be avoided by the use of a trust to support the contingent remainder, the doctrine places a premium on the drafting skills of the lawyer. 49 Mich.L.Rev. 762, 764 (1951).\nThe only tenable argument in support of the doctrine is that it promotes the alienability of land. It does so, however, only arbitrarily, and oftentimes by defeating the intent of the grantor. Land often carries burdens with it, but courts do not arbitrarily cut off those burdens merely in order to make land more alienable.\nBecause the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders is but a relic of the feudal past, which has no justification or support in modern society, we decline to apply it in New Mexico. As Justice Holmes put it:\nIt is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.\nHolmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv.L. Rev. 457 at 469 (1897).\nWe hold that the conveyances of the property to the daughters did not destroy the contingent remainders in the daughters\u2019 children. The daughters acquired no more interest in the property by virtue of the later deeds than they had been granted in the original deeds. Any conveyance by them could transfer only the interest they had originally acquired, even if it purported to convey a fee simple. Cook v. Daniels, 306 S.W.2d 573 (Mo.1957).\nThe summary judgment and partial final judgment entered in favor of Abo are reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nSOSA, C. J., and FELTER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PAYNE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Montgomery, Andrews & Hannahs, Walter J. Melendres, Seth D. Montgomery, Santa Fe, for defendants-appellants.", "Losee, Carson & Dickerson, Chad D. Dickerson, Artesia, for plaintiffs-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "600 P.2d 278\nABO PETROLEUM CORPORATION et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. James W. AMSTUTZ et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nNo. 12184.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nSept. 10, 1979.\nRehearing Denied Sept. 25, 1979.\nMontgomery, Andrews & Hannahs, Walter J. Melendres, Seth D. Montgomery, Santa Fe, for defendants-appellants.\nLosee, Carson & Dickerson, Chad D. Dickerson, Artesia, for plaintiffs-appellees." }, "file_name": "0332-01", "first_page_order": 378, "last_page_order": 381 }