{ "id": 1568727, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sammy M. BARELA, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Barela", "decision_date": "1979-12-06", "docket_number": "No. 4169", "first_page": "700", "last_page": "704", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "93 N.M. 700" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "604 P.2d 838" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "548 F.2d 421", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 993471 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/548/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 U.S.C.S. \u00a7 881", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(4)" }, { "page": "(a)(4)" }, { "page": "(a)(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2773120 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571126 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 N.W.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10757940 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/211/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 So.2d 853", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2547549, 9669333 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ala/294/0260-01", "/so2d/314/0853-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ala. 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala.", "case_ids": [ 2547549 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ala/294/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 So.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9703134 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/356/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 So.2d 451", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9630212, 9630302 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/307/0451-01", "/so2d/307/0451-02" ] }, { "cite": "242 N.W.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 4750820, 10695431 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/sd/90/0455-01", "/nw2d/242/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 A.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "139 N.J. Super. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 302941 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/139/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Neb. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 5201602 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/neb/191/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 F.2d 165", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1106111 ], "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/163/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 F.2d 219", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 74382 ], "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/231/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 So.2d 172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9565880 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/363/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Or. 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or.", "case_ids": [ 2413489 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/or/215/0653-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 548, "char_count": 11560, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.74604027699622e-08, "percentile": 0.530925162046127 }, "sha256": "1d8a643d4cff8e6da1a42ad815d76561169029edc95bbe3b2a29c67316e4ce2c", "simhash": "1:36492f468536327b", "word_count": 1875 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:53:36.909287+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "LOPEZ, J., concurs.", "SUTIN, J., dissenting." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sammy M. BARELA, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWOOD, Chief Judge.\nThe State sought the forfeiture of a pickup truck under \u00a7 30-31-34, N.M.S.A. 1978. Although quasi-criminal, and gauged by standards applicable to a criminal proceeding, this was a civil proceeding. State v. Ozarek, 91 N.M. 275, 573 P.2d 209 (1978); In re One 1967 Peterbilt Tractor, Etc., 84 N.M. 652, 506 P.2d 1199 (1973). On the basis of the affidavit submitted by the State in support of the petition for forfeiture, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Barela, the person to whom the pickup was registered. The State appeals. The issue is the meaning of the statutory forfeiture provision; specifically, whether it applies to the facts in this case.\nThe facts in the affidavit, undisputed, are:\n1. On November 2, 1978, Barela told Gunter, an undercover police officer, that Barela had 17 pounds of marijuana for sale at $85 per pound. Gunter told Bare-la he wanted to purchase a pound the following day.\n2. On November 3, 1978, Gunter told Barela that Gunter was ready to make the purchase. Barela asked Gunter to accompany him to Barela\u2019s home to pick up the marijuana.\n3. Barela and Gunter drove to Bare-la\u2019s home in the pickup sought to be forfeited.\n4. The marijuana was in the kitchen of Barela\u2019s home; Barela sold Gunter a pound of marijuana in the kitchen.\n5. Barela and Gunter left Barela\u2019s home in the pickup and returned to the location where the two had met. On this return trip, the marijuana was in Gunter\u2019s possession.\nSection 30-31-34(A), supra, provides for the forfeiture of controlled substances manufactured, distributed, dispensed or acquired in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. No claim is made that the marijuana did not come within this provision.\nAlso subject to forfeiture, under \u00a7 30-31\u2014 34(D), supra, are\nall conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale of property described in Subsections A or B .\nNeither \u00a7 30-31-34(B), supra, involving raw materials, products and equipment, nor \u00a7 30-31-34(G), supra, involving exclusions from forfeiture, are involved in this case.\nSection 30-31-34(D), supra, pertains to:\n(1) Conveyances used to transport for the purpose of sale, property described in Subsections A and B.\n(2) Conveyances intended to be used to transport for the purpose of sale, property described in Subsections A and B.\n(3) Conveyances used to facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale, property described in Subsections A and B.\n(4) Conveyances intended to be used to facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale, property described in Subsections A and B.\nEach of these four items involves transportation. Transportation for what purpose? \u201cFor the purpose of sale.\u201d The sale of what? \u201cProperty described in Subsections A and B.\u201d\nSection 30-31-34(D), supra, required that the transportation aspect of the statute must be transportation of the marijuana for the purpose of sale. The briefs discuss \u201cfacilitation\u201d of transportation. We are not concerned with facilitation because the transportation aspect of the statute relates to the transportation of the \u201cproperty\u201d (the marijuana) for the purpose of sale. There are no facts indicating the pickup was in any way involved in any transporting of the marijuana for the purpose of sale.\nThe State contends this view of the statute is too restrictive, that \u00a7 30-31-34(D), supra, is sufficiently similar to federal statutes that interpretations of federal statutes should apply to the New Mexico statute. A federal statute pertaining to forfeiture of carriers transporting contraband articles, 49 F.C.A. \u00a7 781(a) (1954) makes it unlawful \u201cto use any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft to facilitate the transportation, carriage, conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale, barter, exchange, or giving away of any contraband article.\u201d A federal statute pertaining to forfeiture in connection with controlled substances, 21 U.S.C.S. \u00a7 881(a)(4) (1972), subjects to forfeiture \u201c[a]ll conveyances . . . which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1) or (2) . . . .\u201d\nBoth federal statutes are much broader than the New Mexico statute. For example, compare the language in 21 U.S.C.S. \u00a7 881(a)(4) \u2014 \u201cto facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described\u201d \u2014 with the language in \u00a7 30-31-34(D), supra \u2014 \u201cto facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale of property described . . . .\u201d Because the federal statutes are not similar to the New Mexico statute, federal decisions interpreting the federal statutes are not helpful in determining the applicability of the New Mexico statute to the facts in this case.\nThe opinion in United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, Etc., 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1977) states that the broad language of 21 U.S.C.S. \u00a7 881(a)(4) \u201cpatently indicates the congressional intent to broaden the applicability of the forfeiture remedy it provided.\u201d The history of the New Mexico statute shows a legislative intent to restrict the applicability of the forfeiture provision. As originally enacted by Laws 1972, ch. 84, \u00a7 33, the statute read: \u201c[T]o facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale or receipt of property described . .\u201d (Our emphasis.) The emphasized language \u201cor receipt\u201d was removed from \u00a7 30-31-34(D) by Laws 1975, ch. 231, \u00a7 I-\nThe deletion of \u201cor receipt\u201d from the statute supports our view that the transportation aspect of \u00a7 30-31-34(D), supra, pertains to the transportation of the controlled substance for purpose of sale. This view is consistent with the statement in State v. Ozarek, supra: \u201cForfeitures are not favored at law and statutes are to be construed strictly against forfeiture.\u201d Such a strict approach to the meaning of \u00a7 30-31-34(D), supra, is appropriate because forfeiture is quasi-criminal in character with the object of penalizing for the commission of an offense against the law. State v. Ozarek, supra.\nThe summary judgment is affirmed.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nLOPEZ, J., concurs.\nSUTIN, J., dissenting.", "type": "majority", "author": "WOOD, Chief Judge." }, { "text": "SUTIN, Judge\n(dissenting).\nI dissent.\nSummary judgment was granted defendant. In construing the language of \u00a7 30-31-34(D), N.M.S.A.1978, the trial court found that the defendant's pick-up truck was not used to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale of marijuana.\nSection 30-31-34(D) subjects to forfeiture:\n[A]ll . . . vehicles\nwhich are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale of property [which includes marijuana]\nTo arrive at a conclusion in this case, we must first explain the meaning of the words and phrases in the statute.\n(a) The word \u201cfor\u201d means \u201cwith a view to; in order to effect.\u201d Ramsay Signs, Inc. v. Dyck, 215 Or. 653, 337 P.2d 309 (1959).\n(b) All vehicles \u201cintended for use,\u201d means vehicles \u201cwith a view to being used,\u201d or \u201cin order to effect the use\u201d such as \u201clooking forward to be used,\u201d \u201cexpected to be used,\u201d or \u201cproposed to be used.\u201d\n(c) \u201cTo facilitate the transportation,\u201d means \u201cto make [transportation] easy or less difficult . . . as to facilitate the execution of a task.\u201d Mosley v. State ex rel. Broward Cty., 363 So.2d 172 (Fla.App.1978); United States v. One 1950 Buick Sedan, 231 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1956); Piatt v. United States, 163 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1947).\n(d) \u201cFor the purpose of sale of property\u201d means \u201cwith a view to making a sale of property\u201d or \u201cin order to effect a sale of property.\u201d\n(e)\u201cTransport\u201d means to carry or convey from one place to another. State v. One 1970 2-Door Sedan Rambler, 191 Neb. 462, 215 N.W.2d 849 (1974). The statute does not say \u201ctransport property for sale.\u201d \u201cTransportation\u201d as used does not say \u201ctransportation of property for sale.\u201d \u201cTransportation for the purpose of sale of property\u201d means \u201ca vehicle used by a person to effect a sale of property.\u201d\nSection 30-31-34(D) is not limited to \u201cvehicles actually used by persons as transportation to effect a sale.\u201d It also includes \u201cvehicles which a person looks forward to using as transportation to effect a sale.\u201d Forfeiture is not limited to actual transportation by a person. In other words, the legislature intended that forfeiture of vehicles may be undertaken when the facts show that a person actually used the vehicle as a means of transportation to effect a sale, or when a person owns a vehicle which he looks forward to using whenever he wants to effect a sale. The thrust of the statute is to deprive the drug trafficker of needed mobility.\nOf course, an automobile is subject to forfeiture when it is used to transport a drug to a parking lot where defendant met an unknown undercover agent to whom the sale was made. State v. Datsun, 139 N.J. Super. 186, 353 A.2d 129 (1976). In the instant case, defendant drove an undercover agent from a meeting place to defendant\u2019s home, made the sale, and then drove the agent back to the point of the meeting place. The vehicle was used \u201cto facilitate the transportation for the purpose of making a sale of property.\u201d Mosely, supra; One 1950 Buick Sedan, supra; Platt, supra.\nA question of fact exists whether defendant\u2019s vehicle is subject to forfeiture on two grounds: (1) whether the vehicle was used to facilitate a narcotics transaction and (2) whether the vehicle was intended for use for this purpose.\nThis conclusion results from the fact that the prime target of vehicle forfeitures is the \u201cnarcotic peddler\u201d and \u201cdrug traffick er.\u201d The purpose of forfeiture is to deny these people mobility and to financially weaken the narcotics enterprise. State v. One 1972 Pontiac Grand Prix, Etc., 242 N.W.2d 660 (S.D.1976).\nSection 505(a)(4) of the 1979 Uniform Controlled Substances Act subjects to forfeiture:\nall . . . vehicles . . which are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale or receipt of property [which includes controlled substances] . . . . [Emphasis added.]\n\u201cOr receipt\u201d was deleted from the above New Mexico statute. The Commissioners\u2019 note says:\n. Effective law enforcement demands that there be a means of confiscating the vehicles and instrumentalities used by drug traffickers in committing violations under this Act. The reasoning is to prevent their use in the commission of subsequent offenses involving transportation or concealment of controlled substances and to deprive the drug trafficker of needed mobility. [Emphasis added.]\nForfeiture statutes are intended to apply to those individuals who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise. In re 1972 Porsche 2 Dr., Etc., 307 So.2d 451 (Fla.App.1975); Griffis v. State, 356 So.2d 297 (Fla.1978). This proceeding is now controlled by the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure inasmuch as summary judgment was entered. Reeder v. State, 294 Ala. 260, 314 So.2d 853 (1975). A preponderance of the evidence is required to establish the right of forfeiture. State v. One Certain Conveyance, Etc., 211 N.W.2d 297 (Iowa 1973).\nThis appeal should be reversed.", "type": "dissent", "author": "SUTIN, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel A. Bryant, Asst. Dist. Atty., Alamogordo, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Thomas A. Sandenaw, Jr., Alamogordo, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "604 P.2d 838\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sammy M. BARELA, Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 4169.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nDec. 6, 1979.\nDaniel A. Bryant, Asst. Dist. Atty., Alamogordo, for plaintiff-appellant.\nThomas A. Sandenaw, Jr., Alamogordo, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0700-01", "first_page_order": 746, "last_page_order": 750 }