{ "id": 1568675, "name": "Gil CANDELARIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ira ROBINSON and Robert Singer, Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Candelaria v. Robinson", "decision_date": "1980-01-03", "docket_number": "No. 4017", "first_page": "786", "last_page": "793", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "93 N.M. 786" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "606 P.2d 196" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "88 A.2d 892", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "371 Pa. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 1237058 ], "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/371/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E.2d 184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 N.C.App. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551027 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/36/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Fla. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Fla.", "case_ids": [ 1906592 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/fla/136/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Miss. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Miss.", "case_ids": [ 8818011 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/miss/202/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 A. 22", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 Me. 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Me.", "case_ids": [ 492193 ], "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/me/120/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 N.M. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5362726 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/80/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 P.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.M. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5323864 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/78/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Vt. 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Vt.", "case_ids": [ 4641788 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/vt/126/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 P. 1110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 N.M. 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4724885 ], "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/22/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 P. 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "case_ids": [ 5778528, 4800529 ], "year": 1920, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or/96/0610-01", "/or/97/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 N.M. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841712 ], "year": 1920, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/26/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2868205 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 N.M. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5364856 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/80/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 A.L. R.3d 1030", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2768156 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.M. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2744294 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/79/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 N.M. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2719808 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/68/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2776872 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 P. 617", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1912, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 N.M. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 208825 ], "year": 1912, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/17/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 N.M. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2824971 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/86/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2777372 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0094-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 765, "char_count": 19242, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9601511937859141e-07, "percentile": 0.7379024800287585 }, "sha256": "907d41744c88643f90d33e30f47c7d05bdf7ec6189242fdbdd9412921ab964c6", "simhash": "1:a9999043331b340c", "word_count": 3091 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:53:36.909287+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HERNANDEZ, J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "Gil CANDELARIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ira ROBINSON and Robert Singer, Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWOOD, Chief Judge.\nClaiming defamation, three counts of the complaint sought damages from Singer and Robinson. These counts were dismissed on the basis that the alleged defamation was absolutely privileged. Plaintiff appeals. We (1) identify the immunity (privilege) claims applicable to this case, (2) discuss the procedural posture of the appeal, and (3) discuss the duties of Singer and Robinson.\nApplicable Immunity Claims\nVelton (we use plaintiff\u2019s spelling) was murdered in February, 1974. The four defendants in State v. Morrison, Sup.Ct. No. 10084, were convicted of the murder. Subsequent proceedings resulted in the convictions being set aside and in the discharge of these four defendants. Lee was charged with the Velton murder in January, 1978. He was convicted of second degree murder with firearm enhancement. Sentence was imposed June 16, 1978. Lee\u2019s conviction was affirmed by memorandum opinion in State v. Lee, (Ct.App.) No. 3687 decided February 22, 1979.\nThe events referred to in plaintiff\u2019s complaint took place after the discharge of the four defendants in State v. Morrison, supra, and after the conviction of Lee.\nThe count against Singer alleged that in August and September, 1978, at the request of District Attorney Robinson, Singer prepared a report \u201cregarding the investigation of the WILLIAM VELTON murder case in 1974\u201d; that Singer submitted this report to Robinson; that statements by Singer in the report defamed plaintiff. One of the counts against Robinson alleged that Robinson wrote a letter to the sheriff on September 21, 1978. A copy of this letter was attached to the complaint. The letter quoted a portion of Singer\u2019s report, referred to plaintiff\u2019s investigation of the Velton case as \u201chighly improper gestapo-type tactics,\u201d agreed with Singer that plaintiff \u201ccould not be prosecuted\u201d due to the statute of limitations, and recommended that plaintiff\u2019s employment with the sheriff\u2019s department \u201cbe terminated immediately.\u201d This count alleged that Robinson\u2019s letter to the sheriff defamed plaintiff. The second count against Robinson alleged that comments made by Robinson at a \u201cpress conference\u201d on September 14, 1978, defamed plaintiff.\nThere is no issue in this appeal concerning the sufficiency of pleading defamation; rather, the issues involve the immunity of Singer and Robinson. The trial court ruled that the alleged defamation was \u201cabsolutely privileged as a matter of law, and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act prohibits this suit . .\u201d Salazar v. Bjork, 85 N.M. 94, 509 P.2d 569 (Ct.App.1973) stated that \u201cimmunity\u201d is a more precise description than \u201cprivilege\u201d in describing the protection afforded in this case. See Franklin v. Blank, 86 N.M. 585, 525 P.2d 945 (Ct.App.1974).\nThe trial court\u2019s ruling was in two parts: 1) an absolute immunity as a matter of law, and 2) immunity under the Tort Claims Act, \u00a7\u00a7 41-4-1 through 41-4-25, N.M.S.A.1978 (Supp.1979).\nThe ruling of absolute immunity as a matter of law involves the concepts of judicial immunity and executive immunity. Judicial immunity is involved because the office of district attorney is a quasi-judicial office. Ward v. Romero, 17 N.M. 88, 125 P. 617 (1912). Executive immunity is involved because the office of district attorney has duties which cannot be properly classified as quasi-judicial. See \u00a7 36-l-18(B) and (C), N.M.S.A.1978.\nThe ruling of absolute immunity as a matter of law also involves the concepts of absolute immunity and qualified immunity. Robinson was the district attorney and Singer was his special assistant. On the basis of these positions, Robinson and Singer contend they have an absolute immunity; plaintiff contends their immunity is qualified. Involved in this aspect of the immunity argument is the fact that Robinson and Singer are attorneys; they claim an absolute privilege on that basis as well as on the basis of their official positions.\nAttorney immunity is not involved. Absolute immunity is accorded to attorneys for defamation reasonably related to communication preliminary to, in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of judicial proceedings in which the attorney participates as counsel. Romero v. Prince, 85 N.M. 474, 513 P.2d 717 (Ct.App.1973). This immunity does not apply to defamation on the attorney\u2019s part which occurs after final disposition of the judicial proceeding. Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) page 780. There is nothing indicating the alleged defamation involved judicial proceedings; the only showing is to the contrary. The alleged defamation occurred after the Lee conviction in 1978, involved the 1974 investigation of the Velton murder and, according to Robinson\u2019s letter, occurred after any criminal offense by plaintiff was barred by the statute of limitations.\nIt is unnecessary to determine whether the immunity involved in the first part of the trial court\u2019s ruling was judicial, executive, absolute or qualified. No immunity under these categories is involved unless the alleged defamation occurred during the performance of some duty by Robinson and by Singer. Restatement of The Law, Torts 2d (1977), \u00a7\u00a7 585, 591, 593; see Adams v. Tatsch, 68 N.M. 446, 362 P.2d 984 (1961); Mahona-Jojanto, Inc., N. S. L. v. Bank of New Mexico, 79 N.M. 293, 442 P.2d 783 (1968); Salazar v. Bjork, supra; Neece v. Kantu, 84 N.M. 700, 507 P.2d 447, 60 A.L. R.3d 1030 (Ct.App.1973). Compare Torres v. Glasgow, 80 N.M. 412, 456 P.2d 886 (Ct.App.1969).\nSection 41-4-4, supra, was amended in 1978 and this amendment was in effect at the time of the defamation alleged in the complaint. As amended, \u00a7 41-4-4(A) provided:\nA governmental entity and any public employee while acting within the scope of duty are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as waived by Sections 41 \u2014 4-5 through 41-4-12 NMSA 1978.\nThe only waiver section, remotely applicable, was \u00a7 41 \u2014 4-12, supra, which pertains to law enforcement officers. Neither Robinson nor Singer was a \u201claw enforcement officer\u201d as that term is defined in \u00a7 41-4-3(D), supra. Robinson and Singer were public employees under \u00a7 41-4-3(E), N.M.S. A.1978.\n\u201c[Ijmmunity from liability for any tort\u201d \u00a7 41 \u2014 4-4(A), supra, applies to Robinson and Singer if their alleged defamation occurred \u201cwhile acting within the scope of duty . . . .\u201d Section 41 \u2014 4-3(F), supra, states:\n\u201c[Sjcope of duties\u201d means performing any duties which a public employee is requested, required or authorized to perform by the governmental entity regardless of the time and place of performance[.]\nIf either Robinson or Singer was acting within the scope of his duty as a public employee at the time of his alleged defamation, he is immune from liability under the Tort Claims Act regardless of any other immunity afforded to a district attorney or assistant district attorney. The question of judicial, executive, absolute or qualified immunity need not be decided because in this case, such immunity involves no duty different than the duty defined in the Tort Claims Act.\nThe applicable immunity claim, in this case, is the immunity provided by the Tort Claims Act. This holding is not to be taken as a suggestion that the converse is true. Section 41 \u2014 4-2(A), supra, limits the liability of public employees; however, \u00a7 41 \u2014 4-14, supra, preserves \u201cany defense available\nThe Procedural Posture\nAt oral argument, counsel agreed that depositions included in the record were not before the trial court, that the defamation counts were dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule of Civ.Proc. 12(b)(6). In considering such a motion, all facts well pleaded must be accepted as true; the motion may be granted only when the plaintiff cannot be entitled to relief under any state of facts provable under the claim. Runyan v. Jaramillo, 90 N.M. 629, 567 P.2d 478 (1977).\nRobinson points out that the complaint \u201calleges no tort committed by Ira Robinson outside the scope of his duties.\u201d Robinson seems to assert that the absence of such an allegation brings the complaint within the immunity of the Tort Claims Act. We disagree. Immunity is a defense. Prosser, supra, page 776. Plaintiff was not required to anticipate this defense. Jamison v. McMillen, 26 N.M. 231, 190 P. 726 (1920); Pople v. Orekar, 22 N.M. 307, 161 P. 1110 (1916); see Rule of Civ.Proc. 8(a) and (c).\nPlaintiff asserts the complaint contains no allegation that Robinson and Singer \u201cwere acting within the scope of their duties at the time the remarks and statements were made.\u201d On the basis of an absence of allegations concerning the duties of Robinson and Singer, plaintiff asserts that there was no basis for an immunity ruling and no basis for a ruling that the defamation allegations failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We agree only in part with this contention. The specific allegations of the complaint are discussed in the next point.\nDuties of Singer and Robinson\nA.Singer\nThe complaint alleges that Robinson was the district attorney, that Singer \u201cacting as a Special Assistant District Attorney . prepared a report at the request of . [Robinson] regarding the investigation of the . . [Velton] murder case in 1974 and this report was submitted to . [Robinson].\u201d Singer\u2019s alleged defamation was based on statements made by Singer in the report.\nThe district attorney may appoint assistant district attorneys and assign their duties. Section 36-1-5, N.M.S.A.1978. The allegation that Singer was a \u201cspecial\u201d assistant district attorney has no legal significance in this case. Petition of Dusablon, 126 Vt. 362, 230 A.2d 797 (1967).\nTaking the allegations of the complaint as true, Runyan v. Jaramillo, supra, the complaint alleged that while acting as an assistant district attorney, Singer prepared his report at the request of Robinson and submitted the report to Robinson. This was an allegation that Singer\u2019s report was requested or authorized by the district attorney; this was an allegation that in preparing and submitting the report, Singer acted within the scope of his duty. See \u00a7 41-4-3(F), supra. Under the allegations of the complaint, Singer was immune from liability for his alleged defamation. Section 41-4-4(A), supra.\nB.District Attorney Duties\nThe Constitution and statutes \u201cprescribe and delimit\u201d the authority of the district attorney. State v. Reese, 78 N.M. 241, 430 P.2d 399 (1967). Pertinent statutory duties of the district attorney, stated in \u00a7 36-1-18, N.M.S.A.1978 .are:\nA. prosecute and defend for the state in all courts of record of the counties of his district all cases, criminal and civil, in which the state or any county in his district may be a party or may be interested;\n* * * * * *\nC.advise all county and state officers whenever requested[.]\nN.M.Const., art. VI, \u00a7 24 states the district attorney \u201cshall be the law officer of the state and of the counties within his district\nIn connection with the powers of the state police board, Winston v. New Mexico State Police Board, 80 N.M. 310, 454 P.2d 967 (1969), it was held \u201cthat the authority of the agency is not limited to those powers expressly granted by statute, but includes, also, all powers that may fairly be implied therefrom.\u201d A similar rule of implied authority applies to district attorneys. New Mexico district attorneys\u2019 constitutional and statutory duties include duties incidental and necessary to the discharge of duties prescribed by the Constitution or statutes. Withee v. Lane & Libby Fisheries Co., 120 Me. 121, 113 A. 22 (1921); Adams v. State, 202 Miss. 68, 30 So.2d 593 (1947).\nThe district attorneys\u2019 statutory duty to prosecute criminal cases includes the duty to investigate to determine whether a criminal charge should be filed; \u201c \u2018it is his duty to inquire into the facts . . Adams v. State, supra; Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 187 So. 392 (1939).\nThe district attorney\u2019s request to Singer, acting as an assistant district attorney, to report on the investigation of the Velton murder was within the scope of the district attorney\u2019s duty stated in \u00a7 36-1-18(A), supra. But no issue is made of this; the question of the scope of the district attorney\u2019s duty involves the district attorney\u2019s use of the report.\nC. Robinson\u2019s Letter to the Sheriff\nRobinson\u2019s letter to the sheriff quoted portions of Singer\u2019s report and referred to plaintiff\u2019s use of \u201chighly improper gestapo-type tactics\u201d in investigating the Velton murder. The letter agreed with Singer that plaintiff could not be prosecuted due to the statute of limitations. The letter recommended that plaintiff be terminated immediately. Was this letter in the scope of the district attorney\u2019s duty? Yes.\nSection 36-l-18(C), supra, makes it the duty of the district attorney to advise the sheriff \u201cwhenever requested[.]\u201d There being nothing indicating the sheriff requested the advice in Robinson\u2019s letter, we do not consider the statutory provision further.\nThe Constitution designates the district attorney as the \u201claw officer\u201d of his district. What are the duties of a law officer? They are not defined in the New Mexico Constitution or statutes. Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (1966) defines \u201claw officer\u201d as \u201ca public official employed to administer or advise in legal matters[.]\u201d Withee v. Lane & Libby Fisheries Co., supra, indicated that the duties of an attorney general as chief law officer included the exercise of all power and authority as the public interest may require in the absence of express legislative restriction to the contrary. We do not suggest that a district attorney, as law officer, has the powers indicated for the attorney general in Withee because the statement in Withee is based on common law powers non-existent in New Mexico. State v. Reese, supra. Withee does, however, indicate that as law officer, the district attorney may take action in the public interest. State ex rel. Jacobs v. Sherard, 36 N.C.App. 60, 243 S.E.2d 184 (1978) suggests a district attorney has an implied duty to act as an \u201cadvocate of the State\u2019s interest in the protection of society.\u201d\nThe letter stating the investigation\u2019s conclusion as to plaintiff\u2019s conduct, stating the conclusion that the statute of limitations had run on any prosecution and recommending that plaintiff be terminated, was incidental to the district attorney\u2019s duty as law officer to advise on legal matters in the public interest and in the protection of society.\nThe recommendation for termination, stated in the letter, was made \u201cas Chief Law Officer of Bernalillo County[.]\u201d Plaintiff attached the letter to his complaint as an exhibit and thus made it a part of his pleading. The complaint showing that the letter was written as law officer and the letter being incidental to the duties of a law officer, the letter was authorized and within the \u201cscope of duty\u201d defined in \u00a7 41-4-3(F), supra. Robinson was immune from liability for the alleged defamation in the letter. Section 41-4-4(C), supra.\nD. Robinson\u2019s Press Conference\nAdams v. Tatsch, supra, quotes with approval from Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952). The quotation is to the effect that an attorney general is immune from liability for defamatory remarks made at a press conference because it was in the public interest to permit the attorney general \u201c \u2018to keep the public advised of his official acts and conduct where such actions are . within the scope of his official duties or powers.\u2019 \u201d Thus, if the defamatory remarks occurred at a press conference advising of action taken by the attorney general within the scope of his official duties, the remarks also occurred within the scope of the attorney general\u2019s duties. This approach, which involves informing the public of action taken within the scope of duty, is applicable to the district attorney\u2019s press conference. To the extent Robinson\u2019s press conference informed the public of action taken within the scope of the district attorney\u2019s duties, Robinson was immune from liability for alleged defamation at the press conference.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint does not allege what Robinson stated at the press conference. We do not know whether the press conference involved Singer\u2019s report, the letter to the sheriff, or other matters. Nor do we know in what context the alleged defamatory remarks were made. Inasmuch as the issue is the propriety of dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and inasmuch as immunity from liability for the press conference remarks cannot be determined from the complaint, dismissal of this claim was improper. There being nothing showing that Robinson\u2019s press conference remarks were immune, plaintiff could be entitled to relief under this claim.\nThe order dismissing the claim against Singer is affirmed. The order dismissing the defamation claim based on Robinson\u2019s letter to the sheriff is affirmed. The order dismissing the defamation claim based on Robinson\u2019s press conference remark is reversed. The cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. IT IS SO ORDERED.\nHERNANDEZ, J., concurs.\nSUTIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "WOOD, Chief Judge." }, { "text": "SUTIN, Judge\n(Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part).\nI concur and dissent.\nBased solely on defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for failing to state a claim, the trial court found:\n[T]hat the comments, remarks and statements of the defendants . are absolutely privileged as a matter of law, and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act prohibits this suit against defendants\nThe trial court entered an Order:\n[T]hat the Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action in plaintiff\u2019s Complaint are dismissed with prejudice and that defendants . . . are dismissed with prejudice.\nDismissed with prejudice means that plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief under any set of facts. I disagree.\nUnder the Tort Claims Act, immunity is granted defendants if their acts or conduct were done within the scope of their duties.\nThe second count alleged that Singer \u201cprepared a report at the request of the Defendant, IRA ROBINSON, regarding the investigation.\u201d Under this allegation, Singer\u2019s report was prepared in the scope of his duties. After the Order was entered dismissing Count II, plaintiff learned by way of Singer\u2019s deposition that the final report was not mentioned in his contract or his appointment as an assistant to the district attorney or the attorney general. In other words, if plaintiff could amend his Count II and allege that the district attorney did not request the investigatory report, that it was prepared outside the scope of his duties, plaintiff would state a claim for relief under the Tort Claims Act, and the disclosed contents of the report would not grant Singer absolute immunity.\nAs to Singer, the Order of the District Court should be reversed.\nI concur in the remainder of the majority opinion.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "SUTIN, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "James L. Brandenburg, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Stephen M. Williams, Shaffer, Butt, Thornton & Baehr, Albuquerque, for Ira Robinson.", "Robert M. Strumor, Santa Fe, Coors, Singer & Stratton, P. A., Albuquerque, for. Robert N. Singer." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "606 P.2d 196\nGil CANDELARIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ira ROBINSON and Robert Singer, Defendants-Appellees.\nNo. 4017.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJan. 3, 1980.\nJames L. Brandenburg, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant.\nStephen M. Williams, Shaffer, Butt, Thornton & Baehr, Albuquerque, for Ira Robinson.\nRobert M. Strumor, Santa Fe, Coors, Singer & Stratton, P. A., Albuquerque, for. Robert N. Singer." }, "file_name": "0786-01", "first_page_order": 832, "last_page_order": 839 }