{
  "id": 1573055,
  "name": "Wilfred GALLEGOS and Marie Lorraine Gallegos, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. C. H. QUINLAN, Dora S. Quinlan and Quinlan Ranches, Inc., a Colorado Corporation, Defendants-Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "Gallegos v. Quinlan",
  "decision_date": "1980-05-29",
  "docket_number": "No. 12655",
  "first_page": "405",
  "last_page": "407",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "94 N.M. 405"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "611 P.2d 1099"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.M.",
    "id": 8835,
    "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 52,
    "name_long": "New Mexico",
    "name": "N.M."
  },
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      "cite": "77 N.M. 462",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1967,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
      "cite": "87 N.M. 3",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
      "case_ids": [
        2829852
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1974,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/87/0003-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "90 N.M. 428",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
      "case_ids": [
        2870773
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1977,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/90/0428-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "92 N.M. 283",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
      "case_ids": [
        1557252
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/92/0283-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "61 N.M. 235",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
      "case_ids": [
        5316995
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1956,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/61/0235-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 387,
    "char_count": 5816,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.803,
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    "sha256": "03a3493e7528f29315fb83a38d767f87c54e1932f9f4678691294a36f4be542f",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:18:16.712923+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "EASLEY and FELTER, JJ., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Wilfred GALLEGOS and Marie Lorraine Gallegos, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. C. H. QUINLAN, Dora S. Quinlan and Quinlan Ranches, Inc., a Colorado Corporation, Defendants-Appellees."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "OPINION\nPAYNE, Justice.\nPlaintiffs Gallegos brought suit to be declared the fee simple owners of property that they alleged defendant Quinlan had fraudulently obtained by tax deed from the State of New Mexico. Quinlan received his tax deed in 1959. He filed a quiet title suit in which a decree was entered in his favor in 1961. The Gallegos\u2019 acquired their claim of title eighteen years later, in 1977 and 1978, through deeds received from the heirs of Elmer Davis and John Pearson. The United States Government had given Davis and Pearson the first patents on the land. The Gallegos\u2019 asked that the quiet title decree in favor of Quinlan be set aside and moved for summary judgment. Quinlan counterclaimed and also asked for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Quinlan. We affirm.\nOn appeal, the Gallegos\u2019 contend that summary judgment was improper because of a genuine issue of fact that existed concerning whether the original tax deeds, upon which Quinlan based his quiet title suit, were obtained by fraud.\nThe original patentees never recorded the property and never had the property assessed for taxes. Quinlan, whose property abutted and partially surrounded the property in question, began a search prior to 1955 to determine the ownership in the hope that he could purchase the property. He could find no evidence of who owned the property in any of the county records, but learned the names of the original patentees from the United States Government. He made at least some attempt to locate them. In 1955, Quinlan went to the Taos County Assessor\u2019s Office to have the property entered for assessment of unpaid taxes in order to precipitate an eventual tax sale. Quinlan maintains that he presented the true owners\u2019 names for assessment, but the tax schedules listed him as the owner of the property. Quinlan paid no taxes on the property after it was assessed in his name, and in March 1959 the land was deeded to the state for unpaid taxes. In December 1959 Quinlan purchased the property from the state by paying back taxes and penalties. The deed which Quinlan received from the state erroneously listed him as the original owner. The sale of the property by the state was made during a period when, by statutory limitation, only the previous owner was entitled to obtain the land by repurchase. \u00a7\u00a7 72-18-31 and 32, N.M.S.A. 1953 (current version at \u00a7\u00a7 7-27-6 and 7, N.M.S.A.1978).\nQuinlan\u2019s suit to quiet title on the property was based upon the tax deed. Quinlan and his successor, a closely held corporation, have exercised ownership of the land since that time.\nThe Gallegos\u2019 allege that the defendant misrepresented himself as the original owner to obtain the repurchase preference provided to previous owners in the sale of land for unpaid taxes. They claim that if such actions constitute fraud, the quiet title suit must be set aside. Quinlan alleges that there was insufficient evidence of fraud to overcome the motion for summary judgment and argues that, by virtue of the intervening eighteen years, the statute of limitations for contesting tax deeds has long since run.\nWe do not reach, nor rule upon, the arguments of either party. A tax deed obtained by fraud may be attacked without regard to the statute of limitations. Fraud vitiates the conveyance when the fraud is shown by clear and convincing evidence. See Trujillo v. Dimas, 61 N.M. 235, 297 P.2d 1060 (1956). However, the Gallegos\u2019 have no standing to assert a claim in this case.\nThe method by which the state obtained title to the land is not an issue. Under Section 72-8-15, N.M.S.A.1953 (repealed by N.M.Laws 1974, ch. 92, \u00a7 34), the county, immediately upon the expiration date of the redemption period, executes tax deeds to the state for all unredeemed property that is sold to the state. The fact that the property was assessed in the wrong owner\u2019s name did not make the deed issued by the county to the state defective. The applicable statute in effect at that time, Section 72-8-14, N.M.S.A.1953 (repealed by N.M.Laws 1974, ch. 92, \u00a7 34), states: \u201cNo sale of any real property, land or lot, or parts thereof, or any property for delinquent taxes shall be considered invalid on account of its having been charged on the tax rolls in any other name than that of its record owner . . . .\u201d The state obtained a good title to the land and the original patentees lost it. The Gallegos\u2019 predecessors had neither assessed the land nor paid taxes thereon. They cannot attack the state\u2019s title. Therefore, any title or interest that the Gallegos and their predecessors in interest held was lost and they have no standing to assert a claim in this case.\nThis action brought by the Gallegos\u2019 is similar, in relevant part, to a quiet title action, wherein a party may prevail only on the strengths of their own title and not through the weakness of their adversary\u2019s title. Baker v. Benedict, 92 N.M. 283, 587 P.2d 430 (1978); Jackson v. Hartley, 90 N.M. 428, 564 P.2d 992 (1977); Lerma v. Romero, 87 N.M. 3, 528 P.2d 647 (1974); Heron v. Conder, 77 N.M. 462, 423 P.2d 985 (1967). In the instant ease, the Gallegos\u2019 have no title or interest in the property. Thus, they can raise no claim against the title of Quinlan. Summary judgment against the Gallegos\u2019 was proper for the reasons stated. We do not reach the merits of Quinlan\u2019s title.\nWe affirm.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nEASLEY and FELTER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PAYNE, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Weisfeld & Wallner, Eugene W. Weisfeld, Taos, for plaintiffs-appellants.",
      "Brandenburg & Johnson, Clifford J. Johnson, Taos, for defendants-appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "611 P.2d 1099\nWilfred GALLEGOS and Marie Lorraine Gallegos, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. C. H. QUINLAN, Dora S. Quinlan and Quinlan Ranches, Inc., a Colorado Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.\nNo. 12655.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nMay 29, 1980.\nWeisfeld & Wallner, Eugene W. Weisfeld, Taos, for plaintiffs-appellants.\nBrandenburg & Johnson, Clifford J. Johnson, Taos, for defendants-appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0405-01",
  "first_page_order": 441,
  "last_page_order": 443
}