{ "id": 1573240, "name": "Kathy RICKERSON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Gail R. Williams, Deceased, and First National Bank of Roswell Conservator of the Estate of Michael Williams, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The STATE of NEW MEXICO, and the CITY of ROSWELL, Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Rickerson v. State", "decision_date": "1980-04-01", "docket_number": "No. 4360", "first_page": "473", "last_page": "480", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "94 N.M. 473" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "612 P.2d 703" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "567 P.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "negligent failure to maintain streets in reasonably safe condition subjects governing body to liability" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "negligent failure to maintain streets in reasonably safe condition subjects governing body to liability" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2868076 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 757", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568726 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 N.M. 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5356266 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/80/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 N.M. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5365750 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/81/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 N.M. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1589305 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/59/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557070 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 N.M.L.Rev. 249", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N.M. L. Rev.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "63 N.M. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2778531 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" }, { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/63/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 P.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 792", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "93 Cal.Rptr. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "15 Cal.App.3d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4417268 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/15/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Cal.Rptr. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "254 Cal.App.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2196254 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/254/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 So.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9762588 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "840" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/234/0833-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 A.2d 906", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "13 Md.App. 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md. App.", "case_ids": [ 2246817 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/13/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5334147 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 757", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568726 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 757", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568726 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0757-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 913, "char_count": 21998, "ocr_confidence": 0.823, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9446009442346584e-07, "percentile": 0.7359542969493589 }, "sha256": "3a00f28921709072ca580e63218a081d0cd0c14be1caf8bfec43d0cd0d0448a6", "simhash": "1:b1c4ddc4b00852e0", "word_count": 3547 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:18:16.712923+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Kathy RICKERSON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Gail R. Williams, Deceased, and First National Bank of Roswell Conservator of the Estate of Michael Williams, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The STATE of NEW MEXICO, and the CITY of ROSWELL, Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWALTERS, Judge.\nPlaintiff appeals the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of the State and the City of Roswell. We reverse.\nPlaintiff alleged notice in the City and State of a dangerous intersection at which plaintiff\u2019s decedent was killed, and failure of those defendants to install adequate controls. The appellees-defendants urge in this court that data collected on the traffic and other features of the intersection did not warrant the installation of signals. Whether or not that is so is a question of fact which cannot be resolved by summary judgment. Fidelity Nat\u2019l Bank v. Tommy L. Goff, Inc., 92 N.M. 106, 583 P.2d 470 (1978).\nAppellees also contend that summary judgment was proper because it was \u201cclear\u201d that the non-appealing defendant Lara\u2019s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the wrongful death here involved.\nThey point to the deposition of Lara in which he admitted that he knew the stop sign was there and, in fact, that he stopped before proceeding into the through street on which plaintiffs\u2019 decedent was travel-ling. Thus, they argue, the traffic control device adequately served its purpose by informing defendant that he was required to stop and he negligently ignored the traffic sign.\nLara\u2019s admission of negligence, however, is not a complete answer to plaintiff\u2019s claims that the intersection was controlled by an improper or inadequate sign, and that a need for installation of traffic signals at that intersection, \u201cfor the general safety of the citizens of the City,\u201d was recognized by the City and that need conveyed to the State Highway Department seven months before the fatal accident to Gail Williams occurred. The State Highway Department ultimately agreed with the City\u2019s traffic study relating to the pertinent intersection, for it responded one year later with a written agreement to provide and install a \u201ccomplete signalization and illumination\u201d system at that location. Plaintiffs suggest that either four-way stop signs or signalization installed when the City first concluded that the intersection was inadequately controlled might well have induced both drivers to approach the intersection differently than they did on February 6, 1978. If that is a reasonable inference, then a jury could find that appellees\u2019 inaction also contributed to the death of plaintiffs\u2019 decedent.\nWe do not think such an inference beyond the bounds of a jury\u2019s consideration under the facts presently developed in this case. The request by the City in 1977 for assistance from the State in installing a traffic signal must have been triggered by a considered judgment that the intersection was not adequately controlled at that time, and a continuing inadequacy into the future could be foreseen. A negligently dangerous condition operated upon by commission of another negligent act which might not unreasonably be foreseen to occur, is regarded as a proximate cause of the injury finally resulting from the condition. Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400, 285 P.2d 507 (1955).\nIf reasonable minds could differ on issues of sole proximate cause, remote cause, intervening cause, or concurring proximate cause, the matter is for the jury. Kelly v. Montoya, 81 N.M. 591, 470 P.2d 563 (Ct.App.1970). By depositions, affidavits, and exhibits, plaintiff raised sufficient questions of concurring causation to avoid summary judgment. See Harless v. Ewing, 80 N.M. 149, 452 P.2d 483 (Ct.App.1969).\nThe City, however, strongly argues that neither governmental body is liable and that the summary judgment entered in their favor is supported by reason of sovereign immunity extended under \u00a7\u00a7 41-4-4A and 41-4-11B, N.M.S.A. 1978, which provide, respectively:\n41-4-4.....\nA. A governmental entity and any public employee while acting within the scope of duty are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as provided in the Tort Claims Act [41\u2014 4-1 to 41-4-25 N.M.S.A.1978].\n41-4-11.\nB. The liability for which immunity has been waived pursuant to Subsection A of this section shall not include liability for damages caused by:\n(1) a defect in plan or design of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area; or\n(2) the failure to construct or reconstruct any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area.\nSections 41 \u2014 4-6 and 41 \u2014 4-11A, however, withdraw immunity for damages resulting from negligence \u201cin the operation or maintenance of any . . . equipment or furnishings,\u201d and for negligence \u201cin the maintenance of or for the existence of any . highway, roadway, street . . .\u201d\nIn City of Albuquerque v. Redding, 93 N.M. 757, 605 P.2d 1156 (1980), the argument was made, as here, that the street defect complained of, the sewage drain grate, was one of design and that \u00a7 41 \u2014 4-11B granted immunity from liability. The court held that the more specific statute, \u00a7 41 \u2014 4-8A referring to waste collection, applied, and it denied immunity for injury arising from negligence in the operation of such services.\nThe same reasoning applies in this case. Sections 41 \u2014 4-6 and 41 \u2014 4-11A, which discuss negligent maintenance of equipment or furnishings (the single stop sign on the street travelled by Lara) and negligent maintenance or existence of any highway, roadway, or street (inadequate controls at the intersection), are more specific statutes concerning maintenance or existence of traffic control equipment, and they must govern in this case. Redding, supra.\nThe concept of negligence also includes failure to act. N.M.U.J.I. (Civ.) 12.0. Appellees are not exempt, therefore, from liability under statutory immunity. Whether additional traffic-control equipment should have been maintained, and negligently was not, and whether the maintenance or existence of the sign-controlled intersection as it was at the time of the accident was negligent, are jury questions. Cf. Gallagher v. Albuquerque Metropolitan Arroyo Flood Control Auth., 90 N.M. 309, 563 P.2d 103 (Ct.App.), cert. den. 90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485 (1977) (negligent failure to maintain streets in reasonably safe condition subjects governing body to liability).\nThe judgment is reversed and the case remanded for trial on the merits.\nSUTIN, J., specially concurring.\nHERNANDEZ, J., dissenting.", "type": "majority", "author": "WALTERS, Judge." }, { "text": "SUTIN, Judge\n(specially concurring).\nI specially concur.\nPlaintiffs sued defendants for damages for the death of Gail R. Williams. Her death occurred as a result of an automobile collision between vehicles driven by decedent and Lara at the intersection of McGaffey and Sunset Streets in Roswell. The installation and maintenance of traffic control devices were under the sole control and supervision of the State or exercised jointly with the City. Plaintiffs claim that defendants knew or should have known that the intersection was hazardous due to improper and inadequate traffic control devices and defendants had a duty to rectify such hazardous condition and negligently failed to do so; that as-a direct and proximate result of defendants\u2019 negligence, the collision occurred.\nBasically, plaintiffs\u2019 claim is that 30\" stop signs placed on each side of McGaffey for entrance into Sunset, a through street, were improper and inadequate to control traffic at the intersection and created a hazard; that Gail drove on Sunset and Lara entered from McGaffey and a collision occurred; that State/Municipality were negligent and their negligence caused the death of Gail.\nDefendants filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. Defendants claimed:\n1. Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Tort Claims Act of New Mexico, \u00a7 41-4-1 to \u00a7 41 \u2014 4r-25, N.M.S.A., 1978 Comp.\n2. These Defendants are immune from any suit by Plaintiffs on the cause of actions stated in Plaintiffs\u2019 Complaint, under the provisions of the Tort Claims Act of New Mexico.\n3. In the alternative, should the Court have to consider any matters involved in this case other than the pleadings, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and these Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\nThe trial court did not rule on defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. It entered a Summary Judgment and Order that there was no genuine issue of any material fact to be submitted to the jury.\nBefore summary judgment is granted, the district court has a duty to follow the rules announced in Goodman v. Brock, 83 N.M. 789, 498 P.2d 676 (1972). Under Goodman, the burden was upon defendants to make a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact existed or that defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law for some other reason. If defendants failed in this respect, summary judgment must be denied. On the other hand, if defendants met their burden, the burden shifted to plaintiffs to prove that a genuine issue of material fact existed and that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law or for any other reason.\nIf these rules were followed and spelled out in the summary judgment in accordance with the allegations in the complaint, our duties would be lessened. In the Brief-In-Chief filed in this Court, plaintiffs should have shown that defendants failed to make a prima facie showing. If a prima facie showing was made, then plaintiffs must establish by the transcript that genuine issues of material fact were present.\nSeldom are the Goodman rules followed in the district court or in an appeal.\nDefendants made no showing as a matter of law that the stop signs on McGaffey Street were sufficient to control traffic at the intersection. Neither did they show that a hazardous condition did not exist, nor that this hazardous condition was not the proximate cause of the collision.\nOn the surface, without delving into the facts presented by plaintiffs, State/Municipal liability cannot arise where the reasonable flow of traffic is controlled by proper stop signs at intersections. Under these circumstances, the intersection is reasonably safe for use by persons exercising ordinary care and caution for their own safety. The proximate cause of the collision would be the fault of one or both of the drivers. In order to impose liability on defendants to take precautionary measures to guard the safety of members of the public using public ways, an unusual and extra ordinary hazardous condition must exist such as would create a reasonable probability of an accident thereby occurring to the travelers. Gordon v. Howard County, 13 Md.App. 42, 280 A.2d 906 (1971).\nWhen a hazardous condition exists, duties change. In McDaniel v. Welsh, 234 So.2d 833, 840 (La.App.1970), the court said:\nWe judicially note that in municipalities, especially metropolitan areas, vehicular congestion on the public street is constantly increasing. We deem it reasonable to conclude that increasing traffic volume poses new and added control problems to those authorities charged with the obligation of regulating automobile traffic. The greater the volume of traffic, the greater is the need for effective vehicular control, which includes properly functioning signals upon which motorists may rely with confidence.\nThe presence of stop signs to control traffic on a street before entering an intersection does not absolve a government entity of liability where a dangerous condition has been created. Feingold v. County of Los Angeles, 254 Cal.App.2d 622, 62 Cal.Rptr. 396 (1967). Of course, where a dangerous condition does not exist at the intersection at which the accident occurred the City was not required to provide warning by signals, signs or other devices. Callahan v. City and County of San Francisco, 15 Cal.App.3d 374, 93 Cal.Rptr. 122 (1971).\nIn New Mexico, the State Highway Commission and local authorities were statutorily mandated to place and maintain such traffic control devices as they may deem necessary to regulate, warn or guide traffic. Sections 66-7-102, 66-7-103, N.M.S.A. 1978. The words \u201cdeem necessary\u201d has shades of color in meaning. The ordinary meaning of \u201cdeem\u201d is \u201cto. think or judge; to have an opinion; to believe.\u201d In other words the duty of defendants was to place such traffic control devices at the SunsetMcGaffey intersection which they thought were necessary to regulate traffic. This is a mandatory, not discretionary function. Defendants are subject to liability if defendants did not reasonably regulate the flow of traffic for the protection of users of the intersection. The duty is statutory. The violation of this duty falls within the realm of negligence. The factual issue to determine is whether stop signs on McGaffey Street were sufficient to reasonably regulate the flow of traffic on February 6, 1978, the date of the accident. If the defendants\u2019 investigations undertaken, or expert testimony produced, would establish that the signs were sufficient to control the flow of traffic, as a matter of law, they would not be liable. If not sufficient, it would reasonably be foreseen that accidents would probably occur. Whether the traffic condition at the intersection be called ultra-hazardous, hazardous, dangerous or unsafe is not alone conclusive of liability. The controlling factor is whether the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of the drivers of the vehicles or the lack of reasonable signalization.\nIn the instant case, defendants have stated several defenses: (1) defendants did not have notice of the dangerous condition at the intersection and therefore had no duty to warn of the dangers; (2) that the intersection was in a reasonably safe condition; (3) Lara\u2019s negligence was the sole proximate cause of decedent\u2019s death. Discussion is unnecessary to say that under the evidence these defenses are issues of fact.\nSummary judgment based upon whether genuine issues of material fact exist should be reversed.\nUnder the Goodman rule, defendants can show \u201cthat they were entitled as a matter of law for some other reason to a summary judgment in their favor.\u201d [83 N.M. 792, 498 P.2d 679.]\nThe only remaining issue is whether defendants are immune from liability under the provisions of the Tort Claims Act. Section 41-4-1, et seq., N.M.S.A. 1978. In the Legislative Declaration, public policy was declared to be, \u201cthat governmental entities and public employees shall only be liable within the limitations of the Tort Claims Act and in accordance with the principles established in that act.\u201d All judicially created categories, such as \u201cgovernmental\u201d or \u201cproprietary\u201d functions and \u201cdiscretionary\u201d or \u201cministerial\u201d acts previously used to determine immunity or liability, were abolished. \u201cLiability for acts or omissions . shall be based upon the traditional tort concepts of duty and the reasonably prudent person\u2019s standard of care in the performance of that duty.\u201d Section 41-4-2.\nPrior to the adoption of the Tort Claims Act \u201cthe manner in which the streets should be used and the installation of stop signs or electrical control systems calls for the exercise of municipal discretion, a governmental function, for which a municipality cannot be called to account respecting its employment of such power.\u201d Hammell v. City of Albuquerque, 63 N.M. 374, 376, 320 P.2d 384, 386 (1958). The \u201cgovernmental function\u201d has been abolished and the exercise of municipal discretion has been made mandatory by \u00a7 66-7-103, supra. In Hammell, supra, the alleged negligence of the City was failing to reinstall a stop sign where one was supposed to have been directed. This negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.\nToday, under the Tort Claims Act, absent immunity, defendants would be under a duty to reinstall the stop sign if they deemed it necessary. If they failed to exercise reasonable care, defendants would be liable in damages.\nIn the instant case, we are confronted with the subject of improvement of signalization at the Sunset-McGaffey intersection. Are the defendants immune to liability under the Tort Claims Act? This is a matter of first impression.\nGenerally, under the Tort Claims Act, immunity is granted governmental entities and any public employees while acting within the scope of duty, except as provided in the Act. Section 41^4 \u2014 4(A). If defendants do not fall within an exception, they are immune to liability. The only pertinent section of the Act is \u00a7 41-4-ll(A) and (B).\nUnder subsection (B):\nThe liability for which immunity has been waived pursuant to Subsection (A) of this section shall not include liability for damages caused by:\n(1) a defect in plan or design of any . street .\nThis subsection preserves \u201cgovernmental\u201d immunity to liability for a defect in plan or design of a street. It is not an exception to the general rule. The plan or design of a street is a project in thought and ideas described on paper or by model, and, upon approval, is structured for operation. It is the work for engineers skilled in the creation of a thoroughfare in a city, a part of which is reserved for vehicle and pedestrian use. In the preparation of a plan or design, signalization is included.\nIn the instant case, the initial design or plan of the Sunset-McGaffey intersection was placed in operation. No defect was shown to exist with reference to this plan. Although a study has been made of a second plan or design, it has not been completed and put in operation.\nThe only reverence to \u00a7 41 \u2014 4\u201411(B)(1) is found in City of Albuquerque v. Redding, 93 N.M. 757, 605 P.2d 1156 (1980). Redding holds that a drain gate in the curb lane of the street formed a part of the street surface, but it was only incidental to the plan or design of the street. Therefore, subsection (B)(1) was not applicable. The court said with reference to the drain grate:\nIts direct purpose was not to facilitate the use of or flow of traffic upon the roadway. Its direct and primary purpose obviously was to care for solid or liquid waste collection and disposal from the roadway, and in this manner, incidentally to facilitate the flow of traffic upon the roadway.\nThe signalization of an intersection is to facilitate the use and flow of traffic. It is not incidental to the plan or design of the street.\nInasmuch as no defect in plan or design exists, defendants are not immune to liability under subsection (B)(1).\nUnder subsection (A):\nThe immunity granted . does not apply to liability for damages resulting from . . wrongful death . caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the maintenance of . any . . . street .\nThis subsection is an exception to the general rule of \u201cgovernmental\u201d immunity. It does waive immunity to liability caused by negligence in the maintenance of a street.\nSection 41-4-11 preserves immunity in the plan or design of a street, but waives immunity in the maintenance of a street. Professor Kovnat noted that the legislature created an artificial category which invites litigation, prolonged by argument, about whether an activity is included within the category. Section 41 \u2014 4-11 amply provides opportunities for dispute. Kovnat, Torts: Sovereign and Governmental Immunity in New Mexico, 6 N.M.L.Rev. 249-268 (1976).\nWhat is meant by \u201cmaintenance of a street\u201d? To me, it is logical to conclude that, since \u201cdefect in plan or design of a street\u201d appears in the same section with \u201cmaintenance of a street,\u201d \u201cmaintenance of a street\u201d includes within its perimeter or scope, an improvement of the \u201cplan or design.\u201d \u201cMaintenance\u201d is defined as \u201cupkeep or continuance.\u201d In other words, if the \u201cplan or design\u201d of signals at an intersection prove to be defective in operation due to an unusual increase in the flow of traffic, the State/Municipality have a duty to maintain that intersection with signalization that will make it a reasonably safe place for the control of traffic. When this event occurs, the proximate cause of the collision will be that of the drivers of motor vehicles and not the lack of signalization of the intersection.\nSection 41 \u2014 4-ll(A) and (B) may be termed \u201ccompromise legislation\u201d for the protection of the State and the public. The indeterminate features of \u201cplan or design\u201d of a street deserve immunity, but the determinate features of \u201cmaintenance of a street\u201d do not. The legislature said in effect that in the correction of defects or mistakes heretofore made, or the need for improvement of the original \u201cplan or design\u201d due to changes in the flow of traffic, the State/Municipality shall be held liable for negligence in maintenance; the upkeep or continuance thereof. This process was reasonable and logical in the mind of the legislature. It was an expression of legislative intent. The judiciary must pay its respect to the intent of the legislature.\nDefendants are not immune to liability.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "SUTIN, Judge" }, { "text": "HERNANDEZ, Judge\n(dissenting).\nI respectfully dissent.\nSection 41 \u2014 4-ll(B)(l), N.M.S.A.1978, grants governmental entities immunity from liability for damages caused by \u201ca defect in plan or design of any . highway, roadway . . . \u201d. The decision to install or not to install traffic controls or warning devices is a primary part of the plan or design of a highway. Its direct purpose is to \u201cfacilitate the use or flow of traffic\u201d upon the highway or roadway. City of Albuquerque v. Redding, supra. It is my opinion that the Appellees are immune from liability as a matter of law, and that summary judgment was properly granted.", "type": "dissent", "author": "HERNANDEZ, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Tandy L. Hunt, Hunt & Shamas, Roswell, for plaintiffs-appellants.", "Bob E. Turner and Steven L. Bell, Atwood, Malone, Mann & Cooter, P. A., Roswell, John P. Cusack, Cusack, Schnedar & Fleming, Roswell, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "612 P.2d 703\nKathy RICKERSON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Gail R. Williams, Deceased, and First National Bank of Roswell Conservator of the Estate of Michael Williams, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The STATE of NEW MEXICO, and the CITY of ROSWELL, Defendants-Appellees.\nNo. 4360.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nApril 1, 1980.\nWrit of Certiorari Denied May 21, 1980.\nTandy L. Hunt, Hunt & Shamas, Roswell, for plaintiffs-appellants.\nBob E. Turner and Steven L. Bell, Atwood, Malone, Mann & Cooter, P. A., Roswell, John P. Cusack, Cusack, Schnedar & Fleming, Roswell, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0473-01", "first_page_order": 509, "last_page_order": 516 }