{
  "id": 1555190,
  "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John DOE, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Doe",
  "decision_date": "1981-11-25",
  "docket_number": "No. 5236",
  "first_page": "263",
  "last_page": "266",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "97 N.M. 263"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "639 P.2d 72"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.",
    "id": 9025,
    "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 52,
    "name_long": "New Mexico",
    "name": "N.M."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "635 P.2d 142",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "P.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "90 N.M. 236",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
      "case_ids": [
        2867320
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/90/0236-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "451 U.S. 454",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        6187407
      ],
      "weight": 4,
      "year": 1981,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/451/0454-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "49 N.M. 405",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
      "case_ids": [
        8842044
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1946,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/49/0405-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "96 N.M. 515",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
      "case_ids": [
        1577297
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/96/0515-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 421,
    "char_count": 6088,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.741,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.6933106825854744e-07,
      "percentile": 0.6996336465948401
    },
    "sha256": "448b07ef6fb5538a1e571422633112ea8b36e5753f7c1f37ff06df764b1bf511",
    "simhash": "1:964c5da30ce0185f",
    "word_count": 964
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:10:51.585150+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "LOPEZ and DONNELLY, JJ., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John DOE, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "OPINION\nWALTERS, Chief Judge.\nFour issues raised on appeal are (1) denial of the child\u2019s motion to strike the State\u2019s request to transfer the cause from Children\u2019s Court to District Court because, of delay between the time of filing the petition and the motion to transfer; (2) compelling the child to undergo a psychological examination and (3) allowing the psychologist to testify regarding his evaluation of the child; and (4) admission of testimony regarding prior bad acts of the child.\nThis case must be decided under the Children\u2019s Code, \u00a7\u00a7 32-1-1, et seq., N.M.S.A.1978, as it provided before the effective date of amendment, June 19, 1981, since all events occurred before that date. N.M. Const. art. 4, \u00a7 34.\n1. A lapse of 43 days existed between the time of filing the petition on February 3, 1981 and the motion to transfer on March 17, 1981. Defendant argues that N.M.R.Child. Ct. 14, N.M.S.A.1978, requires the motion to be filed within ten days of the petition or first appearance of counsel. Rule 14 does not apply to transfer motions. State v. Doe, 96 N.M. 515, 632 P.2d 750 (Ct.App.1981). Defendant further urges that under N.M.R.Child. Ct. 46, N.M.S.A.1978, a motion filed mid-way in the period during which an adjudicatory hearing must be held is an unreasonably delayed filing. Defendant\u2019s first attorney withdrew two weeks after the petition was filed; new counsel made his entry of appearance on March 23rd. There was no counsel of record at the time the State filed the transfer motion; consequently, one filed earlier would not have avoided whatever evils defendant attempts to read into the \u201cdelayed\u201d filing. There is no evidence to suggest that defendant was prejudiced by the \u201clate\u201d motion, or that the State, by filing the motion to transfer, was attempting in any way to avoid the time limitations for adjudicatory hearings in Children\u2019s Court. There was no unreasonable delay; this point does not require reversal.\n2. Section 32-1-32(B), N.M.S.A.1978, even prior to the 1981 amendment, authorized the court to order a psychiatric or psychological examination if there were indications the child was \u201cmentally ill or mentally retarded.\u201d The court directed the examination \u201con its own motion\u201d because \u201cin the Court\u2019s opinion the child\u2019s acts are not normal.\u201d\nWhether \u00a7 32-1-32(B), supra, is sufficiently broad to encompass court-ordered examinations of children who \u201care not normal,\u201d we need not decide. The court may appoint experts on its own motion. N.M.R. Evid. 706, N.M.S.A.1978.\nThe court is expected to conduct Children\u2019s Court proceedings in a manner that will further the purposes and policies stated in \u00a7 32-1-2, N.M.S.A.1978; and under Martinez v. Martinez, 49 N.M. 405, 165 P.2d 125 (1946), it is vested with broad and inherent powers to accomplish the results contemplated by the statutes under which the action is brought, and to attain a correct resolution of the issues presented.\nAdditionally, in reaching a decision whether to transfer the cause to District Court, the judge must decide \u201cwhether the child is amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a child through available facilities.\u201d Section 32-1-30, N.M.S.A.1978. If an expert\u2019s evidence of the results of a psychological examination will assist the Children\u2019s Court judge in making that determination, the court cannot be faulted for exercising every power it has to provide for that examination. We hold it has authority to do so.\n3. The child next argues that admission of the psychologist\u2019s testimony following a compelled examination violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. This is an idle contention. Although no Miranda warnings were given in this case before the child was examined, there is not a word of the expert\u2019s testimony which indicates he received any inculpatory statements from the child during the examination, or relied on any such information in reporting his conclusions. These facts convincingly distinguish the instant case from Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981); there was no self-incrimination in this record. State v. Kendall, 90 N.M. 236, 561 P.2d 935 (Ct.App.1977). We do not hold, however, that expert testimony resulting from an involuntary examination ordered by the court which is acceptable on a transfer motion would necessarily withstand a Fifth Amendment attack if offered at trial. See Estelle v. Smith, supra; State v. Holland, 635 P.2d 142 (Wash.App.1981).\n4. Defendant argues here that testimony at the transfer hearing from two juvenile probation officers was hearsay not within any of the exceptions; and inadmissible under N.M.R.Evid. 404(b), 608, and 609, N.M.S.A.1978. The objections on hearsay and regarding Rule 404(b) were not presented in the court below. They are not reviewable here. N.M.R.Evid. 103; N.M.R.Crim.App.P. 308, N.M.S.A.\nRule 609 allows testimony of a conviction which is used to impeach the witness. Rule 608 permits evidence of specific acts of conduct when probative of the truthfulness or untruthfulness of the witness or of one about whose truthfulness the witness has testified. There was no evidence of conviction, and there was no issue of any witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. The evidence was not offered for either purpose covered under Rules 608 and 609, supra.\nThe testimony of the probation officers was relevant, however, (N.M.R.Evid. 401, N.M.S.A.1978) on the issue of the child\u2019s amenability to rehabilitation or treatment (\u00a7 32-1-30, N.M.S.A.1978). It was therefore admissible. N.M.R.Evid. 402, N.M.S.A.1978.\nNo error appearing from the record, the order of transfer is affirmed.\nLOPEZ and DONNELLY, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WALTERS, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John L. Walker, William D. Teel, Teel & Walker, P. A., Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant.",
      "Jeff Bingaman, Atty. Gen., Clare E. Mancini, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "639 P.2d 72\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John DOE, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 5236.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nNov. 25, 1981.\nRehearing Denied Dec. 9, 1981.\nWrit of Certiorari Denied Jan. 15, 1982.\nJohn L. Walker, William D. Teel, Teel & Walker, P. A., Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant.\nJeff Bingaman, Atty. Gen., Clare E. Mancini, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0263-01",
  "first_page_order": 293,
  "last_page_order": 296
}