{ "id": 1555106, "name": "Manuel SANCHEZ and Arthur Sanchez, Petitioners, v. STATE of New Mexico, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Sanchez v. State", "decision_date": "1982-02-04", "docket_number": "No. 13803", "first_page": "445", "last_page": "447", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "97 N.M. 445" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "640 P.2d 1325" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "87 N.M. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2835733 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" }, { "page": "951" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/87/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 F.Supp. 1381", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3820414 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/399/1381-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 L.Ed.2d 145", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 S.Ct. 222", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "444 U.S. 911", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11385412, 11385321, 11385455, 11385366, 11385271, 11385209 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0911-05", "/us/444/0911-03", "/us/444/0911-06", "/us/444/0911-04", "/us/444/0911-02", "/us/444/0911-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568737 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 L.Ed.2d 248", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 S.Ct. 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 984", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6422592, 6423776, 6423682, 6422790, 6422888, 6423464, 6422991, 6423344, 6422704, 6423890, 6423162, 6423581 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0984-01", "/us/409/0984-11", "/us/409/0984-10", "/us/409/0984-03", "/us/409/0984-04", "/us/409/0984-08", "/us/409/0984-05", "/us/409/0984-07", "/us/409/0984-02", "/us/409/0984-12", "/us/409/0984-06", "/us/409/0984-09" ] }, { "cite": "462 F.2d 765", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1338747 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/462/0765-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Cal.Rptr. 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Cal.App.3d 959", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Or.App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or. App.", "case_ids": [ 2148722 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/27/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ariz. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 1534140 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/128/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 P.2d 1347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2872968 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "954" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 N.M. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5333672, 5336026, 5328933 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "decided under \u00a7 40A-16-11, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol.1964)" }, { "parenthetical": "decided under \u00a7 40A-16-11, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol.1964)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/82/0534-02", "/nm/82/0534-01", "/nm/82/0534-03" ] }, { "cite": "82 N.M. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5333146 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/82/0537-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 448, "char_count": 7423, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2800238127662766e-07, "percentile": 0.6172798105217717 }, "sha256": "abfbb216e1247e968b1d7934b93850137ffff48b8b7c926fc59ac8ac256955b3", "simhash": "1:ab6cca4f25e00528", "word_count": 1199 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:10:51.585150+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SOSA, Senior Justice, and PAYNE and FEDERICI, JJ., concur.", "EASLEY, C. J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "Manuel SANCHEZ and Arthur Sanchez, Petitioners, v. STATE of New Mexico, Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nRIORDAN, Justice.\nDefendants were indicted for \u201creceiving stolen property\u201d with a value exceeding $2,500, in violation of Section 30-16-11(A) and (F), N.M.S.A.1978, and as accessories under Section 30-1-13, N.M.S.A.1978. After a pre-trial hearing on a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, the trial court dismissed the indictment. The Court of Appeals summarily reversed the trial court. We granted certiorari, and we reverse the Court of Appeals.\nThe indictment alleges that on July 2, 1980, the defendants \u201creceived, retained or disposed\u201d of 72 different items that belonged to four separate parties. Under New Mexico law, it is unlawful to \u201creceive stolen property.\u201d Section 30-16-11(A), reads:\nReceiving stolen property means intentionally to receive, retain or dispose of stolen property knowing that it has been stolen or believing it has been stolen, unless the property is received, retained or disposed of with intent to restore it to the owner. [Emphasis added.]\nUnder Section 30-16-11(D) through (G), N.M.S.A.1978, penalties are set forth that increase as the value of the stolen property increases.\nThe statute contemplates that a person may commit \u201creceiving stolen property\u201d in one of three ways. The property may be \u201creceived\u201d, or the property may be \u201cretained\u201d, or the property may be \u201cdisposed\u201d of by a defendant. Proof of any one of these methods, coupled with the requisite knowledge, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. See State v. Carlton, 82 N.M. 537, 484 P.2d 757 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 82 N.M. 534, 484 P.2d 754 (1971) (decided under \u00a7 40A-16-11, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol.1964)).\nThe defendants allege that the properties belonged to four separate victims; therefore, the defendants should be charged with four separate counts. The indictment, however, cumulated the four charges for the purpose of enhancing the penalty, thereby making the crime a third degree felony.\nThe issue in this appeal is whether the property taken from more than one owner or at more than one time can be combined together into one count, thereby combining the values of the stolen items to increase the penalty.\n\u201cReceiving\u201d, \u201cretaining\u201d or \u201cdisposing\u201d of stolen property are separate crimes requiring different considerations. If the defendant is charged with \u201creceiving\u201d stolen property, each \u201creceiving\u201d of the stolen property is a separate crime and the defendant may be charged with a separate offense for each. State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 160, 560 P.2d 951 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347 (1977).\nIf the defendant received the stolen [property] ... at a time different from the time that he received the [other stolen property] ..., then there were two offenses for which two sentences would be imposed even though at the time of discovery defendant possessed all the stolen property involved.\nId. at 163, 560 P.2d at 954.\nIn Bell, the defendant was charged with two counts of receiving stolen property. On appeal, he contended that the possession of numerous items of stolen property amounted to one crime. The Court of Appeals ruled that since there was evidence showing two separate \u201creceivings\u201d, the defendant could be sentenced for two crimes.\nThe question that arises is if there is more than one \u201creceiving\u201d may the State combine the separate acts into one crime? The answer is that they may not. To allow the State to join or sever counts alleging \u201creceiving\u201d would violate the defendant\u2019s rights. It would allow the State to increase a misdemeanor to a felony by combining separate offenses to reach the statutory amount for a felony.\nHowever, if the indictment meant to charge the defendants with \u201cretaining\u201d stolen items owned by different individuals, then the defendant may be charged with only one count. The simultaneous possession of stolen items owned by different individuals is a single act constituting one offense. State v. Reisig, 128 Ariz. 60, 623 P.2d 849 (Ct.App.1980); State v. Gilbert, 27 Or.App. 1, 555 P.2d 31 (1976). In People v. Harris, 71 Cal.App.3d 959, 139 Cal.Rptr. 778 (1977), the defendants were convicted of nine counts of possession of stolen property. All the stolen items were seized from Harris\u2019 residence pursuant to a search warrant. Each item seized constituted an offense, for example, two televisions that were seized made up two offenses. The appellate court reversed the trial court holding that the defendant stood convicted of only one count of possession of stolen property.\nThus, the values of all the stolen items could be added together to reach a felony rather than separating the values by ownership or item.\nIf the indictment meant to charge the defendants with \u201cdisposing\u201d of stolen property, then the defendants may be charged with a separate count for each separate transaction of such disposure. See United States v. Schrenzel, 462 F.2d 765 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 984, 93 S.Ct. 325, 34 L.Ed.2d 248 (1972). In Schrenzel, the indictment charged four separate sales of drugs by the defendant on four separate days. The defendant argued that the sales of the drugs were a continuing transaction, thus there was only one offense instead of four. The court held that these were separate transactions. \u201c \u2018The test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each count requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.\u2019 \u201d (Citations omitted.) Id. at 771.\nIn the present case, if the defendants were charged with \u201cdisposing\u201d of stolen property on different occasions, each \u201cdisposing\u201d would constitute a separate count because different facts would be involved.\nWe have reviewed the indictment in this case which is extremely vague. The indictment in a single count stated that \u201cthe defendants \u2018received, retained and disposed\u2019 of stolen property.\u201d These offenses were not charged separately or plead in the alternative. Therefore, we determine that the trial court was correct in dismissing the indictment. We do not have a transcript of the motion hearing, but all doubts are resolved in favor of the trial court\u2019s ruling. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 93 N.M. 105, 597 P.2d 290, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 222, 62 L.Ed.2d 145 (1979).\nThe grand jury indictment is to inform the defendants of the nature of the charge so that surprise is avoided. United States v. Papia, 399 F.Supp. 1381 (E.D.Wis.1975). \u201cEvery accused has the right to be informed of the crime with which he is charged in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense.\u201d State v. Foster, 87 N.M. 155, 157, 530 P.2d 949, 951 (Ct.App.1974). Under this indictment, the defendant cannot tell whether he is being charged with \u201creceiving\u201d, \u201cretaining\u201d or \u201cdisposing\u201d of the stolen property, nor can it be determined whether the charges are being \u201cstacked\u201d to enhance the penalty.\nThe trial court was correct in its ruling that the indictment is faulty and must be dismissed.\nThe Court of Appeals is reversed; the district court is affirmed.\nSOSA, Senior Justice, and PAYNE and FEDERICI, JJ., concur.\nEASLEY, C. J., dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "RIORDAN, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Marchiondo & Berry, William C. Marchiondo, Albuquerque, for petitioners.", "Jeff Bingaman, Atty. Gen., Heidi Topp Brooks, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "640 P.2d 1325\nManuel SANCHEZ and Arthur Sanchez, Petitioners, v. STATE of New Mexico, Respondent.\nNo. 13803.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nFeb. 4, 1982.\nRehearing Denied Feb. 26, 1982.\nMarchiondo & Berry, William C. Marchiondo, Albuquerque, for petitioners.\nJeff Bingaman, Atty. Gen., Heidi Topp Brooks, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for respondent." }, "file_name": "0445-01", "first_page_order": 475, "last_page_order": 477 }