{
  "id": 1555178,
  "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John DOE, A Child, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Doe",
  "decision_date": "1982-02-04",
  "docket_number": "No. 5420",
  "first_page": "598",
  "last_page": "601",
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    "name": "N.M."
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    {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:10:51.585150+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "WALTERS, C. J., and HENDLEY, J., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John DOE, A Child, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "OPINION\nWOOD, Judge.\nThis appeal involves the order of the Children\u2019s Court transferring the child to District Court to be prosecuted on criminal charges, as an adult. We discuss: 1. psychological examination, 2. amenability to treatment or rehabilitation, and, 3. use of the child\u2019s statements.\nPsychological Examination:\nThe petition filed in Children\u2019s Court alleged delinquency on the basis of two murders in the first degree. The Children\u2019s Court attorney moved that the matter be transferred to District Court, and also moved that the child be directed to undergo a psychological evaluation. Such an evaluation was ordered on the question of whether the child was amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a child through available facilities. The \u201camenability\u201d question is involved in transfer proceedings. Sections 32-1-29 and 32-1-30, N.M.S.A.1978 (1981 Repl.Supp.).\nThe evaluation took place; the psychologist conducting the evaluation testified at the transfer hearing.\nThe child makes two claims. First, he asserts that the court lacked the authority to order the evaluation; that the only authority for a mental examination of a child is \u00a7 32-l-32(B), N.M.S.A.1978 (1981 Repl. Supp.), and that authority is limited to examination for competency. Second, he contends that testimony by the psychologist who conducted the examination violated the child\u2019s privilege against self-incrimination.\nBoth claims were answered, adverse to the child, in State v. Doe, 97 N.M. 263, 639 P.2d 72 (Ct.App.1981). The court may appoint experts under Evidence Rule 706. The psychologist\u2019s testimony does not indicate that he received any inculpatory statements from the child or that he relied on any such statements in making his evaluation.\nAmenability to Treatment or Rehabilitation :\nThe motion to transfer was based on \u00a7 32-1-30, supra. Section 32-1-30(A)(4), supra, requires the court to have \u201cconsidered whether the child is amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a child through available facilities .... \u201d Questions by the court at the transfer hearing show the court considered the amenability question. The court ruled that the child was not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation through available facilities.\nThe child contends the amenability ruling \u201cis not supported by the evidence and in fact contrary evidence was presented and that ultimately the Trial Court committed an abuse of discretion in ordering said Transfer to Criminal Court.\u201d\nThe child\u2019s argument is that the psychologist\u2019s testimony went only to treatment at facilities available in New Mexico; that a diagnostic report showed the child was amenable to treatment in facilities outside New Mexico. The report was introduced into evidence, but not included in the appellate record. We do not know whether the facilities out-of-New Mexico were available. See State v. Doe, 91 N.M. 506, 576 P.2d 1137 (Ct.App.1978).\nAssuming that the report showed available out-of-state facilities, this would not require a ruling by the court that the child was amenable to treatment through available facilities. The report was prepared four months prior to the homicides and five months prior to the transfer hearing. The court could properly consider the report as non-current. The court could also consider the psychologist\u2019s testimony that the report might be double edged; that the recommendation in the, report for out-of-state treatment might be genuine or might be an attempt to find an alternative to returning the child to his community and environment. There is no testimony explaining the contents of the report. An amenability ruling, favorable to retaining the child in Children\u2019s Court, was not required as a matter of law.\nThe amenability question does not proceed on the basis of the- sufficiency of the evidence to support a \u201cfinding.\u201d Section 32-1-30(A)(4), supra, requires consideration of the amenability question. \u201cFindings\u201d as to amenability are not a statutory requirement, nor are they a requirement under Children\u2019s Court Rule 43. If findings are made, the function of the finding is to show that consideration was given. On appeal, the issue is not the sufficiency of the evidence as to any amenability ruling; rather, the issue is whether the court\u2019s consideration of the amenability question was an abuse of discretion. State v. Doe, 93 N.M. 481, 601 P.2d 451 (Ct.App.1979). There was no abuse of discretion in this case.\nUse of Child\u2019s Statements :\nAlthough findings are not required on the amenability issue, \u00a7 32-1-30(A)(5), supra, requires a specific finding \u201cthat there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child committed the alleged delinquent act.\u201d There is no contention that the requisite finding was not made. See State v. Doe, 93 N.M. 481, 601 P.2d 451, supra. The claim is that the child\u2019s statements were used in connection with this finding and such use was improper.\nThe pertinent portions of \u00a7 32-1-27, N.M.S.A.1978 (1981 Repl.Supp.), are:\nC. No person subject to the provisions of the Children\u2019s Code who is alleged or suspected of being a delinquent child or a child in need of supervision may be interrogated or questioned without first advising the child of his constitutional rights and securing a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver.\nD. Before any statement or confession may be introduced at a trial or hearing when a child is alleged to be a child in need of supervision or a delinquent child, the state must prove that the statement or confession offered in evidence was elicited only after a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the child\u2019s constitutional rights was obtained.\n* * * * # *\nF. Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, no confessions, statements or admissions may be introduced against a child under the age of fifteen years prior to an adjudication on the allegations of the petition. [Emphasis added].\nParagraphs C and D go to custodial interrogation. See State v. Dominguez, Ct.App. 5490, decided January 7, 1982 and State v. Edwards, Ct.App. 4881, decided October 20, 1981 (21 S.B.B. 61). The court excluded evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant because the testimony revealed that the affidavit for the search warrant utilized a statement that the child made to law enforcement personnel. In finding reasonable grounds to believe (probable cause, see Children\u2019s Court Rule 43), that the child committed the two homicides the trial court stated that its ruling was not based on statements the child made to police officers. Use of \u201ccustodial\u201d,statements having been excluded, paragraphs C and D are not involved in the appellate issue.\nParagraph F is not limited to custodial questioning; it goes to statements, confessions or admissions of a child in any context. If the child is \u201cunder the age of fifteen years,\u201d his statements, confessions or admissions may not be introduced against him prior to an adjudication on the allegations of the petition. In finding reasonable grounds to believe that the child committed the homicides, the court relied on the testimony of three witnesses. This testimony was to the effect that the child did the killings. This testimony included statements and admissions made by the child, to the witnesses, at or near the place of the killings both before and after the killings.\nThe child asserts that his statements and admissions to the three witnesses could not be used. The court found that the child had \u201ca chronological age of 17 years and is of a mental age of 12 to 13 years. His ability to understand and comprehend the English language and make judgment decisions is the equivalent of a child with the chronological age of 12 to 13 years.\u201d On the basis of this finding, the child asserts he was under the age of fifteen years, and for this reason his statements and admissions could not be used. We disagree.\nThe numerous references to age in the children\u2019s code are references to years of age, not mental age. See \u00a7\u00a7 32-1-3(A) and (B), 32-1-9(A), 32-1-19(C), 32-1-20(A), 32-1-27(1), 32-1-29(A)(1), 32-1-30(A)(1), N.M.S.A.1978 (1981 Repl.Supp.). A \u201cyear\u201d is a period of solar days. Webster\u2019s, Third New International Dictionary, (1966). Compare Matter of Doe, 89 N.M. 507, 554 P.2d 669 (Ct.App.1976).\nThe age of fifteen years means the passage of fifteen of the units of time which are called years. Paragraph F does not refer to \u201cmental age,\u201d and does not exclude use of the admissions and statements made by the child to the three witnesses.\nThe order of transfer is affirmed.\nIt is so ordered.\nWALTERS, C. J., and HENDLEY, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WOOD, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Thomas J. Horne, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant.",
      "Jeff Bingaman, Atty. Gen., Anthony Tupler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "642 P.2d 201\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John DOE, A Child, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 5420.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nFeb. 4, 1982.\nWrit of Certiorari Denied March 18, 1982.\nThomas J. Horne, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant.\nJeff Bingaman, Atty. Gen., Anthony Tupler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0598-01",
  "first_page_order": 628,
  "last_page_order": 631
}