{ "id": 1555073, "name": "Rita SCHALL, and Rita Schall as next friend of Fernando Griego, Raymond Griego and Louis Griego, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Thelma B. SCHALL, Individually, as a mother and next friend of Andrea Dawn Schall, A minor and dependent child of Ronald Schall, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JACK'S TREE AND SHRUBBERY SERVICE, and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Schall ex rel. Griego v. Schall ex rel. Schall", "decision_date": "1982-02-25", "docket_number": "Nos. 5197, 5123", "first_page": "665", "last_page": "670", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "97 N.M. 665" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "642 P.2d 1124" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "93 N.M. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568654 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 P.2d 286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568707 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "593 P.2d 1078", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 804", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557144 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0804-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575459 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 P.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2838672 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 N.M. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5321793 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/73/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 P.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571156 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 P.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573146 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2870207 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 P.2d 991", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573145 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 N.M. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841871 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1936, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/40/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2865518 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/89/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 N.M. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5373068 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/75/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 N.M. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2830312 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/87/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 N.M. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1565123 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1941, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/45/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571150 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0162-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 869, "char_count": 18464, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.796484210511943e-08, "percentile": 0.45714228899059367 }, "sha256": "6aed8ee1c2c310b13a62e24ddd60a8f85d6e0a0c73dd9ce63598dad9b96daa7e", "simhash": "1:247eaa8f9ccdc856", "word_count": 3004 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:10:51.585150+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WALTERS, C. J., and LOPEZ, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "Rita SCHALL, and Rita Schall as next friend of Fernando Griego, Raymond Griego and Louis Griego, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Thelma B. SCHALL, Individually, as a mother and next friend of Andrea Dawn Schall, A minor and dependent child of Ronald Schall, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JACK\u2019S TREE AND SHRUBBERY SERVICE, and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nDONNELLY, Judge.\nThese actions arise out of a dispute between two claimants, Thelma and Rita Schall (decedent\u2019s second and third wives, respectively), each alleging herself to be the surviving widow of Ronald Schall and seeking, under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, widow\u2019s and children\u2019s benefits as the result of his work-related death on July 7, 1979.\nOn April 1, 1980, Rita Schall individually and as next friend of her children Fernando Griego, Raymond Griego and Louis Griego, filed a workmen\u2019s compensation action against decedent\u2019s employer, Jack\u2019s Tree and Shrubbery Service and its insurer, United States Fidelity and Guaranty, Inc.\nThereafter, Thelma brought a separate action against defendants seeking widow\u2019s and children\u2019s benefits on behalf of herself and her minor daughter, Andrea Schall. Thelma alleged that she was still lawfully married to decedent at the time of his death, and that she and decedent\u2019s minor daughter were legally entitled to his support.\nDefendants filed answers to the two claims, denied plaintiffs respective allegations, except for the occurrence of the fatal injury to Ronald Schall. Defendants asserted that they had received conflicting claims for decedent\u2019s benefits and were uncertain as to which parties were lawfully entitled to them. Defendant employer had previously filed a third-party complaint against Thelma and her daughter, Andrea, asking the court to determine what, if any, rights, these plaintiffs had as dependents of decedent. The separate actions were consolidated for trial.\nAfter hearing on the merits, the court entered findings and conclusions awarding compensation benefits to decedent\u2019s third wife, Rita. It denied benefits to decedent\u2019s second wife, Thelma. It awarded equal children\u2019s benefits to decedent\u2019s three stepchildren from his marriage to Rita, and to his natural daughter by Thelma, and awarded equal attorney\u2019s fees to both Rita and Thelma. Both claimants appeal from the judgment.\nThe principal points asserted in the two appeals are:\nClaim of Thelma Schall:\n(1) The trial court erred in failing to find that she was entitled to benefits as the rightful widow of decedent.\nClaim of Rita Schall:\n(2) The trial court erred in failing to award compensation benefits as required by statute;\n(3) The court abused its discretion in its award of attorney\u2019s fees to both claimants.\nI. Thelma Schall\u2019s Appeal:\nOn appeal, Thelma argues that she, and not Rita was decedent\u2019s lawful widow and thus entitled to the award of widow\u2019s benefits.\nThelma further argues that \u00a7 52-1-17, N.M.S.A.1978, of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act does not require that a wife be actually dependent upon her husband for support to recover compensation benefits in the event of his death. The failure of a deceased workman to support a wife or children before death' is not determinative of the issue of dependency and constitutes only one of several factors which may be considered. Kau v. Bennett, 91 N.M. 162, 571 P.2d 819 (Ct.App.1977); In re Tocci, 45 N.M. 133, 112 P.2d 515 (1941).\nSection 52-1-17, supra, of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act specifies that, in the event of the death of a workman:\n[T]he following persons, and they only, shall be deemed dependents and entitled to compensation under the provisions of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act:\nA. a child under eighteen years of age incapable of self-support and unmarried or under twenty-three years of age if enrolled as a full-time student in any accredited educational institution;\nB. the widow or widower, only if living with the deceased at the time of his death, or legally entitled to support from, including a divorced spouse entitled to alimony;\nThe relation of dependency must exist at the time of the injury.\nIn New Mexico, where the validity of a subsequent marriage is attacked on the basis of the continuing existence of a prior marriage at the time the second was contracted, a presumption of validity attaches to the last marriage. Panzer v. Panzer, 87 N.M. 29, 528 P.2d 888 (1974); see also Trower v. Board of County Commissioners, 75 N.M. 125, 401 P.2d 109 (1965); Lauderdale v. Hydro Conduit Corp., 89 N.M. 579, 555 P.2d 700 (Ct.App.1976). As held in Panzer, the quantum of proof required to overcome the presumption of validity of a subsequent marriage is \u201cclear and convincing evidence.\u201d Panzer quotes with approval the following language from In re Jubala\u2019s Estate, 40 N.M. 312, 59 P.2d 356 (1936):\nTo overcome the prima facie case established by the showing of subsequent marriage, proof of a former marriage is required, and also evidence from which it may be concluded that it has not been dissolved by death or divorce.\nDecedent and Thelma Schall were married in Illinois on March 18,1969. They separated informally in June, 1969, and decedent left Illinois. Subsequently, their one child, Andrea Dawn, was born August 12, 1969.\nDecedent married Rita in New Mexico in April, 1979. She had three minor children from a prior marriage. Three months later, decedent was killed in a motor vehicle accident which occurred during the course and scope of his employment.\nThelma testified that after decedent left Illinois, her contacts with him were few. She received a letter from decedent in May of 1970, advising her that he had obtained a divorce from her while living in New Mexico, but providing no other details. Thelma never received formal notice or documents pertaining to a divorce from decedent, and was never apprised as to when or where any divorce was filed or formalized. Thelma presented evidence at trial that she and decedent had lived during their marriage in the same home in Medora, Illinois, that she still occupies. Decedent knew at all times where she resided. She also testified that she had never sought or obtained a legal separation or divorce. Decedent\u2019s letter was not tendered into evidence as an exhibit, nor was evidence presented at trial that officially confirmed the granting of a divorce.\nPursuant to N.M.R.Evid. 803(10), N.M.S. A.1978, Thelma introduced affidavits from the district court clerks of each of the judicial districts in New Mexico. The affidavits stated that no records of a divorce proceeding or final decree existed in which Ronald Schall was a party. Thelma asserts that this was clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that decedent\u2019s second marriage was valid. She contends that since the affidavits indicated decedent had not been divorced in New Mexico, decedent\u2019s subsequent marriage to Rita was legally invalid because of a prior existing valid marriage.\nIn arriving at its final decision, the trial court made findings of fact that, after decedent separated from Thelma in June, 1969, he was a long-distance truck driver who traveled throughout the continental United States; that he did not have a permanent residence or mailing address prior to April 6, 1979, when Rita and decedent were married in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The trial court further found that in May, 1970, Thelma was notified by decedent that he had obtained a divorce from her.\nThe standard of review applicable as to whether a presumption has been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence was set forth in Estate of Fletcher v. Jackson, 94 N.M. 572, 613 P.2d 714 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 674, 615 P.2d 991 (1980):\nIt is for the fact finder ... to determine whether the proof requirement had been met; the appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and determines whether the fact finder could properly have determined whether the proof requirement had been met.\nThelma presented evidence that decedent did not obtain a divorce in New Mexico. This fact did not negate by clear and convincing evidence the presumption of validity of decedent\u2019s marriage to Rita in 1979. During the ten-year interval between marriages, it is undisputed that he traveled extensively throughout the United States. Whether or not decedent was validly divorced in a jurisdiction other than New Mexico was not established.\nThe evidence also indicated that decedent had been married and divorced before he married Thelma. Decedent was cognizant of the steps necessary to legally dissolve an existing marriage.\nNot only was the evidence insufficient to rebut the presumption that Rita\u2019s marriage was valid, its validity was supported by substantial evidence. Findings of fact supported by substantial evidence will not be overturned on appeal. Boone v. Boone, 90 N.M. 466, 565 P.2d 337 (1977); Den-Gar Enterprises v. Romero, 94 N.M. 425, 611 P.2d 1119 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 628, 614 P.2d 545 (1980); Den-Gar explains that substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\nThe evidence adduced in the trial below supports the trial court\u2019s findings and conclusions that decedent was validly married to Rita at the time of his death. Lauderdale v. Hydro Conduit Corp., supra.\nII. Rita Schall\u2019s Appeal:\nA) Computation of Survivors\u2019 Benefits:\nRita challenges the trial court\u2019s computation and distribution of survivors\u2019 benefits to herself, her three children, (decedent\u2019s stepchildren), and decedent\u2019s natural daughter from his marriage to Thelma.\nThe parties stipulated that at the time of his death, decedent was earning $6.00 per hour, working an average of forty hours a week, and making an average weekly wage of $240.00, two-thirds of which is $160.00.\nThe trial court\u2019s conclusion of law no. 4 awarded benefits as follows:\n4. Workmen\u2019s compensation payments as of the date of death, required to be paid by Jack\u2019s Tree and Shrubbery Service and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Company, are as follows:\nA. Rita C. Schall, 40% or $64.00/week\nB. Fernando Griego, Jr. 15% or $24.00/week\nC. Raymond Griego, 15% or $24.00/week\nD. Louis Griego, 15% or $24.00/weelc\nE. Andrea Schall 15% or $24.00/week\nIn making its computation, the court obviously took 40% of two-thirds of decedent\u2019s average weekly wage (40% of $160), and distributed the remaining 60% of $160.00 between the four children.\nRita argues that the court\u2019s computation does not comport with \u00a7 52-1-46(C)(3), N.M.S.A., 1978. It provides that upon the death of a covered employee, benefits are to be distributed as follows:\n[To] the widow or widower if there be a child or children living with the widow or widower, forty-five percent of the average weekly wage of deceased, or forty percent, if such child is not or all such children are not living with a widow or widower, and in addition thereto, compensation benefits for the child or children which shall make the total benefits for the widow or widower and child or children sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the average weekly wage of the deceased. When there are two or more children, the compensation benefits payable on account of such children shall be divided among such children, share and share alike;\nRita contends that the trial court should have awarded her 40% of the average weekly wage of decedent, (40% of $240) and awarded the children the difference between 40% and 66 and %% of the average weekly wage of decedent, (or 16%%), share and share alike.\nAlthough \u00a7 52-1-46, supra, delineates the compensation benefits payable upon the death of a workman, it is expressly limited by the language of Subsection G thereof, which provides:\nG. no compensation benefits payable by reason of a workman\u2019s death shall exceed the maximum weekly compensation benefits as provided in Section 52-1-41 NMSA 1978 and no dependent nor any class thereof, other than a widow, widower or children, shall in any event be paid total benefits in excess of seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500) exclusive of funeral expenses and the expenses provided for medical and hospital services for the deceased paid for by the employer.\nRita agrees that \u00a7 52-1-41(A), N.M.S.A. 1978, limits workmen\u2019s compensation benefits to the lesser of either two-thirds of a workman\u2019s average weekly wage of $96.00 or the state maximum, which was $186.38 at the time of decedent\u2019s death.\nUnder \u00a7 52-1-46, supra, for purposes of awarding survivor\u2019s benefits, dependent minor stepchildren, whether adopted or not, and natural children are treated equally, and each is entitled to share alike. See \u00a7 52-1-18, N.M.S.A.1978; Shahan v. Beasley Hot Shot Service, Inc., 91 N.M. 462, 575 P.2d 1347 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 491, 576 P.2d 297 (1978).\nSection 52-1-46(C)(3) supra, unequivocally awards a widow or widower of a deceased workman 40% of the average weekly wage of the workman, where decedent left surviving him a minor child or children, one or more of whom are not living with the surviving spouse. Section 52-1-41(A), supra, and the remaining provisions of \u00a7 52-1-46(C)(3), supra, set out the outer limits of the total recovery.\nUnder \u00a7 52-1-46(C)(3), supra, Rita was thus entitled to 40% of decedent\u2019s average weekly wage of $240.00, (40% X $240.00), amounting to a weekly award of $96.00. Decedent\u2019s three stepchildren from his marriage to Rita Schall and his natural daughter are entitled to one-fourth each of the sum of $64.00, the remaining 26%% of decedent\u2019s average weekly wage.\nThe award to Rita and decedent\u2019s children and stepchildren was erroneous. Rita should receive $96.00 per week, and the children, $16.00 per week per child, for a maximum of 600 weeks.\nThis award is, however, subject to modification in the event the children lose their status as dependents as provided in \u00a7 52-1-46(C)(3), N.M.S.A.1978, or in the event decedent\u2019s widow dies or remarries. Section 52-1-46, supra; Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Jarde, 73 N.M. 371, 388 P.2d 382 (1963).\nIII. Award of Attorney\u2019s Fees:\nRita asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding identical sums as attorney\u2019s fees for Thelma and Rita.\nFinding of fact no. 17 reads:\nEach Plaintiff should receive a reasonable award of attorney\u2019s fees to be paid to Plaintiff\u2019s counsel and considering the offers of Defendants, and chilling effect of miserly fees, time and effort of attorney, and extent, novelty, complexity and parties involved in the issues, fees normally charged, the reputation, ability, experience, and skill of the attorney, and relative success, the amount involved, and the rate of inflation, each Plaintiff is allowed $2,250 plus tax, as compensation for their attorney.\nThe final judgment entered specified that \u201c[defendants shall pay to each plaintiff\u2019s attorney $2,250.00, plus tax, as reasonable attorney\u2019s fees or a total of $4,500.00, plus tax.\u201d\nNeither counsel for Thelma or Rita presented any evidence at trial as to attorney\u2019s fees. At the conclusion of trial, the court stated to counsel that he was requesting \u201caffidavits from the attorneys as to those matters that they want me to consider on attorney\u2019s fees filed no later than a week from today, and I would like requested findings and conclusions of law, if you desire them, no later than a week from today.\u201d\nCounsel for Thelma and Rita submitted extensive affidavits detailing the nature and extent of work performed by them on behalf of their respective clients. No stipulation appears of record affirmatively indicating agreement on the part of the parties or the court that the affidavits be considered as evidence in fixing the award of attorney\u2019s fees. However, no objection to consideration of the affidavits was voiced by plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys or defense counsel. Rita did not request findings of fact or conclusions of law relating to an award of attorney\u2019s fees. On appeal, no issue has been raised as to the propriety of the award of attorney\u2019s fees based on the matters contained in the affidavits submitted by counsel.\nWhere the trial court alerts the parties of its intent to consider specific evidence, or requests the parties to submit matters for its consideration and the parties comply, making no objection to the use of such evidence or documents, the court\u2019s reliance on such evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Medina v. Zia Co., 88 N.M. 615, 544 P.2d 1180 (Ct.App.1975), cert. denied, 89 N.M. 6, 546 P.2d 71 (1976).\nA party\u2019s failure to submit a request for a finding of fact or conclusion of law as to the award of attorney\u2019s fees or the amount thereof precludes our review of the issue on appeal. Lopez v. K. B. Kennedy Engineering Co., 95 N.M. 507, 623 P.2d 1021 (Ct.App.1981). This court is not inclined to second-guess the trial judge in his determination as to the reasonableness of an award of attorney\u2019s fees unless there is a lack of evidentiary basis for the court\u2019s determination or unless the court has been shown to have clearly abused its discretion. Lopez v. K. B. Kennedy Engineering Co., supra; Lamont v. New Mexico Military Institute, 92 N.M. 804, 595 P.2d 774 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 675, 593 P.2d 1078 (1979); Marez v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 93 N.M. 9, 595 P.2d 1204 (Ct.App.1978), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 532, 591 P.2d 286 (1979).\nThe trial court\u2019s finding of fact no. 17 affirmatively indicates consideration of each of the factors enumerated in Fryar v. Johnsen, 93 N.M. 485, 601 P.2d 718 (1979).\nWe affirm the trial court on the issues raised on appeal relating to its award to Rita of survivor\u2019s benefits herein, and the award of attorney\u2019s fees. That portion of the final judgment calculating the amount of benefits to be awarded to Rita, decedent\u2019s child and stepchildren is reversed for the award of benefits consistent with this opinion. Thelma will bear her own costs on appeal; defendants who took no part in defending Rita\u2019s or the children\u2019s right to compensation should pay the sum of $2,000 to Rita as reasonable attorney\u2019s fee for successful efforts on appeal. .\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nWALTERS, C. J., and LOPEZ, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "DONNELLY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Victor Roybal, Jr., Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant Thelma Schall.", "Maria G. Geer, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant Rita Schall.", "Hal Simmons, Albuquerque, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "642 P.2d 1124\nRita SCHALL, and Rita Schall as next friend of Fernando Griego, Raymond Griego and Louis Griego, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Thelma B. SCHALL, Individually, as a mother and next friend of Andrea Dawn Schall, A minor and dependent child of Ronald Schall, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JACK\u2019S TREE AND SHRUBBERY SERVICE, and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Defendants-Appellees.\nNos. 5197, 5123.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nFeb. 25, 1982.\nVictor Roybal, Jr., Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant Thelma Schall.\nMaria G. Geer, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant Rita Schall.\nHal Simmons, Albuquerque, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0665-01", "first_page_order": 695, "last_page_order": 700 }