{ "id": 1582510, "name": "William R. WILSON, d/b/a Skylard Agency Real Estate, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David HAYNER, Lillian N. Hayner and Roger Hayner, Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Wilson v. Hayner", "decision_date": "1982-08-03", "docket_number": "No. 5335", "first_page": "514", "last_page": "517", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "98 N.M. 514" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "650 P.2d 36" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "72 N.M. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2854460 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/72/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8504699 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 N.M. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2805098 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 N.M. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590381 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/60/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 N.M. 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5377551 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/75/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Cal.Rptr. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Or. 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or.", "case_ids": [ 4448751 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1908, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or/52/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 S.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Va. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va.", "case_ids": [ 2061378 ], "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/va/197/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 N.M. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5363411 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/81/0410-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 547, "char_count": 10025, "ocr_confidence": 0.799, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0895487181225579e-07, "percentile": 0.5653134603600442 }, "sha256": "4156a4507c3bc8cdf395aa02ddd535468434d96f673971771defa2d5f6474acb", "simhash": "1:5350f685a1ce9b66", "word_count": 1616 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:49.367595+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "LOPEZ and DONNELLY, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "William R. WILSON, d/b/a Skylard Agency Real Estate, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David HAYNER, Lillian N. Hayner and Roger Hayner, Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSUTIN, Judge.\nWilson, a real estate broker, sued the Hayners [Hayner], owners of land, for a real estate commission. The jury rendered a verdict for Hayner and Wilson appeals from the judgment. We affirm.\nWilson claims the trial court erred (1) in denying admission of certain evidence, (2) in refusing to instruct on Hayner\u2019s duties to Wilson, and (3) in giving certain instructions.\nA. There was no error in denial of evidence.\nDuring the course of trial, Wilson sought the admission in evidence of a warranty deed and a purchase and sales contract involving partial sales of Hayner\u2019s land. These sales occurred after the expiration of Wilson\u2019s listing agreement with Hayner and ten months after this action was filed.\nWilson claims this evidence was relevant to show (1) that Hayner prevented Wilson from introducing other qualified buyers to Hayner, including the two who purchased land from Hayner, and (2) that the prospective purchaser himself was a qualified buyer. We disagree. Wilson cites no authority to support his position.\nRule 401 of the Rules of Evidence states:\n\u201cRelevant evidence\u201d means evidence having a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\nIn other words, under this rule, there must be an important fact in the case to be determined. To establish this fact, a party submits evidence. If the evidence tends to make the existence of the fact more probable, the evidence is relevant. If less probable, the evidence is not relevant. Whatever naturally and logically tends to establish a fact in issue is relevant. The determination of relevancy, as well as materiality, rests largely within the discretion of the trial court. Wright v. Brem, 81 N.M. 410, 467 P.2d 736 (Ct.App.1970).\nThe facts to be determined are stated above. They are important facts because they are the basis of Wilson\u2019s complaint. The question is:\nDid the deed and the purchase and sale contract of portions of Hayner\u2019s land, transactions between Hayner and other purchasers after the listing agreement with Wilson had expired, tend to make the existence of those facts more probable or less probable than they would be without the evidence?\nWith reference to whether evidence of the subsequent sales were relevant to show that the prospective purchaser was a qualified buyer, the documents offered in evidence had no relationship with the prospective purchaser with whom Hayner was dealing. The evidence did not in any way tend to make more probable the existence of the fact that the prospective purchaser was a qualified buyer.\nNeither did the subsequent sales by Hayner to other purchasers tend to make more probable the existence of the fact that Hayner prevented Wilson from introducing other qualified buyers to Hayner, including the two who subsequently purchased land from Hayner.\nWilson argues that Hayner had a duty to inform Wilson about Hayner\u2019s negotiations with the prospective purchaser; that Hayner did not tell Wilson of disagreements that existed between Hayner and the prospective purchaser, and that Hayner \u201cprevented\u201d Wilson from introducing other qualified buyers such as the two who later purchased portions of Hayner\u2019s land after the listing expired and ten months after this action was filed. Therefore, Wilson claims the deed and the purchase and sale contract were relevant evidence.\nIn the owner-broker relationship, the contractual duties of the owner are to compensate the broker for services rendered in accordance with the contract of employment and to exercise good faith toward the broker so long as the relationship exists. Campbell v. Sickels, 197 Va. 298, 89 S.E.2d 14 (1955); Jennings v. Trummer, 52 Or. 149, 96 P. 874 (1908); 12 Am.Jur.2d Brokers \u00a7 100 (1964). The owner-broker relationship existed between February 14,1979 and February 14, 1980, the period during which the listing agreement was in effect.\n\u201cIn its traditional sense good faith connotes a moral quality; it is equated with honesty of purpose, freedom from fraudulent intent and faithfulness to duty or obligation.\u201d Raab v. Casper, 51 C.A.3d 866, 124 Cal.Rptr. 590, 593 (1975).\nHayner\u2019s only duty to Wilson was to act in good faith toward effecting a sale of his land to the prospective purchaser supplied by Wilson. This duty did not include a repetitious report to Wilson of the progress of the negotiations. It is not a duty based upon a fiduciary relationship. Wilson owed Hayner a fiduciary duty. Iriart v. Johnson, 75 N.M. 745, 411 P.2d 226 (1965). This fiduciary duty was not reciprocal. If Wilson desired information on the progress of Hayner\u2019s negotiations, inquiry should have been made.\nCity of Clovis v. Archie, 60 N.M. 239, 241, 290 P.2d 1075 (1955) defines \u201cprevent\u201d as \u201ckeep from happening, hinder, frustrate.\u201d Hayner did not keep Wilson from introducing other qualified buyers, including the two who subsequently purchased land. If Wilson was hindered or frustrated during the period of negotiations, it was due to his failure to make inquiry. Wilson was free to supply as many qualified buyers as he deemed necessary in compliance with his listing agreement.\nWilson\u2019s syllogism is erroneous in several respects: (1) in negotiations with the prospective purchaser presented by Wilson, Hayner acted in good faith; (2) on December 5, 1979, Wilson knew that the prospective sale had fallen through. The listing agreement expired February 14, 1980. During this interim period, Wilson failed to locate, pursue or produce any other buyers ready, willing and able to buy, including the two known to Wilson who did purchase portions of Hayner\u2019s land after the listing expired; (3) whether any would have been ready, willing and able to buy is pure speculation; and (4) Hayner did not \u201cprevent\u201d Wilson from pursuing his duties. All that Wilson wanted was payment of a commission from Hayner which the jury denied.\nThe deed and purchase and sale agreement were not relevant evidence and the denial of their admission in evidence was a correct ruling.\nB. Denial of Wilson\u2019s requested instruction was proper.\nWilson tendered an instruction on the issues which set forth one duty for Wilson and five duties for Hayner. Wilson claims the court refused to instruct the jury about Hayner\u2019s legal duties to Wilson as his theory of the case. His theory of the case was:\n8. Sellers directly or ' indirectly through their actions have prevented the performance of the listing agreement which by its terms entitles Plaintiff to his commission.\nThe court instructed the jury:\nPlaintiff claims:\n(c) That he is entitled to the commission under the listing agreement because he was prevented by one or more of the defendants by their actions from performing under the listing agreement.\nThe trial court instructed the jury on Wilson\u2019s theory as to the duty of Hayner.\nWilson\u2019s requested instruction also included duties of Hayner to exercise due diligence, act in good faith, communicate to Wilson the change in terms and the reason, and communicate to Wilson reasons for refusing to complete a transaction. These duties fall within the theory of \u201cprevention.\u201d If uncertainty should be claimed with reference to this conclusion, Wilson did not plead these duties in his complaint.\nWilson slanted this instruction to place heavy burdens on Hayner during the jury\u2019s deliberations. Such instructions frustrate the intent of the law. \u201cMany miscarriages of justice result from the highly technical nature of jury instructions.\u201d UJI, p. 7. The purpose of instructing the jury is to make the issues to be determined plain and clear. Haynes v. Hockenhull, 74 N.M. 329, 393 P.2d 444 (1964). No statement should be included which is likely to confuse or mislead the jury. Embrey v. Galentin, 76 N.M. 719, 418 P.2d 62 (1966).\nWilson claims these burdens were dictated by Southwest Motel Brokers, Inc. v. Alamo Hotels, Inc., 72 N.M. 227, 382 P.2d 707 (1963). This case does not recognize or create the legal duties enumerated in Wilson\u2019s requested instruction. It dealt solely with the issue as to whether a broker is entitled to a commission where the seller, without reason, refused to consummate a sale to a ready, willing and able purchaser. Furthermore, unlike Southwest, the potential buyer refused to consummate the sale, not Hayner. An instruction on the issues is the most important single instruction in the lawsuit. The court and lawyers should give particular attention to its finalization. The court did.\nWilson\u2019s requested instruction was properly denied.\nC. Certain instructions given were not prejudicially erroneous.\nInstruction No. 2 given was the first paragraph of UJI 8.20 entitled \u201cFraudulent misrepresentation.\u201d Wilson objected \u201con the grounds that before fraud is established, there has to be some detriment or some damage shown and there is no evidence of any damage or any detriment to the defendants.\u201d Hayner asked for no affirmative relief by way of damages. The last paragraph of UJI 8.20 reads:\nIf you find these four elements, the other party can recover damages proximately resulting from the fraudulent misrepresentation.\nThis paragraph was omitted.\nInstructions No. 3 and 4 given are UJI 8.5 and 8.2 respectively under the subject matter of Contracts. Wilson, not Hayner tendered the first sentence of UJI 8.5. This was refused. The trial court added thereon appropriate parts of the instruction. Wilson cannot complain. Wilson\u2019s objection to UJI 8.2 was innocuous.\nThe trial court properly instructed the jury.\nAffirmed. Wilson shall pay the costs of this appeal.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nLOPEZ and DONNELLY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "SUTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Pedro G. Rael, Los Lunas, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Stephen A. Hubert, Martin, Cresswell & Hubert, P.A., Las Cruces, for defendantsappellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "650 P.2d 36\nWilliam R. WILSON, d/b/a Skylard Agency Real Estate, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David HAYNER, Lillian N. Hayner and Roger Hayner, Defendants-Appellees.\nNo. 5335.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nAug. 3, 1982.\nPedro G. Rael, Los Lunas, for plaintiff-appellant.\nStephen A. Hubert, Martin, Cresswell & Hubert, P.A., Las Cruces, for defendantsappellees." }, "file_name": "0514-01", "first_page_order": 552, "last_page_order": 555 }